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ABSTRACT 
Children’s health service rights and the issue of consent 
P. S Mahery 
Although the concept of human rights is very much accepted as part of human existence 
throughout the world today there is still much controversy surrounding the idea of rights 
for children. The Constitution however not only recognises the fact that like all other 
members of society, children are capable of being bearers of human rights but emphasises 
also the special position of children in society by granting them specific rights in the 
Constitution. Health rights are particularly important for children as the entitlements and 
obligations created by such rights are necessary for children to realise their full potential. 
In this thesis the entitlements and obligations attached to children’s health service rights 
in the Constitution are explored. The extents to which these rights are respected are also 
considered with a particular focus on consent laws. Through consent laws children in 
certain age groups are given decision making powers relating to their health care. A 
unique relationship exists between the issue of consent and children’s right to health care 
services. This relationship becomes more apparent when one investigates the impact that 
legislative ages of consent has on those children assumed to be incompetent to consent 
because they are below the age of consent. In this thesis an impact analysis of consent 
provisions and the use of ages of consent is undertaken in respect of provisions contained 
in the Children’s Act.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
For centuries children were regarded as being incapable of possessing their own rights. 
However a worldwide conversion to a culture of respect for human rights gradually saw 
to it that the rights of children received recognition and acceptance globally. This thesis 
examines a particularly important right guaranteed in the South African Constitution to 
everyone including and specifically to children, namely, health as a human right.  
 
In the context of this thesis, the significance of health as a human right in South Africa 
today is largely due to the history of the health system in the pre-democratic South 
Africa.1 This history illustrates the limited and sometimes lack of health entitlements for 
the majority of South Africans and also the limited responsibilities taken on by the then 
undemocratic-state in respect of health needs for the larger part of the South African 
communities.2 The need to ‘heal the injustices of the past [in the health system]’3 and to 
transform it into one based on constitutional values resulted in a shift from past practices 
and an acknowledgement of the significance of health as a human right. This ‘shift’ and 
‘acknowledgment’ is illustrated by the inclusion of health rights in the Final Constitution 
                                                 
1 This history has been well documented. See for example, J Heaton and E Davie (1991)  South African 
Human Rights and Labour Law Yearbook 19 at 19. South Africa’s historical and political context is also 
outlined in, In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 
1253 (CC) paras 5 -13.  C Ngwena (2000) Journal for Juridical Science 1 at 4-5. See also K Pillay (2003) 
Law, Democracy and Development 55 at 56. J Mubangizi (2002) TSAR 343 at 346. S Liebenberg and K 
Pillay (eds)  (2002) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Resource Book  224. 
2 See L London (2004) Health and Human Rights 1 where the author notes ‘Apartheid laws created the 
homelands system as the cornerstone of ‘separate development,’ depriving black South Africans of 
citizenship and confining them to underdeveloped and impoverished homelands generating a legacy of 
death and disease due to undernutrition, tuberculosis, and infantile gastroenteritis, illustrating starkly the 
impact of human rights violations on health’ at 2-3. See also S Khoza (ed) (2007) Socio-economic rights in 
South Africa: a Resource book  at 276. 
3 Preamble of the Constitution. 
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despite strong opposition to the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution 
generally.4  
 
Given the position that children hold in society, to be able to share in entitlements created 
by rights as significant as health rights is a great advantage for them in many respects. 
                                                 
4 The debates surrounding the inclusion of socio-economic rights were very contentious. Although there 
was general consensus that civil and political rights had a place in the Interim Constitution there were 
different opinions about the need for socio-economic rights in the Interim or the Final Constitution. ‘On the 
one hand it was argued that if socio-economic rights were not given meaningful protection by the 
Constitution then the legitimacy of the Constitution would suffer because people would be bound to say it 
does not deal with their most fundamental needs. On the other hand it was argued that it would be equally 
erosive to the legitimacy of the Constitution if it promised too much.’ See C Heyns and D Brand (1998) 
Law, Democracy and Development at 153. See also, N Haysom (1992) South African Journal on Human 
Rights   451 where this debate was also explored. Claims were made that socio-economic rights were not 
justiciable and thus had no place in the Constitution. The main arguments against constitutional protection 
of socio-economic rights were founded in the distinction made between such rights and civil and political 
rights. See in this regard again N Haysom at 458-461. This distinction between socio-economic rights and 
civil and political rights has often been criticised as being false. See B de Villiers (1994) ‘Social and 
economic rights’ in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers and D Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism: 
The new South African legal order 599 at 622-625:   The debate on the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights was  put to rest by the Constitutional Court in the First Certification judgment (and subsequent 
judgments) when the Court held that socio economic rights are to some extent justiciable (enforceable) and 
‘at the very minimum, socio economic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion’. See Ex 
Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996, 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) at para 78. For more on the debates and the drafting history of 
socio economic rights see generally, J Mubangizi ‘The constitutional protection of socio-economic rights in 
selected African countries: A comparative evaluation’ (2006) 1 African Journal of Legal Studies 1 at 2.  
See also B De Villiers at 622-626 and P de Vos (1995) SAPR/PL at 236-239 and  See S Khoza ‘The 
importance of a dialogue on strategies to promote socio-economic rights in South Africa’ ESR Review 
(2006) vol 7  6 at 7.   
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This thesis explores those advantages created through health rights for children and also 
looks at challenges emanating from attempts to implement children’s health rights. 
Before an outline of the general content of the chapters is given there are two things 
which must be mentioned at the outset for the benefit of the reader. The first issue relates 
to certain aspects relevant to the investigation about to be embarked on which are not 
considered in this thesis and the second relates to the terminology used throughout the 
thesis. 
 
1.1 EXCLUSIONS   
Although an attempt to explore every single aspect relevant to this investigation could 
have added a great deal to this thesis a broad and unfocused child rights discussion on the 
issue would overshadow the main focus of the thesis and run the risk of frustrating rather 
then enlightening the reader. Thus, some relevant and equally important aspects of the 
issue of children’s health rights are not explored, for example children’s health rights in 
international law5 is not particularly focused on but it is equally relevant to this issue. 
This is so especially given the fact that South Africa has ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child6 (CRC) as well as the African Charter on the 
                                                 
5 The right to health is found in international instruments like Article 12 of  The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, entered into force 3 September 1981, As well 
as in Article 5 of  The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 
entered  into force 4 January 1969.  For a reference on other international instruments in which the right to 
health appear see the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment 14 ‘The right 
to the highest attainable standard of health’  at para 2. See also A Chapman (2002) ‘Core obligations 
related to the right to health’ in A Chapman and Sage Russel (eds) Core obligations: building a framework 
for economic, social and cultural rights 185 at 191-192. See also P Hunt and J Mesquita (2006) Human 
Rights Quarterly 332 at 341 and A Eide and W Eide ‘Comparison with other international human rights 
provisions’ in  A Alen et al (eds) Article 24: The right to health: A commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child  3 2006 Martinus nijhoff Publishers Leiden-Boston. 
6 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), entered into force 2 September 1990. South Africa ratified 
the Convention on June 16 1995. 
Article 24 of the CRC provides: 
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Rights and Welfare of the Child7 where children’s health rights are also guaranteed. 
Although mention is made particularly of the CRC, it is not focused on given the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall 
strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services. 
2.  States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take 
appropriate measures 
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality; 
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children 
with emphasis on the development of primary health care; 
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health 
care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available technology and through the 
provision of adequate nutritious foods and  clean drinking-water, taking into 
consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution; 
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers; 
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, are informed, 
have access to education and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health 
and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and 
the prevention of accidents; 
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education 
and services. 
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional 
practices prejudicial to the health of children 
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-operation with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the present article. In this 
regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries. 
7 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, entered into force 29 November 1999. The 
Charter was ratified by South Africa in January 2000.  
The African Charter on the Welfare of the Child protects children’s rights in article 14, which reads: 
Article 14: 
1. Every child shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual 
health. 
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to pursue the full implementation of this right 
and in particular shall take measures: 
(a) to  reduce infant and child mortality rate 
(b) to ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with    
emphasis on the development of primary health care; 
(c) to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water; 
(d) to combat disease and malnutrition within the framework of primary health care through the 
application of appropriate technology; 
(e) to ensure appropriate health care for expectant and nursing mothers; 
(f) to develop preventive health care and family life education and provision of service; 
(g) to integrate basic health service programmes in national development plans; 
(h) to ensure that all sectors of the society, in particular, parents, children, community leaders and 
community workers are informed and supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and 
nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the 
prevention of domestic and other accidents; 
(i) to ensure the meaningful participation of non-governmental organizations, local communities 
and the beneficiary population in the planning and management of a basic service programme for 
children; 
(j) to support through technical and financial means, the mobilization of local community 
resources in the development of primary health care for children. 
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particular scope of this which is rather centred around health rights and their 
implementation nationally.   
 
In investigating the scope and nature of health rights for children the thesis looks 
particularly at entitlements and obligations created by these rights. In considering 
obligations attached to these rights the thesis only looks at obligations placed on the State 
and does not consider for example the horizontal application of these rights and the 
obligations flowing from that. Although parental responsibilities in respect of their 
children’s rights are mentioned in a general way no particular focus is placed on this 
issue. Again the reason for these exclusions stem from the particular scope and focus of 
this thesis. 
 
1.2 TERMINOLOGY 
Unlike international law which protects a broader right to health8 the constitutional 
provisions explored in this thesis guarantee rights to health care services only. The right 
to health extends beyond the boundaries of the right of health care services.9 Ngwenya 
explains that the term ‘right to health’ is preferred in international law because  it is more 
                                                 
8Both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which entered into 
force 3 January 1976 and the CRC protects a right to ‘the highest attainable standard of health’. See article 
12 of the ICESCR and article 24 of the CRC above note 6. In terms of international law health as a right 
includes health care, which in tern includes health care services. The ICESCR Committee explains that the 
right to health must be understood as the ‘enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services …necessary 
for the realization of the highest attainable standard of health’. See Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR): General Comment 14 ‘The right to the highest attainable standard of health’ at 
para 8. Thus, health care is found to include the entire range of health care services, including preventive 
health care services, as well as medical care and family planning services. See B Toebes  (1999) The Right 
to Health as a Human Right in International Law 248.  
9 G Van Bueren (2005) ‘Health’ in H Cheadle, D Davis and N Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional 
Law: The Bill of Rights 22-1 at 22-5-6.  It is also found that the right to health does not mean a right to 
good health or the best treatment, it entails that at the very least everyone should have access to primary 
health care services. See Liebenberg and Pillay above note 1 at 230 as well as Ngwena above note 1 at 20. 
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inclusive than ‘right to health care’ or ‘right to health protection’ and has acquired more 
common usage.10 He notes however that in South Africa the term ‘right to health care’ is 
generally preferred.11
 
Although health service rights viewed collectively with other rights in the Constitution  
could found a right to health equivalent to that in international law12 Carstens and 
Pearmain argue, correctly it is submitted that ‘[u]ltimately, the concept of a right to health 
in South African law is likely to be of limited value since it is the interaction of the 
various rights in the Bill of Rights which will determine the outcome of a particular case 
involving health care services rather than a global consideration of a right to health per 
se’.13 This is in line with the view of the Constitutional Court (referred to also as ‘the 
Court’ throughout this thesis) that rights should be understood within their textual setting 
having regard to the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole,14 and that socio-
economic rights in particular, must be read together in the setting of the Constitution as a 
whole.15  
 
The preferred term used to describe the health provisions to be considered in this thesis to 
is ‘health service rights’ so as to stay in line with the restrictive formulation of the 
provisions. Since health services are part of health rights, the term ‘health rights’ will also 
use to refer to the provisions central to the discussions.   
                                                 
10 C Ngwena (2005)  ‘Rights concerning health’ in D Brand and C Heyns (eds ) Socio-Economic Rights in 
South Africa 107 at 107. 
11 Above note 10 at 108. 
12 P Carstens and D Pearmain (2007)  Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law  35. 
13Above note 12 at 36.  
14 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 
para 22. 
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 1.3 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS AND THEIR CONTENT 
The three chapters about to follow investigate the nature, scope and content of health 
service rights for children in a textual and practical manner and do so as follows: Chapter 
2 sets out the entitlements and obligations attached to health service rights in the 
Constitution by considering the interpretation given to the content of these rights. While 
Chapter 2 is more descriptive in format the last two chapters are more analytical. Chapter 
3 is an extension of the investigation of the scope and content of children’s health rights 
conducted in the previous chapter. It takes a particular aspect of health rights and 
considers how it affects children’s ability to access health care services. In this chapter 
accessibility in relation to the issue of children’s consent to health services is explored in 
light of legislative reform in the form of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.  Chapter 3 thus 
considers the consent provisions in the new Act and explores the consequences it has for 
children’s access to health care services. Chapter 4 takes a particularly contentious issue 
regarding consent, namely, the age of consent, and embarks on an investigation into the 
constitutional validity of ages of consent in health care provisions particularly in the 
Children’s Act.   
 
1.4: MAIN ARGUMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Constitution grants health rights to everyone and makes special provision for 
children’s health rights. This is significant for children generally and individually. It 
means that the Constitution guarantees entitlements to children which flow from these 
health rights. The state thus has an obligation to ensure that these entitlements are 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Above note 14 at para 24. 
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enjoyed by all children. This obligation is usually fulfilled through the enactment of 
health legislation. The Children’s Act which is particularly important in this thesis also 
provides health provisions to realise the entitlements which these rights give children.  
 
This thesis aims to explore the meaning of health rights for children and to evaluate one 
of the methods used to give effect to these, namely, the ability to consent to health care 
services. In so doing the arguments central to this evaluation is to the effect that one of 
the most essential entitlements stemming from health service rights for children is the 
ability to access health care services. Health legislation must therefore ensure that 
children are able to access health care services. In an attempt to give effect to children’s 
entitlements in terms of their health rights, the legislature uses an approach which 
impacts significantly on children’s health service rights. This approach comes in the form 
of consent laws. An evaluation of consent provisions in the new Children’s Act illustrates 
the positive and negative impact that consent laws have on children’s health rights from a 
practical point of view.  
 
It is however the evaluation of age limitations in consent laws which produced disturbing 
findings in respect of the health service rights of certain children. The use of this 
approach in health provisions such as those found in the Children’s Act proved to be an 
impediment to the ability of children below the age of consent to access health care 
services independently. In light of the guarantees created by health service rights for 
children below the age of consent an analysis of this approach leads to a finding that it 
 8
unreasonably and unjustifiably limits the right of those children to be able to access 
health care services.  
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CHAPTER 2: CHILDREN’S HEALTH SERVICE RIGHTS 
2.1: INTRODUCTION 
The South African Constitution has been hailed as unique and progressive because it 
includes a range of socio-economic rights complimented by corresponding duties in 
respect of such rights.1 Health service rights form part of the pool of socio-economic 
rights which attract corresponding obligations. Considering that the international right to 
health has been described as vague due to a lack of clarity around its entitlements and the 
duties which it places on the state,2 does such a description hold true also for health rights 
contained in the South African Constitution? This is what this chapter aims to explore to 
some extent.  
 
What are the entitlement and obligations attached to health rights under the Constitution? 
An attempt to respond to such a question will necessarily require a broad, in-depth 
investigation into the scope and content of health rights in South Africa generally. 
However to stay within the scope of this thesis health service rights will be considered 
only as far as they apply to children. The investigation is further limited to addressing the 
question raised above, whether the description of international health rights also applies 
in the context of children’s health rights as set out in the Constitution. To this end the 
chapter will explore the entitlements and obligations attached to these rights as they apply 
to children. 
 
                                                 
1 C Ngwena (2000) Journal for Juridical Science 1 at 21. See also J Mubangizi (2006) African Journal of 
Legal Studies  1 at 2-3.  Our Constitution is said to provide arguably the most sophisticated and 
comprehensive system for the protection of socio-economic rights of all the constitutions of the world 
today. See C Heyns and D Brand (1998) 2 Law, Democracy and Development 153 at 153.    
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While health rights are found in various sections of the Constitution 3 this chapter is 
limited to an investigation into the content and interpretation given to ‘health service 
rights’ found in section 27 and section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. The chapter is thus 
set out as follows: As a starting point, Section 2.2 provides summaries of leading cases 
on socio-economic rights for ease of reference to these cases throughout the chapter (and 
the thesis as a whole). In pursuing clarity on the entitlements and obligations created by 
sections 27 and 28(1)(c), Section 2.3 deals with children’s health-rights entitlements 
created by these sections of the Constitution. Section 2.4 further investigates the 
obligations created by these provisions and the general obligations attached to health 
rights in terms of section 7 of the Constitution and finally, Section 2.5 will conclude the 
chapter. 
 
2.2 SUMMARY OF LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CASES ON SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
No investigation of the scope and nature of health service rights can ever be complete 
without continuous reference to the jurisprudence on socio-economic rights as developed 
by the Constitutional Court on various occasions. This is why the Courts’ interpretations 
of socio-economic rights provisions are set out throughout the chapter (and this thesis 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 B Toebes  (1999) Human Rights Quarterly 661 at 661-662.  
3Section 12(2) protects the right  to bodily and physical integrity including the right to make decisions 
concerning reproduction, the right to security in and control over one’s body and the right to consent to 
being subjected to medical or scientific experiments. 
Section 24(a) protects everyone’s right an environment which is not harmful to their health or well-being. 
Section 27 (1) (a) protects the right to access health care services including reproductive health care. 
Section 27(3) grants a right not to be refused emergency medical treatment.  
Section 28(1)(c) protects children’s right to basic health care services. 
Section 35(2)(e) provides the right to adequate medical treatment at State expense for detained persons, 
including prisoners. 
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generally) as the analyses of the relevant socio-economic rights provisions in these 
sections continue.  
 
Although the jurisprudence on socio-economic rights is still developing, the 
Constitutional Court started to lay the foundation for adjudicating on these rights ten 
years ago already. Many cases have emerged since then, adding to the development of the 
Court’s jurisprudence on socio-economic rights. Not all these cases will be discussed 
here but the one’s that laid the foundation are essential to any discussion on socio-
economic rights and these are highlighted below with the intention of continuous 
reference to them as the chapter proceeds. 4
 
2.2.1 Soobramoney v Minister of Health5
In this case Mr Soobramoney was denied an order in the High Court directing the 
Addington Hospital to put him on their dialysis programme. He suffered from chronic 
renal failure and needed regular renal dialysis to keep him alive. At first he obtained the 
treatment through private doctors and hospitals but when his funds became depleted he 
sought the treatment from a state facility. Due to limited resources and on the basis that 
Mr Soobramoney did not comply with the requirements set by the hospital in order to be 
placed on its dialysis programme the treatment was refused. After being denied treatment 
Mr Soobramoney made an urgent application to the Durban High Court to set aside the 
decision of the hospital. His application failed. 
 
                                                 
4 A general discussion of other cases can be found  in S Liebenberg (2004) ESR Review 7. M Pieterse 
(2006) SAJHR 473. D Davis (2006) SAJHR 301. S Khoza (ed) (2007) Socio-economic rights in South 
Africa: A resource book 1. G Devenish (2007) THRHR 84. 
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On appeal to the Constitutional Court Mr Soobramoney claimed that by refusing him 
treatment the state had infringed his right to life and his right not to be refused emergency 
medical treatment. The Court held that the appelants’ circumstances did not constitute an 
emergency as set out in 27(3) and that his claim fell to be determined in terms of section 
27(1) and 27(2). After considering the state’s available resources the Constitutional Court 
ultimately found that the appellant did not proof that the state’s failure to provide renal 
dialysis facilities to all patients suffering with chronic renal failure was a breach of their 
obligations under section 27(2).6  The appeal was denied. 
  
2.2.2 Government of RSA v  Grootboom7
Mrs Grootboom and a group of people who were living in deplorable conditions in the 
informal settlement in Wallacedene decided to move. They then settled illegally on 
private land earmarked by the state for low cost housing. They were evicted and left 
homeless. In an urgent application to the Cape High Court the evictees argued that their 
right to shelter for their children and their right to housing had been infringed by the state 
and demanded that the state provide them with interim relief until they could be 
permanently accommodated. The application was successful. The state appealed to the 
Constitutional Court. After evaluating the state’s housing programme the court found that 
the state did not meet its obligations under section 26(2) of the Constitution. The states’ 
housing programme failed to provide temporary solutions to those in desperate and 
urgent need. The appeal failed.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 
6 Above note 5 at para 36. 
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2.2.3 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign8 (TAC)  
 In this case the Constitutional Court had to consider the governments’ policy on 
prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV. The policy was that the 
drug nevirapine prescribed  for PMTCT of  HIV infected pregnant women  was only 
made available at certain research sites  at state hospitals and doctors not working at these 
sites were unable to prescribe nevirapine to their HIV positive pregnant patients. This 
placed in danger the lives of the babies of HIV infected women who did not have access 
to the research sites. The applicants argued that the right to access health care services 
and the babies’ right to basic health care services were violated by the states policy. The 
state questioned the efficacy of nevirapine, the capacity to provide the full ‘package’ of 
the treatment (which included testing and counselling) and claimed that the research sites 
were to provide crucial data on which a comprehensive programme would eventually be 
created and provided. The Constitutional Court found that the states policy on PMTCT 
was too rigid.  The measure which the state took to give effect to the right of access to 
health care services was found not to be reasonable as required by section 27(2). 
Government was ordered to remove the restrictions. 
 
2.2.4 Khosa v Minister of Social Development9  
Certain provisions of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1999 excluded non citizens from 
being eligible to apply for social assistance. The applicants in this matter were 
Mozambicans who were permanent residents in South Africa. If they were South African 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
8 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033. 
9 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Others v Minister of 
Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC). 
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citizens they would have been eligible for social assistance in terms of the Act. The 
applicants claimed inter alia that the exclusion of non-South Africans from the 
entitlements under the Social Assistance Act was inconsistent with section 27(1)(c) of the 
Constitution which guarantees ‘everyone’ the right to social security. It was also 
contended that the exclusion infringed children’s rights under section 28 of the 
Constitution. They approached the High Court to declare the provisions unconstitutional 
and were successful.  The order of invalidity had to be confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court. After considering the principles of the equality clause and the obligations of the 
state in terms of section 27(2) the Constitutional Court found that the exclusion was 
discriminatory and could not be saved by section 36 and that the measure of legislative 
exclusion taken by the state did not comply with the constitutional standard of 
‘reasonableness’ as set out in section 27(2) of the Constitution. The relevant parts of the 
provisions were declared invalid.  
 
In the section below the provisions containing health rights are analysed by considering 
the interpretation that the above cases attached to socio-economic rights. It must be noted 
first that although the interconnectedness of health service rights with other rights is 
relevant in discussing the interpretation of health service rights, it is not necessary for the 
purposes of this chapter to launch an inquiry into the interrelatedness of health service 
rights with other rights, because the interconnectedness of such right and of socio-
economic rights is well established10 (and was confirmed in some of the abovementioned 
cases).11
                                                 
10 See for example P Carstens and D Pearmain (2007) Foundational Principles of South African Medical 
Law  27-34. S Khoza (2007) Socio-economic rights in South Africa: a resource book 27. The ‘Vienna 
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 2.3 ENTITLEMENTS CREATED BY HEALTH SERVICE RIGHTS FOR 
CHILDREN 
2.3.1 Separate or additional health rights entitlements for children? 
As will be seen from the structure of this section the entitlements for children under 
section 28 are considered separately from the entitlements created by section 27(1) of the 
Constitution. The question could then be asked whether children’s health rights under 
section 28 create separate entitlements from those created by section 27. The answer to 
this question lies in the interpretation of the children’s clause and their relation to 
corresponding clauses which apply to everyone. Although this is discussed more broadly 
later it must be briefly addressed here for the purpose of explaining the structure of the 
Section. 
 
 In Grootboom the Constitutional Court held the view that children’s rights in section 
28(1)(c) overlap with the rights in section 26 and 27(1) and that this overlap is not 
consistent with the notion that section 28(1)(c) creates separate and independent rights for 
children and their parents.12 In light of this view, Carstens and Pearmain argue, that ‘the 
right of children to basic health care services is therefore a facet of a single right of 
access to health care services rather than an additional and separate right to the one 
expressed in section 27(1) of the Constitution’.13 This conclusion is in line with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Declaration and Programme of Action as adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 
(1993), A/CONF.157/23) also confirms that ‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated’ at para 5. 
11 Grootboom above note 7 at para 24 and Khosa above note 9 at paras 40-45 . 
12 Grootboom above note 7 at para 74. 
13 Carstens and Pearmain above note 10 at 81. 
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Constitutional Court’s reasoning on the children’s clause. Taking this into account, the 
reason for not conflating discussions of health service entitlements for children under 
sections 27(1) and 28(1)(c) is not because of a view favouring arguments that section 28 
does in fact create separate and independent rights, but serves rather as a form of 
structure to the section to indicate different components of the entitlements created by 
these provisions. The entitlement s and obligations as part of the framework of health 
rights are thus discussed below.  
 
2.3.2 Children’s health services entitlements under section 27 
Section 27 guarantees the population (of which children are a part) a right to access 
health care services. Its relevant portions read as follows: 
Health care… 
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to – 
 (a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
  …………………………………………………………….. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available  
      resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
      (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
 
The health-right entitlements stemming from the text of section 27 are found in two 
subsections. In 27(1) where a right of ‘access to’ health care services, including 
reproductive health care is guaranteed and subsection 3 which protects the right not be 
denied emergency services. 
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 2.3.2.1 A right of ‘access to’ 
The right in section 27 is restrictively formulated as a right of ‘access to’ health care 
services. So what does the phrase ‘a right to access’ mean for children and everyone else? 
What is meant by access to health care services is that there is an adequate supply of 
health services available, providing right-holders the opportunity to obtain health care 
when required (i.e. availability) and also that there is actual utilisation of such services.14 
It also means that the ‘government must facilitate access to or create an enabling 
environment for everyone to access a service’.15 A right of  ‘access to’ however, does not 
protect a direct and immediate demand for health care services, or imply that such 
services will be given free of charge.16  
 
Access to the service also means that the services should also be available without 
discrimination.17 Ngwena explains also that ‘[a] right of access to health care means 
being able to access health care that is affordable, available, and effective18. …It also 
means prioritizing care to vulnerable groups, with particular emphasis on women and 
                                                 
14 M Gulliford et al (2003) ‘Meaning of “access” in health care’ in M Gulliford, and M Morgan (eds)  
Access to health care 1 at 5.  
15 Khoza above note 4 at 34 . 
16  Above note 15.  See also C Heyns and D Brand  above note 1 at 159 where it is explained  that, rights 
phrased as ‘access’ rights do not carry with them absolute entitlements to the provision of the social goods 
in question, free of charge and on demand. See also S Liebenberg and K Pillay (2000) Socio-Economic 
Rights in South Africa: A resource book 27. Ngwena explains further that Section 27 also does not 
guarantee equal access to health care services in any absolute form or impose an unqualified obligation to 
provide free health care to all. See Ngwena above note 1at 3. 
17 C Ngwena and R Cook (2005) ‘Rights concerning health’ in D Brand and C Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic 
Rights in South Africa 107 at 131. 
18 This interpretation of what ‘access to’ means in respect of health care services is also supported by the 
Constitutional Court where it held that government should facilitate access to services by for example 
making health services affordable or geographically reachable. See Minister of Health and Another No v 
New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign as amici curiae) 2006 (2) SA 
311 (CC) para 714 at 539A-B. A 2005 revised draft of the Health Charter from the National Department of 
Health also explained that ‘access’ means  ‘having the capacity and means to obtain and use an affordable 
package of health care services in South Africa in manner that is equitable.’ National Department of Health 
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children.’19 The state is responsible for facilitating access to the necessary health care 
services. To sum up, what is gathered from these remarks is that a right ‘of access to’ 
health services under section 27 does not entitle anyone including children to claim 
health care services on demand, but it does entitle them to be able to obtain available, 
affordable and effective health care services such as primary health care services.  These 
claims are subject to limitations as discussed in Section 3. 
 
2.3.2.2 Health care services, including reproductive health care services 
Section 27 entitles everyone to access some or the other health care service. The National 
Department of Health describes ‘health services’ as services which serve the function of 
responding to health problems as they arise and which play an important role in 
preventing health problems.20 To enable a better understanding about the type of health 
services section 27 guarantees it would have been useful if ‘health care services’ was 
defined in the Constitution, but it is not. The National Health Act 61 of 2003 is the main 
national legislation aimed at giving effect to the health rights in the Constitution, but it 
also fails to define health care services. In terms of national policy21 health care services 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2005) ‘Revised draft of the Health Charter’ 1 at 7: Available at http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/misc-f.html 
[Accessed 31 October 2007] 
19 C Ngwena  (2001-02) Health and Human Rights 27 at 31.  
20 The National Department of Health  (2001) ‘Policy guidelines for Youth and Adolescent health’ Part 3, 
18 at 29: Available at http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/misc-f.html [Accessed 31 October 2007] 
 See also Ngwena above note 1 at 20. 
21 In terms of the White Paper of 1997 the Department of Health adopted the primary health care approach 
and thereafter introduced a Primary Health Care (PHC) package for South Africa in 2000. This package 
was introduces as an effective and cost effective approach for promoting the health of all South Africans. 
The services included in the package consist among others of services ranging from basic personal 
promotive and preventative services such as family planning to personal curative services for minor 
ailments like trauma. It includes also maternal and child care services, some other basic services like oral 
and  rehabilitative services and mental health services. National Department of Health (1997) ‘White paper 
for the transformation of the health system in South Africa’: Available at 
http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/legislation-f.html  [Accessed 1 November 2007] See also para 2.6 at Table 3.2 
of the Policy for a list of services included in the primary health care package. 
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include primary health care22 services and these services must be prioritised.23 Others 
suggest that health care services ‘include both physical and mental health-care services 
and the provision of the support in the use of health-related educated and information, 
including education and information on sexual and reproductive health. Such services 
also include prevention and rehabilitation.’24  
 
Section 27 entitles health rights holders like children the right to access general health 
care services which basically include primary, secondary and tertiary health services. It 
also explicitly protects the right to access reproductive health care services. 25 By 
                                                 
22 The Alma Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care (1978) defines primary health care as follows 
‘[E]ssential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and 
technology made universally accessible to individuals and families in the community through their full 
participation and at a cost that the community and the country can afford to maintain at every stage of their 
development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination. It forms an integral part both of the 
country’s health system, of which it is the central function and main focus, and of the overall social and 
economic development of the community.  It is the first level of contact of individuals, the family and 
community with the national health system bringing health care as close as possible to where people live 
and work, and constitutes the first element of a continuing health care process’. See Declaration of Alma-
Ata;  International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6-12 September 1978: Available 
at http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declaration_almaata.pdf [Accessed 1 November 2007]. 
23 Ngwena above note 19 at 31. 
24 G Van Bueren (2005) ‘Health’  in H Cheadle, D Davis and N Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional 
Law: The Bill of Rights 22-1 at 22-6. The new Children’s Act 38 of 2005 responds to children’s health 
service rights and contains provisions relating to specific health services available to children such as 
medical treatment, surgery and HIV testing. See sections 129-134 of the Act. For a discussions of these 
sections and a description of other legislation giving effect to children’s health rights see Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. See also  S Khoza above note 4 at 289-299.  
25 At the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted by the 4th World Conference on Women  
reproductive health was explained as being ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and 
not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters related to the reproductive system and to its  
functions and processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and 
safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how 
often to do so.  Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have 
access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as 
other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law, and the right of access 
to appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth 
and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy infant. In line with the above definition of 
reproductive health, reproductive health care is defined as the constellation of methods, techniques and 
services that contribute to reproductive health and well- being by preventing and solving reproductive 
health problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and 
personal relations, and not merely counselling and care related to reproduction and sexually transmitted 
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explicitly mentioning reproductive health care section 27 purports to give optimal 
protection to services of seminal importance to women such as services relating to 
fertility, pregnancy and other aspects of reproductive health,26 and it serves also to ensure 
that such services are accessible like any other service.27  
 
2.3.2.3 Emergency medical treatment 
Medical treatment in whatever form it is provided constitutes a health care service and 
thus section 27(3) must also be read together with section 27(1).28 Section 27(3) provides 
that no-one may be refused emergency medical treatment.29 In the Soobramoney case the 
Constitutional Court considered this provision. The Court found that section 27(3) 
envisioned to addressed a situation where ‘[t]he occurrence was sudden, the patient had 
no opportunity of making arrangements in advance for the treatment that was required, 
and there was urgency in securing the treatment in order to stabilise his condition. The 
treatment was available but denied.’30 ‘Treatment’ for the purposes of this section would 
include for example ambulance services needed for emergency health care31, but would 
not apply to ‘routine preventative, diagnostic and curative treatment’.32 Provision of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
diseases.’  See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, 15 
September 1995, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) para 96. Available at  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/e5dplw.htm  [Accessed 1 November 2007] 
26 C Chetty (2002) SAPR/PL 453 at 457. 
27 Ngwena above note 1at 8-9. The reference to such services is particularly significant because such 
services are essentially accessed by women who, historically, have constituted a vulnerable and 
disadvantaged class especially in respect of access to abortion. See Ngwena  and Cook above note 17 at 
121  
28 Van Bueren above note 24 at 22-7. 
29 The National Health Act  61 of 2003 also gives effect to this right in section 5 where it states that ‘A 
health care provider, health worker or health establishment may not refuse a person emergency medical 
treatment’. 
30 Soobramoney above note 5 para 18 at 1703E. 
31 Van Bueren above note 28. 
32 M Pieterse (2007)  Stellenbosch Law Review 75 at 80. 
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treatment should also not depend on the patients’ ability to pay, but this does not mean 
that it must be provided free of charge.33
 
Thus sections 27(1) and (3) entitle children as health right holders to be able to access 
without discrimination, affordable, available and reachable primary, secondary and 
tertiary health care services (particularly reproductive services) and to be provided with 
emergency medical treatment when sudden and unexpected illnesses or injuries befall 
them. It must be noted also that entitlements in respect of these provisions also appear 
from the obligations attached to them as set out in section 27(2). This section (discussed 
further in Section 2.3), entitles everyone to require state measures to be put in place in 
order to progressively realise health rights. 
 
2.3.3 Children’s health service entitlements under section 28(1)(c) 
The relevant parts of section 28(1)(c) provide the following 
Children 
28. (1) Every child has the right –  
 ……………………….. 
2 to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services. [Italics 
inserted] 
 
The entitlements given to children in section 28 (1)(c) can be ascertained from the text of 
the provision itself.  In considering how children’s health rights are protected in section 
28, the textual difference between sections 28(1)(c) and section 27(1) is hard to miss. 34  
                                                 
33 Above note 32 at 80-81. 
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2.3.3.1 ‘Basic’ health care services. 
Children are only entitled to ‘basic’ health care services in section 28(1)(c). The word 
‘basic’ indicates the restrictive manner in which the right is formulated.35 Section 27 does 
not contain this restrictive phrase. The term ‘basic health care’ is not defined in the 
Constitution or subsequent legislation or policy and the Constitutional Court has yet to 
consider its meaning. The need for such a definition is necessary to clarify the 
entitlements created by the right. 36  It has also been suggested that the WHO directives 
for primary health care could be used as a criteria to define ‘basic health care’,37 but 
keeping in mind that ‘basic health care’ services entitles the right holder to more than 
what is currently available under the primary health care package of the Department of 
Health.38 It is submitted that the Constitutional Court urgently needs to give meaning to 
this term to relieve the children’s health care clause from its textual vagueness. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 The Constitutional Court has yet to address this textual difference See M Shung-King et al  (2004) 
‘Children’s rights to health’ in E Coetzee and J Streak (eds) Monitoring child socio-economic rights in 
South Africa: achievements and challenges127 at 135. 
35 I Currie and J de Waal J (2005) The Bill of Rights Handbook 612. 
36 The need for a definition has also been found necessary for the following reasons: 
‘Firstly, it would enable children and their caregivers to know what services they are entitled to under the 
Constitution. Secondly, it would provide service providers, managers and policy-makers with clear goals to 
work towards. Thirdly, it would allow a more coherent development of laws, policies, programmes, 
services and budgets by aligning all these to the defined requirements… Lastly, it would enable us to 
monitor progress made towards the implementation of children’s rights to health and health care through 
the development of appropriate indicators’. See M Shung-King (2005) ‘Defining basic health care services 
for children’ Children’s Institute Newsletter: Child Rights in Focus. June 2005. Available at 
http://ci.org.za/depts/ci/enews/June2005/health_care.htm [Accessed 9 November 2007]. 
37 See E de Wet(1996)  The constitutional enforceability of economic and social rights: The meaning of the 
German constitutional model for South Africa 107. 
The six important directives are: 
(1) adequate access to clean drinking water; 
(2) adequate access to sanitation facilities and refuse removal; 
(3) vaccination against diseases such as measles, polio, tuberculosis etc 
(4) access to trained medical staff for the treatment of common diseases and injuries with a regular 
supply of essential medicines, within one hour’s walking or traveling distance; 
(5) access to trained medical staff during pregnancy and birth and; 
(6) after birth. 
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2.3.3.2 Entitlement to an immediately enforceable right? 
 Section 28 contains no qualifications of progressive realisation and available resources 
as found in section 27(2). This has stirred arguments that these limitations do not apply to 
the rights of children and that children’s rights are immediately demandable.39 However 
others have disagreed, claiming that such an interpretation is unlikely since ‘a right 
cannot place a duty on a state to do what is practically impossible’.40 In the Grootboom 
case the applicants claimed that their right to adequate housing in section 2641 was 
violated as well as their children’s right to shelter as guaranteed in section 28. They 
claimed that although section 26 had internal limitations, the rights of their children to 
shelter did not have such a limitation and therefore the right to shelter was immediately 
enforceable. This implied, that parents through guarantees granted to their children could 
claim housing on demand.   Although the High Court accepted the arguments and found 
that the children’s right to basic shelter was violated by the state, the Constitutional Court 
found differently. The Constitutional Court rejected these arguments on the ground that it 
would create an ‘anomalous result’, in that ‘[pe]ople who have children [would] have a 
direct enforceable right to housing in terms of section 28, while others who have no 
children would not be entitled to housing under the section even though they may be old 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 Shung-King et al above note 34 at 136. 
39 See Grootboom above note 7  para 70-79. See also C Heyns and D Brand above note 1 at 161. 
40  See Shung-King et al above note 34 at 138. 
41 Section 26 reads as follows: 
Housing 
26. 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. 
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or disabled’.42 The Court further found that the rights set out in section 28 overlapped 
with those found in 26 indicating that section 28 does not create separate and independent 
rights for children and their parents.43 In respect of health care services the Court’s 
interpretation implies that children are not entitled to claim health care services from the 
state on demand. This interpretation by the Court also determines the state’s obligations 
in respect of section 28; this is discussed in Section 2.4 below. 
 
2.4 STATE OBLIGATIONS IN RESPECT OF HEALTH SERVICE RIGHTS  
 Obligations in respect of section 27 and section 28 
Section 27(2) provides the following: 
 
‘The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available  resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights 
[i.e the rights set out in 27(1)].’ 
 
There are three legs to the obligations in section 27(2). First, the state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures to give effect to the right. Second, the state has 
to progressively provide access to health care services and third, the measures which the 
state takes to progressively realise the right of access to health care services should be 
done within available resources. 
 
                                                 
42 Grootboom above note 7 at para 71. 
43 Above note 7 at para 74. 
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There is no equivalent obligations provision in respect of the rights contained in section 
28. So do these three legs of obligations apply to children’s health service rights in 
section 28(1)(c)? The Constitutional Court gave answers to this question.  
 
With regards to the state’s obligation to take legislative and other measures to fulfil the 
rights, the Court in Grootboom held in respect of section 28 that  
‘the state must provide the legal and administrative infrastructure necessary to 
ensure that children are accorded the protection contemplated by section 28. This 
obligation would normally be fulfilled by passing laws and creating enforcement 
mechanisms for the maintenance of children, their protection from maltreatment, 
abuse, neglect or degradation
 
and the prevention of other forms of abuse of 
children mentioned in section 28’44[reference omitted].  
 
From the above it is clear that the state also has an obligation to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures to give effect to children’s rights to basis health care 
services as set out in section 28(1)(c).  
 
 The applicants in Grootboom claimed that because the qualifications of progressive 
realisation and available resources are absent from section 28 it implied that children had 
an immediately enforceable right to claim shelter on demand from the state. In rejecting 
this line of argument the Court held that  
                                                 
44 Above note 7 at para 78. 
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‘The carefully constructed constitutional scheme for progressive realisation of 
socio-economic rights would make little sense if it could be trumped in every case 
by the rights of children to get shelter from the state on demand.’45  
 
This indicates that the second leg of the section 27(2) obligations on the State also applies 
to rights in section 28(1)(c). Besides the Courts reasoning about the overlap of the rights 
in section 27 and section 28 at para 74 of its judgment, the fact that the above two legs 
and the third leg of state obligations, namely, available resources, all apply to children 
rights in section 28, is confirmed again in the following passage of the judgment; 
  
‘the obligations created by section 28(1)(c) can properly be ascertained only in the 
context of the rights and, in particular, the obligations created by ss 25(5), 26 and 
27 of the Constitution’46.  
 
Thus, having established that these three legs of state obligations also apply to children’s 
rights in section 2847 what remains now is to explore the meaning and content of these 
obligations in respect of children’s health service rights.  
 
2.4.1 Legislative and other measures 
In most instances legislation48 is required for the full implementation of rights contained 
in the Constitution. However legislation on its own is not enough to comply with section 
                                                 
45 Above note 7 at para 71  
46 Above note 7 at para 74  
47 See also D Horsten and L Jansen van Rensburg  (2004) Speculum Juris  121 at 135. 
48 This includes subordinate legislation like regulations. See New Clicks judgment above note 18. 
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27(2) or international standards to fulfil socio-economic rights.49 In Grootboom the Court 
stated that ‘[l]egislative measures will invariably have to be supported by appropriate, 
well-directed policies, and programmes implemented by the executive’.50  
 
 The form and content of the measure is a choice for the legislature and the executive, but 
the measure must be designed to meet the obligations placed on the state and must be 
capable of realising the right it is aimed to realise.51 It is also not important whether there 
are other better measures which the state could have adopted, what is essential is that the 
measure which the state chose to adopt is reasonable.52  
 
2.4.2 Reasonableness review  
As seen above, section 27(2) obligates the State to take ‘reasonable’ legislative and other 
measures to realise the right of access to health care services. In Grootboom the 
Constitutional Court was invited to determine a minimum core53 in the context of the 
                                                 
49 Other measures considered to be appropriate to fulfill socio-economic rights under the International 
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR) are the provision of judicial remedies, administrative, 
financial, educational and social measures. See, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) General Comment 3 at para 3. See also para’s 5 and 7 of General Comment No. 3. The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child  encourages and identifies appropriate measures of implementation 
children’s rights  including legislation and also the development of special structures, the establishment of 
coordinating and monitoring bodies, comprehensive data collection, awareness raising and training and the 
development of appropriate policies, services and programmes. See Committee on the Rights of the Child 
General Comment No.5 at para 1 and 9. See also World Health Organization (2002) ‘25 Questions and 
Answers of Health and Human Rights’ Health and Human Rights  Publication Series at p 16. 
50 Grootboom above note 7 at para 42.  
51 Above note 7 at para  41 . 
52Above note 51. 
53 The minimum core approach was introduced by the ICESCR Committee in General No 3 at para 10 
which provides: ‘…The Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party’. 
This approach operates for the benefit of the most vulnerable in society  and  it ‘identifies a minimum level 
below which government action should not fall’. See Committee on the Rights of the Child: General 
Comment No. 3 at para 12. For a discussion of the minimum core approach in international law see also S 
Khoza (2006) ESR Review  2 at 5; S Rosa and M Dutschke (2006) SAJHR 224 at 238-240; B Toebes  
(1999) The right to health as a human right in international law  276; A Chapman and S Russel (2002) 
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right to access adequate housing so as to ‘describe the minimum expected of a state’54  in 
order to comply with its obligations in terms of this right. In declining this invitation the 
Court noted that the ‘real question’ to be addressed was whether the measures taken by 
the state to realise this right were reasonable.55 This was the inception of the 
reasonableness approach which the Court has since its introduction in Grootboom placed 
at the centre of its interpretation of socio-economic rights cases. The Court did however 
find that minimum core obligations could be taken into account in determining the 
reasonableness of measures taken by the state.56  
 
The rejection of the minimum core approach by the Constitutional Court has triggered 
different responses from academics, some have criticised this move57 others argue that it 
was a wise one to make,58 and while others continue to find use for this approach despite 
rejection by the Constitutional Court59 others debate the Courts decision by contrasting 
                                                                                                                                                 
Core Obligations: Buiding a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  1 at 8-10; See also in 
that same book  A Chapman ‘Core obligations related to the right to health’ 185-215 where Chapman 
discusses the minimum core obligations relating to health rights in international law. 
54 I Rautenbach (2005) TSAR 627 at 645. 
55 Grootboom above note 7 at para 33. 
56 Above note 55.  
57 D Chirwa (2003) East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 174 at 187-188.  S Liebenberg ‘The 
interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in S Woolman, R Klaaren, A Stein and M Chaskelson (eds)  
Constitutional Law of South Africa  33-i at 33-30-31. D Horsten and L Jansen van Rensburg  above note 47 
at 136. D Bilchitz (2003) SAJHR  19 1 at12-18. Bilchitz critisise even the limited role the Constitutional 
Court gave to the minimum core approach by making it part of the reasonableness enquiry. He argues that 
this approach is incorrect and that ‘the minimum core does not gloss the notion of reasonableness; rather, 
reasonableness is assessed in terms of whether a government has complied with its minimum core 
obligations in terms of the right.’ He argues that separate enquiries are undertaken for determining the 
reasonableness of a measure introduced by the state and the analysis of minimum core obligations which 
considers the obligations created by the right and the notion of progressive realisation. These two enquiries 
should thus not be conflated according to Bilchitz. 
58 M Wesson (2004) SAJHR 284 at 303-305. 
59 See Rosa and Dutschke above note 53 at 239 where the authors argue that the  mimimum core approach 
(and other international standards) should be used by the South African Courts when dealing with 
children’s socio-economic. They note that ‘In relation to children, when assessing if the minimum core has 
been met, the court must apply the general principles of the UNCRC and the AFCRWC [African Charter]. 
The court must therefore scrutinise whether due priority has been given to vulnerable groups of children, 
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the minimum core approach to the reasonableness approach.60 It is submitted that 
however intriguing these academic discussions are ‘no amount of jurisprudential 
gnashing of analytical teeth or academic concern about the failure to follow comparative 
international law’61  will change the Courts decision to reject the minimum core approach 
in favour of the reasonableness review. In light of this rejection it is submitted that a 
broad discussion on the debates surrounding the minimum core approach would not add 
much to the discussion at hand and will thus not be undertaken. The reasonableness 
approach is central to the courts socio-economic rights jurisprudence and a discussion on 
this is thus continued below.  
 
In the Grootboom, TAC and Khosa cases, the Constitutional Court had to consider the 
reasonableness of the policies, programmes and legislation that the state put into 
operation in order to give effect to the rights in section 26 and 27 respectively. On all 
occasions, it was held that the measures taken by government failed to comply with the 
test of reasonableness. In Grootboom where the Court considered the states’ housing 
programmes it held that ' [a] programme that excludes a significant segment of society 
cannot be said to be reasonable’62. Furthermore, ‘[t]hose whose needs are the most urgent 
and whose ability to enjoy all rights  therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the 
measures aimed at achieving realization…If the measures, though statistically successful, 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the best interests of children are protected, that the level of the minimum core is such that it ‘facilitates 
the survival and development of the child and, finally, that the child’s views have been respected in the 
process’. See also Khoza above note 52 at 4-5 where the author argues in favour of a principled minimum 
core for health. 
60Liebenberg  above note 57 at 33:30.  Rosa and Dutschke  argue that the Court’s use of the reasonableness 
review achieves a similar effect to the sentiments behind the minimum core. Rosa and Dutschke above note 
53 at 256. Devenish notes that the Court has implicitly recognised a minimum core right in Grootboom and 
TAC. Devenish  above note 4 at 105. 
61 D Davis (2006) SAJHR 301 at 304. 
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fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may not pass the test’.63 In sum 
the Court’s tests the reasonableness of a program introduced by the state to fulfil its 
constitutional obligations by looking at whether the program is “comprehensive’, 
‘coherent’, ‘balanced’ and ‘flexible’’64 and it must not exclude a significant sector of 
society particularly those whose needs are most urgent.65 In this case the state’s housing 
programme failed because it did not give even temporary relief to people who were living 
in ‘intolerable conditions or crisis situations’.66 In TAC, the Court had to consider 
government policy on prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV. The 
policy was that the drug nevirapine prescribed  for PMTCT of  HIV infected pregnant 
women  was only made available at certain research sites  at state hospitals and doctors 
not working at these sites were unable to prescribe nevirapine to their HIV positive 
pregnant patients. This placed in danger the lives of the babies of HIV infected women 
who did not have access to the research sites. In this case the government’s measure 
under section 27(2) failed and was found unreasonable because it ‘exclud[ed] those who 
could reasonably be included where such treatment is medically indicated to combat 
mother to child transmission of HIV’.67  
 
In Khosa, provisions of the Social Assistance Act which excluded permanent residents 
from obtaining social assistance were found unconstitutional and in breach of section 
27(2) because the provisions unjustifiably excluded a particular vulnerable group of 
                                                                                                                                                 
62 Grootboom above note 7 at para 43. 
63 Above note 62. 
64 Wesson above note 58 at 287.  
65 Above note 58 at 288. 
66 Above note 62. 
67 TAC above note 8 at para 125. 
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society. The Court held that ‘[w]hen the rights to life, dignity and equality are implicated 
in cases dealing with socio-economic rights, they have to be taken into account along 
with the availability of human and financial resources in  determining whether the State 
has complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness’.68 After considering the 
purpose of the exclusion and the impact it had on the life and dignity of the complainants, 
the Court in Khosa held that the denial of access to social services to permanent residents 
was not a reasonable legislative measure as required by section 27(2) of the 
Constitution.69 The paragraphs in these judgments indicate the criterion created by the 
Constitutional Court by which to test reasonableness of the measure the state chooses to 
put in place in order to comply with its obligations under section 27(2) of the 
Constitution.70
                                                 
68 Khosa above note 9 para 44 at 528E. 
69 Above note 9 para 82 at 540A-B. 
70 Bilchitz provides a useful summary of the specific features of reasonableness based on the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation in 11 points: 
‘A reasonable programme must allocate responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres of government. 
1. A reasonable programme must allocate responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres of 
government. 
2. It must ensure that the appropriate financial and human resources are available. 
3. The programme must be capable of facilitating the realization of the right in question. 
4. A wide range of possible measures can be reasonable. The question is not whether other measures 
are more desirable or favourable. (This criterion seems to indicate a difference between 
reasonableness in the context of socio-economic rights and reasonableness in the context of the 
limitations clause; the limitation clause requires that the measures adopted be the least restrictive 
means in violating a right and realising and important social purpose). 
5. The measure must be reasonable ‘both in their conception and their implementation’. 
6. A reasonable programme must be balanced and flexible. 
7. A reasonable programme must attend to ‘crises’: a reasonable programme must ‘respond to the 
urgent needs of those in desperate situations’. 
8. A reasonable programme must not exclude ‘a significant segment’ of the affected population. 
9. A reasonable programme must balance short, medium and long-term needs. 
10. A reasonable programme does not render the best the enemy of the good: is is not necessary to 
design the ideal programme prior to its initial implementation. For instance, in TAC, waiting for 
the best programme to be developed for a protracted period of time before deciding to extent the 
use of nevirapine beyond the research sites was not reasonable given the benefits that could be 
achieved by rolling out the drug in the interim.] 
11. A reasonable programme will not discriminate unlawfully between persons on grounds which 
have a serious impact upon dignity.’ 
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 Since the Court introduced the reasonableness test there has been lots of academic 
opinion on the issue which generally indicate the positive and negative impact that this 
approach has on the enjoyment of socio-economic rights.71 It is submitted that however 
compelling the positive influence of the approach to socio-economic rights may be, the 
mere fact that it has the potential to negatively impact on the enjoyment of socio-
economic rights -by for example not creating any sense of urgency for the state to fulfil 
its obligations in respect of socio-economic rights72 or by creating difficulties for the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights by individuals and group living in poverty,73 or 
that the way this approach operates create problems for the delivery of entitlements 
stemming from court orders,- 74 can never be good for the advancement of such rights.  
 
2.4.3 Progressive Realisation 
The State has to progressively realise the right to access health care services. In the 
context of health care, progressive realisation as explained by the Court in Grootboom 
                                                                                                                                                 
See D Bilchitz (2007) ‘Health’ in S Woolman, T Roux and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa, Student Edition 56A-i at 56A-12. For more summaries of the reasonableness test: See also Chirwa 
above note 57 at 184. See also Liebenberg above note 57 at 33:34. 
71 Liebenberg argues that the reasonableness test is flexible and context specific and allows for on-going 
possibility of challenging socio-economic deprivations in the light of changing contexts. S Liebenberg 
(2006) Stellenbosh Law Review 5 at 29-31. See further S Liebenberg (2004) ESR Review 7 at 9. In 
criticising the reasonableness approach Bilchitz also criticises the approach because it fails to interpret and 
give content to the right in section 27(1). He notes that ‘an approach that rejects the need to determine the 
content of rights is empty’. Bilchitz above note 70 at 56A:20-23. For more academic opinion on the 
reasonableness approach see also Davis above note 61 and Liebenberg above note 57 at 33-40-41.  
72 Ngwena and Cook notes that ‘even though the approach in TAC (to use the min core as part of the 
reasonableness test) has the advantage of flexibility and allows determinations to be made on a case-by-
case basis, it may have the effect of inadvertently failing sufficiently to impress upon the state the 
compelling nature of socio-economic rights obligations’. Ngwena and Cook above note 17 at 143. 
73 Liebenberg (2006) above note 70 at 29. This argument is supported by Chirwa who argues that the Court 
has reduced, economic, social and cultural rights to group claims as far as enforcement of positive 
obligations is concerned. Chirwa above note 57 at 188. 
74 Davis above note 4  at 317-318. 
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means that ‘accessibility should be progressively facilitated, meaning that ‘legal, 
administrative, operational and financial hurdles should be examined and where possible, 
lowered over time.’75  It also means that the state should not take any retrogressive 
steps.76 The Court in Grootboom quoted with approval the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Right (ICESCR) Committee’s interpretation of the concept 
of progressive realisation which inter alia requires states to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards the goal of full realisation of the rights and it requires 
states to justify any retrogressive steps. 77 Although the state is not burdened with strict 
time frames in which to fully realise socio-economic rights the Constitution requires all 
constitutional obligations to be performed diligently and without delay.78 So the state 
should not stagnate and must make progress in advancing access to the relevant rights79 
by using existing and available resources effectively.80
 
Bilchitz argues that the Constitutional Court’s analysis of progressive realization is 
problematic and deficient because it fails to guide the state in the fulfilment of their 
                                                 
75 Grootboom above note 7 para 45 at 70A. 
76 Liebenberg and Pillay above note 16 at  30. 
77 Above note 7 at 70D. See also Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights  ‘The nature of States  
parties obligationa (Art. 2, par 1): 14/12/90. CESCR General Comment 3. at para 9. 
78 Section 237 of the Constitution. 
79 S Liebenberg 2001 ‘Violation of Socio-Economic rights: The role of the South African Human Rights 
Commission”  in P Andrews and S Ellmann (eds) The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South 
Africa’s Basic Law, 405 at 421. 
80 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1986) at para 27: Available at  http://shr.aaas.org/thesaurus/instrument.php?insid=94  
[Accessed 9 November 2007]. Note that General Comment 3 of the ICESCR Committee draws from the 
Limburg principles in setting out the nature and scope of State Parties obligations under the ICESCR. Thus 
the term progressive realization requires the State to do something to further access to health care during 
periods of economic growth and if the State fails to do anything (for example during times of economic 
growth) then it can be critisised as not progressively realizing the right. See Reidar K Lei ‘Health, Human 
Rights and the mobilisation of resources for health’ BMC International Health and Human Rights 2004 (4) 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-698X-4-4.pdf  [accessed 9 November 2007]. 
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obligation to progressively realise socio-economic rights.81 It is submitted that the reason 
for the Courts reluctance to set down guidelines is the fact that the progressive realisation 
of a right depends on the available resources of the state and can thus only be determined 
over a period of time. It has also been noted that that setting time frames for when a state 
should have progressively realised a right would be problematic because the Court would 
have to review (for example) the state’s five year plan on health care service delivery. 82  
Consequently the Court would then also have to review spending on the national budget 
to see if it is being used appropriately in order to give effect to the state’s plan and in 
doing so the Court might have to substitute the views of the executive with its own views 
on how the budget should be better spent in order to give effect to the plan. These are not 
tasks which are suitable for courts to undertake. 83  
 
2.4.4 Available resources 
Section 27(2) requires the state to take measures within available resources to 
progressively realise the right to access health care services. The requirement that the 
rights must be realised depending on available resources can limit the ability to obtain 
constitutional guarantees. 84 Two outcomes of this qualification of ‘available resources’ 
are outlined to show the effect it has on the progressive realisation of rights.  
 
                                                 
81 See Bilchitz above note 70 at 56A-8. 
82 Carstens and Pearmain above note 10 at 63. 
83 Above note 82. In TAC the Court held that ‘The Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and 
focused role for the courts, namely, to require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional 
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Such determinations of 
reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves directed at rearranging 
budgets’. See TAC  above note 8 para 38 at 1047F. 
84 Bilchitz above note 57 at p20. 
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One, the requirement of realising rights progressively within available resources ‘places 
both a duty on the state and allows the state to raise a defence to a claim alleging that its 
progress in realising the rights is unreasonable’.85 The Court held in Grootboom that the 
obligation to take measures to fulfil the right does not require the state to do more than its 
available resources permit.86 The state can however not postpone its obligation to give 
full effect to the right indefinitely87 and must use the resources that it has to its disposal 
effectively and sufficiently.88 The state must also provide evidence of measures taken 
within its available resources to progressively realise the right in question.89  
 
Two, the court found in Soobramoney that the ‘rights themselves are limited by reasons 
of lack of resources’.90  Bilchitz submits that this suggests that the availability of 
resources must also be considered in defining the very content of the right itself.91 In 
                                                 
85 S Liebenberg above note 57 at 33:44. See also Liebenberg and Pillay above note 16 at 30. The authors 
goes on to note that the state must make sure that it correctly prioritises its budgetary and other resources to 
enable it to fulfil its constitutional commitment. 
86 Grootboom above note 7 para 46 at 70G. It has been said that when availability of resources are 
considered in relation to health care services regard must not only be given to the immediate cost of the 
treatment but also the duration of the treatment and the long terms savings, if the treatment is successful 
should be taken into account. See Van Bueren: above note 24  at 22-16. 
87 Liebenberg and Pillay above note 85. See also Ngwena above note 1at 21-22. Section 237 of the 
Constitution is again relevant here. 
88 Liebenberg and Pillay above note 16 at  31. 
89 Ngwena above note 1 at 21. See also Bilchitz above note 57 at 21-23. Bilchitz also sums up the 
Constitutional Court’s criteria to the notion of ‘available resources’  as follows: 
 firstly, the Court will focus its enquiry upon the current allocations within a particular department that is 
directed towards the realization of a particular right; secondly, the Court will be more ready to order 
reallocations within existing budgets rather than require an increased budget in a particular area; and 
finally, the Court will not readily accept a defence that there is a lack of available resources where the 
exclusion of individuals or groups from a government programme constitutes unlawful discrimination or a 
serious invasion of dignity.89 See Bilchitz above note 70 at  56A-8. For a summary of the Constitutional 
Court’s stance on reviewing government policy and budgets for socio-economic rights and the reasons for 
their cautious approach see  Khoza above note 4  at 146. See also Ngwena above note 19 at 33 for a critique 
of the Constitutional Court approach in Soobramoney in respect of the available resources limitation. 
90 Soobramoney above note 5 para 11 at 1701E. This interpretation by the Court that the right not to be 
refused emergency medical treatment would also depend the availability of resources has been criticised by 
Pieterse where he notes inter alia  that such an interpretation of section 27(3) did not accord with the 
textual setting of the provision. See Pieterse above note 32 at 83-85.  
91 Bilchitz above note 57 at 19. 
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other words, the availability of resources is considered an element of the right without 
which the right itself cannot be recognised. Where the recognition of the right depends on 
the availability of resources it could mean that the state will be slow to give effect to it.  
 
 In terms of the CRC which is binding on South Africa, State Parties must use the 
‘maximum’ of their resources to fulfil the right to health.92 The wording of the CRC 
appears to be more forceful then section 27(2). However Ngwena finds the formulation of 
section 27 to be realistic because it is sensitive to the ‘quality and quantity of resources 
that a state can realistically marshal’. 93  Carstens and Pearmain also support this view 
and regard the requirement of available resources as the ‘saving grace’ of the right of 
access to health care services because it is flexible and makes the right practically 
implementable.94 Bilchitz seem to express the same views but focuses his argument on 
the recognition of the right even when current resource availability does not make it 
possible to fulfil the right. 95 He submits that ‘[t]he recognition that people have rights 
even where there is no ability to realise them is important in that it recognised that in a 
world of scarcity, there are often cases where people are not able to acquire what they are 
entitled to. It suggests that as the scarcity is lessened, there are entitlements that are 
already in existence which must now be realised.’ 96 This is exactly the point that 
Carstend and Pearmain make, that the requirement of available resources has the ability 
to adept to circumstances. 
                                                 
92 Convention on the Rights of the Child article 4 read with article 24. In terms of international law 
‘available resources’ includes resources the State has mobilised from the private or the international sector. 
See Chapman and Russel above note 53 at 10. See also Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
above note 77 at para 13. 
93Ngwena  above note 19 at 31. 
94 Carstens and Pearmain above note 10 at 77. 
95 Bilchitz above note 57 at 21. 
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 Although it is clear that the concepts of available resources and progressive realisation do 
apply to children’s rights it is unclear to what extent they apply to the children’s clause 
given that section 28 does not refer to them. The Constitutional Court judgements do not 
clarify this. In a recent Pretoria High Court judgement97 the court noted that section 28 
does not contain internal limitations ‘subjecting children’s socio-economic rights to the 
availability of resources and legislative measures for their progressive realisation’. It 
found that although children’s rights are generally subject to ‘proportional and reasonable 
limitations’ (in terms of the limitation clause) ‘the absence of any internal limitation 
entrenches the rights as unqualified and immediate’. Furthermore the court said that 
‘budgetary implications ought not to compromise the enforcement of the rights and in 
this case urgent needs of the children outweighed the minimal costs or budgetary 
allocation problems’.98 It is submitted that this court was able to come to this conclusion 
because its focus was on the children’s clause only and it applied the clause to the 
circumstances of children only. This was not the case in Grootboom where the 
Constitutional Court was considering the link between section 26 and section 28 and how 
children’s right to shelter tied in with their parent’s right to housing. If the parties before 
the Constitutional Court in Grootboom were children only and the right to basic shelter 
was the only right in issue the court could have come to a different conclusion in its 
interpretation of section 28. 
                                                                                                                                                 
96 Above note 95. 
97 Centre for Child Law and Others v MEC for Education and Others Case no 19559/06 30 June 2006 
unreported. 
98Above note 97 at page 7 of the judgement. This reasoning is in line with the Constitutional Court’s 
conclusion in Khosa that given the impact the exclusion of non South African permanent residents to 
access social assistance had on their life and dignity, the denial of access far outweighed the financial  
considerations relied on by the State. See Khosa above note 9 para 82 at 539-540I-A. 
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  In the meantime the findings of the Constitutional Court thus far makes it clear that 
qualifications of progressive realisation and available resources do apply to children’s 
rights because they overlap with the socio-economic rights set out for everyone in the 
Constitution. Taking this into account and the reality that all socio economic rights in 
general do have financial implications for the state and that they are of such a nature that 
giving full effect to them takes time,99 it remains to be seen whether the Constitutional 
Court will follow the approach of the Pretoria High Court should a similar case arise, but 
given its reluctance to interpret children’s rights as separate rights from those given to 
everyone else, it is very unlikely.  
 
To this end, the Court’s interpretation of children’s rights can be criticised for not 
according children’s rights the priority they deserve. 100 Horsten et al argue that while no 
right is absolute, the fact that the wording of section 28 contains no internal limitation 
should convey a sense of priority in respect of children.101  By applying the 
reasonableness approach to children’s rights it mean that children’s rights are the same as 
everyone else rights, 102 which leaves one to wonder why the constitutional drafters chose 
to separate children’s rights at all. This interpretation of socio-economic rights is not 
unique in its application to the children’s clause but rather falls generally in line with the 
Court’s reluctance to interpret socio-economic rights as guaranteeing direct claims for 
                                                 
99 Note de Vos’ article where he clearly demonstrates that financial implications are not exclusive to socio-
economic rights but that civil and political rights also places financial burden on the state. P de Vos  (1995) 
SAPR/PL 233 at 235. The author further goes on to demonstrate the falsity of this distinction between 
socio-economic rights and civil and political rights at 239-244. 
100Chirwa above note 57 at 190. See also Horsten and Jansen van Rensburg above note 57 at 127.   
101 Horsten and Jansen van Rensburg   above note 100. See also M Shung-King et al above note 34 at 138. 
102 Chirwa above note 100. 
 39
material assistance from the State.103 This reluctance does not accord with international 
law standards which apply to South Africa where claims for direct or indirect material 
assistance from the State are guaranteed as part of the States obligations to give effect to 
the rights.104  
 
2.4.5 GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 
Although an exploration of children’s health-rights entitlements need not go further than 
the text of the provisions hosting those rights, a discussion on the obligations attached to 
these rights is not complete without a consideration of the general obligations which 
apply to these rights and which are found in section 7 (2) of the Constitution. In line with 
international law, section 7(2) provides that the state has the duty to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.105 This includes socio-economic rights.  
 
There appears to be common understanding of the meaning applied to the state’s duties to 
protect, respect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.106 The duty to respect 
                                                 
103 Liebenberg above note 57 at 33-50-51. 
104 CRC art 18(2) and art 20(2) of the African Charter. See also . Rosa and Dutschke above note 53 at 233. 
105 These duties are also described as the primary, secondary and tertiary duty,  primary duty (duty to 
respect); secondary duty  (duty to protect) and tertiary duty (duty to fulfil). Sandra Fredman 2006 Public 
Law  498 at 500. 
106 See, South African Human Rights Commission ‘The Right to Health Care, 5th Economic and Social 
Rights Report Series. 2002/2003 Financial Year. 21 June 2004 Introductory Section (ix) footnotes 5-8. In 
the 6th Economic and Social Rights Report 2006 the Commission builds on the previous interpretation of 
these obligations and summarise them in the Introduction of the report as follows:  
The duty to respect implies an immediate obligation on the state to refrain from legislation or other actions 
that interfere with the enjoyment of these rights. The obligation to protect requires the state to take 
measures to prevent the right from being interfered with by state and non-state actors. The duty to promote 
and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights requires positive action on the part of the state to take legislative 
and other measures to assist individuals and other groups in obtaining access to their right.  See also Khoza 
above note 4 at 35-37 and S Liebenberg and K Pillay above note 16 at  35-38. S Liebenberg above note 57 
at 33-6. For practical examples of how these duties would apply to the right to health care services 
generally L London and L Baldwin-Ragaven (2006) 20 at 22. For examples on how these duties would 
apply in other circumstances see A Skelton and P Proudlock (2007) ‘Interpretation, objects, application and 
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requires the state not to interfere with the enjoyment of the right. In respect of children’s 
health service rights, it means that the state should not carry out, sponsor or tolerate any 
conduct which obstructs or hampers children’s enjoyment of their health service rights.107 
The positive obligation to protect the right commands the state to prevent third parties 
from violating children’s health service rights. The obligation to promote the right places 
a positive obligation on the state to ‘create a conducive atmosphere in which people can 
exercise their rights through public education’.108 When it comes to the duty to fulfil, the 
right the state is required to actively assist individuals in realising the right by putting 
measures in place to facilitate such realisation. For example, by making primary health 
care services free of charge to children under the age of 6,109 the state is actively assisting 
indigent children of that age to realise their right to basic health care services.  
 
These obligations have been explained as meaning two things in respect of the role of the 
State, namely,  
‘To create an enabling environment which makes it possible for people to gain 
access to the rights and improve their quality of life, and to remove barriers in the 
way of people gaining access to the rights, to adopt special measures to assist 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to gain access to the rights.’ 110
 
                                                                                                                                                 
implementation of the Children’s Act’ in C Davel and A Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act 
1-1 at 1-7-8.   
107 South African Human Rights Commission above note 106.  Introductory Section (ix) footnotes 5-8. 
108 Above note 107. 
109 National Health Act 61 of 2003 section 4(3)(a). 
110 Liebenberg and Pillay above note 16 at 27. 
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In order to give effect to children’s health service rights the state is thus obliged to fulfil 
these positive and negative obligations.111 Although the internal limitations qualify the 
states positive obligations it has been accepted by the Constitutional Court that such 
limitations do not apply to the states negative obligations not to interfere with current 
enjoyment of existing rights (duty to respect). 112  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION  
The Constitutional Court in Grootboom considered the difference between children’s 
right to shelter found in section 28 and everyone’s right to housing set out in section 26, 
but no equivalent investigation has been done regarding the different health care 
provisions specifically for children and for everyone in general. Bilchitz notes correctly 
that ‘the TAC judgement is notable for the virtual absence of any analysis of what the 
right to have access to health care services involves.’113 This chapter explored the scope 
and content of children’s health service rights by focusing on the obligations and 
entitlements created by those rights. The significance about the entitlements and 
obligations attached to health care services is the power that comes with it. As far as 
children are concerned these rights give them the power to demand that health care 
services, in whatever form they are needed and available are accessible to them and also 
reveal to them the identity of those responsible for ensuring the effective exercise of this 
power. Although this chapter focused on the state’s responsibilities in relation to health 
                                                 
111 ‘The distinction between negative and positive obligations may be outlines as follows: a negative 
obligation consist in having a duty not to interfere with the ability of someone to do someone to do 
something they are entitled to do; a positive obligation, on the other hand, requires one to act in a particular 
way to provide something for someone’. See Bilchitz above note 57 at 7 
112 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others, Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA140 (CC) see paras 31-33. 
 Grootboom para 34 TAC, para 46 and Jaftha para 34 
113 Bilchitz above note 57 at 6. 
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service rights they are not the only ones with obligations to children in respect of these 
rights. In fact the Constitutional Court has made it clear that parents are primarily 
responsible for giving effect to children’s rights114 but the state is obliged to ensure that 
children’s rights are protected when parental or family care is not available where for 
example the parents are too poor and are thus unable to provide the child with the care 
needed.115  
 
Obligations and entitlements in respect of health service rights also gives children the 
power to hold those responsible for facilitating the enjoyment of their health service 
rights when they neglect those responsibilities. In this respect the Constitutional Court 
has played a significant role and has developed the jurisprudence on the adjudication of 
socio-economic rights. In many respects this jurisprudence seems to fail children in that 
the benefits created by these rights has been found to rest on qualifications not originating 
from the wording of the children’s clause in section 28. However the jurisprudence on 
children’s socio-economic rights especially their health service rights is by no means in 
its final stage of development116 and the powers emanating from the entitlements and 
obligations attached to children’s health service rights should thus not be underestimated.  
 
                                                 
114 Grootboom above note 7 at para 77.  
115 TAC above note 8 at para 79. Thus where the right to parental or family care could not be implemented 
the state has a direct duty to give effect to all the socio-economic needs of children as set out in section 28. 
See also J Sloth-Nielsen ( 2005): Children’ in H Cheadle, D Davis and N Haysom (eds) ‘ South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2nd ed)  23-1at 23-12. See Shung-King et al above note 34 at 135. 
116 Infact the jurisprudence of socio-economic rights in general are still in an ‘embryonic stage of 
development’ See Devenish above note 4 at 106. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONSENT LAWS AND THE IMPACT OF CONSENT 
PROVISIONS IN THE CHILDREN’S ACT 38 OF 2005 ON CHILDREN’S 
ABILITY TO ACCESS HEALTH CARE SERVICE. 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
By conducting an investigation into the entitlements and obligations inherent in health 
service rights the first chapter gave meaning to the concept of health rights as found in 
the Constitution. This was necessary to address the issue of vagueness in respect of health 
service rights in light of an opinion describing health rights in international law as vague.  
In addressing this issue of vagueness chapter 1 reviewed the jurisprudence of socio-
economic rights and in doing so attempted to answer the question ‘what does health 
service rights give children as holders of this right? This chapter explores the transition of 
health rights from the confines of the Constitution into national legislation and into 
practice. The chapter focuses on one element of health service rights, namely, 
accessibility to investigate this transition as driven by legislation.  
 
Accessibility in this chapter relates to the ability of a person to access health care 
services1 and the primary focus here will be on a matter around accessibility, which 
affects children in a unique way, namely, consent. Described as ‘arguably one of the most 
contentious areas of international children’s rights,’2consent plays a big role particularly 
                                                 
1 In the same way as Khoza explains ‘access’ to mean ‘ability to get, have or use something’ S Khoza (ed) 
(2007) Socio-economic rights in South Africa: A resource book 274. The focus in this chapter is on 
children’s ability to get or use health care services. 
2 See G van Bueren (1998) ‘Children’s rights: balancing traditional values and cultural plurality’ in G 
Douglass  and L Sebba (eds) Children’s Rights and Traditional Values 15 at 20. Carstens and Pearmain 
note as well that the question of consent have proven to be problematic when it comes to medical treatment 
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when it comes to children’s ability to access health care services. In light of the 
enactment of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and the commencement of certain provisions 
of this Act,3 children’s consent to health care services can be considered afresh. The main 
aim of this chapter is to see how the consent provisions of the new Act and other 
legislation affect children’s access to health care services. 
 
To arrive at this conclusion, the chapter is set out as follows:4 Section 3.2 will look at the 
link between children’s access to health care services and children’s consent. Section 3.3 
considers the meaning of consent and the common law requirement of consent. Section 
3.4 looks at legislation, other than the Children’s Act, hosting consent provisions. Section 
3.5 will give a description of consent provisions in the new Children’s Act and Section 
3.6 will analyse these provisions so as to determine the impact they have on children’s 
health service rights. Section 3.7 will then conclude the chapter.  
 
3.2 THE LINK BETWEEN CONSENT AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH SERVICE 
RIGHTS 
                                                                                                                                                 
for minors. P Carstens and D Pearmain (2007) Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law 106-
107. 
3 Commencement of certain sections of the Children’s Act 2005 (Act No. 38 of 2005). (Proclamation No. 
13, 2007) GG 30030 3, July 29. All the provisions of this Act have not yet come into operation including 
some of the new sections on consent.  
4 Please note that some of the information used here is taken directly as found in my chapter in the South 
African Health Review. See P Mahery (2006) ‘Consent laws influencing children’s access to health care 
services’ in P Ijumba and A Padarath (eds) South African Health Review 167. 
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The Constitution5  protects children’s health service rights in sections 28(1)(c) and 276.  
In chapter 2 it was found that the right ‘to access’ health care services meant that 
government should put measures in place to facilitate people’s access to health care 
services by ensuring that such services are available, affordable and effective. ‘Access’ 
also means placing health care services within geographical, economic, sociological and 
physical reach, of all people in South Africa without discrimination.7  The issue of access 
to health care services engages the question of rules regarding consent to health care 
services in a very unique way. Although the issue of consent does have something to do 
with health care services being ‘reachable’ as noted above, it does not relate to health 
                                                 
5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
6 For convenience I restate the health service provisions relevant to this chapter: 
Section 28 
28. (1) Every child has the right –  
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services. [my emphasis] 
 
Section 27  
27. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to – 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
                              ……………………………… 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to      
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
7Carstens and Pearmain above note 2 at 41. In terms of international law the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Right has identified four dimensions of accessibility in respect of the right to health, 
namely, non discrimination, physical, environmental and financial accessibility. The dimensions of 
accessibility are outlined as follows: 
Non-discrimination: This means that health; health facilities, goods and services must be accessible to 
everyone especially the more vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population, in law and in fact, 
without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds. 
Physical accessibility: This requires that health facilities, goods and services and the underlying 
determinants of health must be within safe physical reach for all sectors of the population especially 
vulnerable and marginalized groups including children and adolescents. It also requires adequate access to 
buildings for people with disabilities. 
Economic accessibility (affordability): It requires health facilities, goods and services to be affordable to 
all. Payments for such services should be based on the principle of equity which demands that poorer 
households not to be disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer households. 
Information accessibility: It includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning 
health issues, but it should not impair the right to have personal health data treated with confidentiality. See 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14 The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health at  para 12 (b). 
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care services being geographically or economically reachable. ‘Consent’ in relation to the 
right to access health care services and in the context of this chapter, relates to the 
regulation of people’s ability to obtain health care services through the power of consent. 
In other words the issue of consent has to do with health care services being actually or 
factually ‘reachable’ or ‘unreachable’ due to the operation of consent laws. The word 
‘reachable’ should thus be interpreted to mean ‘accessible’ in the context of rules 
regarding consent.  
 
Placing the argument in a practical framework might facilitate better understanding of the 
link between the issue of consent and children’s health service rights, so consider the 
following. Consent laws determine that children of a certain age are able to access certain 
health care services on their own without the need for parental assistance or consent. This 
means that children who have not reached that age yet must be accompanied by their 
parents or guardians when they need health care services and only their parents or 
guardians can consent to the child receiving the relevant health care services (unless its 
an emergency and parents or guardians cannot be reached to give the necessary consent, 
then other rules apply). This shows that, depending on their ability to consent, different 
rules apply when children need to access health care services. Different rules regarding 
consent implies different treatment of children based on their capacity to consent. This 
different treatment can in turn impact on their ability to fully enjoy the guarantees of 
service accessibility which stem from their health service rights.  
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3.3 THE MEANING OF CONSENT8
Consent has been explained as ‘the legal and ethical expression of the human right to 
respect for autonomy and self-determination.’9 In more simple terms, consent is a 
manifestation of a person’s will.10 In order for consent to be valid certain requirements 
have to be complied with. These requirements are (a) the consent needs to be given by a 
person capable in law to give consent, (b) consent must be informed, (c) the consent must 
be clear and unequivocal, (d) the consent must be comprehensive,11 and (e) consent must 
also be given freely.12 These are briefly considered below.13
 
3.3.1 Consent needs to be given by a person capable in law to give consent.14
A child is considered capable in law of consenting when he or she has the capacity15 and 
the competence to consent. For decades, children have however been regarded in law as 
incapable of giving consent in certain circumstance because of their age.16 Legislation 
around the world usually sets age as a determinate of children’s capacity to consent. 
                                                 
8 B Wood and P Tuohy have explored the different ways in which consent is understood in different 
disciplines and professions and the number of theories which has been developed in this regard. See B 
Wood and P Tuohy (2000) ‘Consent in child health: upholding the participation rights of children and 
young people’  in A Smith, M  Gallop, K Marshall and K Nair (eds) Advocating for Children: International 
Perspectives on children’s rights 206 at  210-211. 
9 S Jennings (2003)  Medical Law and Individual Autonomy: Competing Perspectives. Galway Student Law 
Review Available at  http://www.nuigalway.ie/law/GSLR/2003/Medical%20Negligence.pdf [Accessed 12 
November 2007]  
10 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus 
Curiae 2005 (1) SA 509 (T) at p516. 
11 South African Law Commission (Project 122): Assisted Decision-making: Adults with impaired 
Decision-making capacity Discussion Paper 105 January 2004 45 at 57-58.  
12 C Burden-Osmond (2002) Defence Counsel Journal: Available at 
http://www.albusiness.com/legal/contracts-agreements/1067823-1.html Accessed 12 November 2007.  
13 See Castell v de Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) and R Thomas  (2007) SALJ 188 for more discussion on 
these requirements. 
14 W Joubert, J Faris  (2004)  L AWSA para 61 at 54. See also F Veriava (2004) SAJHR 309 at 312. 
15 ‘Capacity to consent depends on whether the person consenting is able to understand the nature of the act 
for which consent is required.’ W Joubert and J  Faris above note 14. 
16 Factors such as youth, mental defect, intoxication or unconsciousness affect capacity to consent. See W 
Joubert and J  Faris above note 14. 
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However this is not the only factor determining capacity to consent. In the case of 
Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others (Reproductive Health 
Alliance as Amicus Curiae)17 (herein after referred to as the Christian Lawyers case) the 
court noted that ‘capacity to consent depends on the ability to form an intelligent will on 
the basis of an appreciation of the nature and consequences of the act consented to.’ 18  
When it comes to competence, a child is considered competent to consent when he or she 
‘achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand 
fully what is proposed.’19  Although age is not the only factor determining a child’s 
ability in law to consent it is a factor which is able to negate the need to engage the other 
factors because of its inflexible nature. Despite this, legislatures around the world use 
ages of consent to make only those children who satisfy that age requirement (together 
with the competence requirement) capable in law of giving consent.  
 
                                                 
17 Christian lawyers above note10. 
18 Above note 10 at p515-516. The court went on to state that within the context of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, ‘actual capacity to give informed consent, as determined in each 
and every case by the medical practitioner, based on the emotional and intellectual maturity of the 
individual concerned …is the distinguishing line between those who may access the option to terminate 
their pregnancies unassisted on the one hand and those who require assistance on the other’ at p516. 
19 Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 ALL ER 402 at 423. Ngwena 
illustrates two approaches used to determine competence. The process approach considers the person’s 
ability to understand, to deliberate and express a preference about treatment without questioning the 
rationality or acceptability of the preference evinced. The outcome approach considers the rationality of the 
decision. According to him the process approach is preferred because it is in line with respect for self-
determination. See C Ngwena 1996 Acta Juridica 132 at 137-138. Freeman outlines seven levels of 
incompetence created by Beauchamp and Childress (2001)  
1. The inability to evidence a preference or a choice; 
2. The inability to understand one’s situation or relevantly similar situations; 
3. The inability to understand disclosed information; 
4. The inability to give a reason; 
5. The inability to give a rational reason; 
6. The inability to give reasons where risk and benefit have been weighed; 
7. The inability to reach a reasonable decision, as judged, for example, by a reasonable person 
standard.  
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3.3.2 Consent must be informed 
Informed consent generally requires the person giving consent to ‘understand the 
supplied information, comprehend the consequences of acting on that information, be 
able to assess the relative benefits and dangers of the proposed action, and be able to 
provide a meaningful response to the question of what should be done’.20 It also requires 
the health care system to supply the patient with all the relevant information regarding a 
proposed procedure or treatment before the patient consents to the procedure or treatment 
being carried out.21 The notion of informed consent respects a patients’ personal 
integrity, because it affirms the patient’s right to determine what happens to his or her 
body.22  
 
In the Christian Lawyers case provisions of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 
92 of 1996 were challenged as being unconstitutional and the issue of informed consent 
was considered. It was argued that the fact that the Act allowed girls under 18 to 
terminate their pregnancy without parental assistance or consent was unconstitutional 
because children under 18 did not have the ability to make decisions regarding a 
termination of pregnancies without assistance from their parents or guardians. In 
discussing the notion of informed consent the court found that the informed consent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Freeman however dismisses these by arguing that ‘if rights were to hinge on competence at any of the 
higher levels depicted [above] few [adults] would have them’. See M Freeman (2007) International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 5 at 12.  
20South African Law Commission above note 11 at 57-58. Thus to be considered ‘informed’ the consent 
must be based on substantial knowledge concerning the nature and effect of the act consented to. See W 
Joubert and J Faris (eds) (1999) LAWSA para 196 at 150. 
21 F Veriava above note 14. 
22 B Wood and P Tuohy above note 8 at 207. A failure to obtain informed consent may be construed as 
negligence in certain cases. Joubert and Faris (1999) above note 20 para 196 at 147. 
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requirement rests on three independent legs, namely, knowledge, appreciation and 
consent.23  
 
‘The requirement of ‘knowledge’ means that the woman who consents to 
the termination of a pregnancy must have full knowledge of the nature and 
extent of the harms or risk’. 
 
‘The requirement of ‘appreciation’ implies more than mere knowledge. 
The woman who gives consent to the termination of her pregnancy must 
also comprehend and understand the nature and extent of the harm or 
risk’. 
 
‘The last requirement of ‘consent’ means that the woman must in fact 
subjectively consent to the harm or risk associated with the termination of 
her pregnancy and her consent must be comprehensive in that it must 
extent to the entire transaction inclusive of its consequences’.  
 
The court found that what was central to the obtainment of termination of pregnancy 
services was the requirement of informed consent and that the Act did not allow any 
termination of pregnancy to take place where the woman was unable to give informed 
consent, despite her age. 24  
 
3.3.3-3.3.4 Consent must be clear, unequivocal and comprehensive 
Simply put this means that the doctor and patient must be absolutely clear about what 
exactly the patient has consented to.  The patient must leave ‘no doubt that he or she is 
                                                 
23 Christian lawyers above note 18. 
24 Above note 10 at p516. 
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prepared to undergo the suggested treatment notwithstanding the risk’.25 In other words 
the patient must be fully aware of what he or she is consenting to.26 That the consent 
must be ‘comprehensive’ implies that the informed consent process runs not only prior to, 
but also after the patient has received the treatment.27 This means that the health 
professional should still inform the patient ‘what is required once he has been discharged 
from hospital’.28  
 
3.3.5 Consent must be given freely 
Consent must not be induced by force, threats or fraud.29 In other words there must be an 
absence of any real or perceived coercive factors.30   
 
3.4 CONSENT LAWS (OTHER THAN THE CHILDREN’S ACT) HOSTING 
CONSENT PROVISIONS  
Section 27(2) of the Constitution requires the state to take legislative and other measures 
to realise everyone’s health service rights. As already established in chapter 1 of this 
theis, this obligation attaches to children’s section 28 rights as well. In response to these 
obligations, children health rights are given effect to in different pieces of legislation. 
What follows now is an exploration of some of this legislation, but particularly those 
                                                 
25 S Strauss (1991) Doctor, patient and the law: A selection of practical issues 12. 
26 W Joubert, and  J Faris (2004) above note 14 at 54. 
27 R Thomas  above note 13 at 191. 
28 Above note 27. 
29 W Joubert and J Faris (2004)  above note 14 at 54. See also G J Nobel (2006) ‘Consent, with Particular 
reference to HIV and AIDS’ CME (Continuing Medical Education): Your South African Journal of CPD 
79 at 79. 
30 C van Staden ‘Can involuntarily admitted patients give informed consent to participation in research? 
South African Journal of Psychiatry 10 at 12.  
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laws which contains provisions of consent with regards to children. For convenience I 
will refer to legislation which contain consent provisions as ‘consent laws’.  
 
The following laws are aimed at giving effect to children’s health service rights 
3.4.1The National Health Act 61 of 2003 (the Health Act)  
The Health Act is the main piece of legislation that sets out the general rules and 
regulations regarding health care procedures. Although the entire Act is not yet in force 
the provisions relating to consent are already operational.31 The rules of consent are 
provided for in section 7 of the National Health Act. This section    requires a user to give 
informed consent before a health care service may be provided to the user.  Section 1 
provides that where ‘the person receiving treatment or using a health service is below the 
age of consent as established under the Child Care Act then ‘user’ includes the person’s 
parent or guardian or another person authorised by law to act on the first mentioned 
person’s behalf’.32 The National Health Act thus refers to the Child Care Act for the age 
threshold regarding children’s consent (see below for ages set out by the Child Care Act). 
To the extent that the Children’s Act will repeal the Child Care Act once the new Act 
becomes fully operational, the reference to the Child Care Act in the Health Act will 
accordingly be replaced by a reference to the Children’s Act.  
 
3.4.2 The Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
                                                 
31 Proclamation of National Health Act, 2003. Government Gazette No. 27503 3, 18 April 2005. 
32 In accordance with the requirement of informed consent the Health Act requires the user to have full 
knowledge of a range of issues relating to the treatment or health service such as his/her health status, the 
range of treatment options, benefits, risks and costs of the treatment. See Section 6. 
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Due to the fact that the provisions regarding consent to medical treatment and surgical 
operation in the new Children’s Act are not yet operational the relevant provisions of the 
Child Care Act are still law. According to the Child Care Act a child can consent to 
his/her own medical treatment without the assistance of a parent or a guardian at the age 
of 14.33  Furthermore at the age of 18 years a child (now considered a major in terms of 
the Children’s Act)34 can consent to his/her own operation without parental or guardian 
assistance.35   
 
3.4.3 The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 
The issue of consent is addressed in section 536 of the Act. Informed consent must be 
given and only the pregnant woman needs to consent. A woman is defined as a female of 
any age.37  This means that the ages of consent regarding medical treatment and surgery 
in terms of the Child Care Act as well as the Children’s Act (once fully operational), do 
not apply to girls requiring a termination of pregnancy either through medical treatment 
or surgery.  Although the health care worker must advise a minor to consult with her 
                                                 
33 Section 39 (4) (b). 
34 Section 17 of the Children’s Act. This section is operational. 
35 Section 39 (4) (a) of the Child Care Act. Although the Child Care Act does not explicitly mention the 
requirement of valid consent the common law rules regarding consent must be complied with and the child 
must understand what he/she is consenting to and consent must be informed, given, freely and equivocally. 
The Child Care Act also needs to be read with the National Health Act to provide comprehensive 
understanding regarding children and consent to health care. 
36 Only the relevant parts of the section is provided hereunder 
Section 5: Consent  
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (4) and (5), the termination of a pregnancy may only take 
place with the informed consent of the pregnant woman. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other law or the common law, but subject to the provisions of subsections  
(4) and (5), no consent other than that of the pregnant woman shall be required for the termination 
of a pregnancy 
(3) In the case of a pregnant minor, a medical practitioner or a registered midwife or registered nurse, 
as the case may be, shall advise such minor to consult with her parents, guardian, family members 
or friends before the pregnancy is terminated: Provided that the termination of the pregnancy shall 
not be denied because such minor chooses not to consult them. 
37 Section 1. 
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parents or guardians, the termination of pregnancy cannot be denied if she chooses not to 
consult with them. 38 Thus, no parental or guardian assistance is required at any stage 
unless the girl agrees thereto. However, as the Christian Lawyers case indicated, 
informed consent rather than age is the key regulation to accessing termination of 
pregnancy under this Act.39  
 
3.4.4 Sterilisation Act 44 of 1998  
Sterilisation can only be performed if a person who is capable of consenting consents 
thereto and that person is 18 years of age. 40  This implies that where a person is capable 
of consenting but below 18 then sterilisation cannot take place.41 A child under 18 can 
only be sterilised if failure to sterilise would result in his/her life being in jeopardy or 
his/her physical health being seriously impaired.42 In the case of a child under 18 year old 
the sterilisation can only take place if consent has been given by parents or guardians and 
when an independent medical practitioner has consulted with the child and has provided a 
written opinion to the effect that the sterilisation is in the best interest of that child.43  
 
3.4.5 Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 
                                                 
38 Above note 36. 
39 Ellis and Faris (eds) (2006) LAWSA: Cumulative Supplement at 381. 
40 Section 2. 
41 Carstens and Pearmain above note 2 at 100. 
42 Above note 40. The Sterilisation Amendment Act 3 of 2005 has made some changes to the main Act one 
of which is  the requirement of ‘informed consent’ and not merely ‘consent’ as prescribed in the main Act. 
43 Section 2(3)(i)(ii).  
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Where a mental health care user needing assisted care, treatment and rehabilitation44  is 
below 18 years, an application for such care, treatment and services must be made by the 
parent or guardian of the user.45 The Mental Health Care Act does not make it explicitly 
clear at what age a child can voluntarily consent to be a mental health care user. It states 
simply that voluntary care, treatment and rehabilitation means the provision of health 
interventions to ‘a person’ who gives consent to such intervention.46 Furthermore it 
stipulates that a mental health care user, who submits voluntarily to a health 
establishment for care, treatment and rehabilitation services, is entitled to such care and 
services. In the absence of anything to the contrary it is submitted that in accordance with 
the provisions of the National Health Act and the Child Care Act (until its medical and 
surgical consent provisions are repealed) that a child needing mental health care in the 
form of medical treatment could at 14 years of age submit himself as a voluntary patient 
to access the treatment. If the mental health care involves surgery then an 18 year old 
could submit himself as a voluntary patient for the treatment. 
 
3.5: LAW REFORM: THE CHILDREN’S ACT 38 OF 2005 
The new Children’s Act was signed into law in June 2006 and came into operation 
partially in July 2007. Some of the provisions relating to children’s consent to health care 
services were among those that came into operation. The new Act has brought and will 
still bring significant changes to current consent legislation. The Child Care Act in 
                                                 
44‘[A]ssisted care, treatment and rehabilitation’ means the provision of health interventions to people 
incapable of making informed decisions due to their mental health status and who do not refuse the health 
interventions. Where the health care intervention is provided to a person who is incapable of making 
informed decision due to his/her mental health status and that person  refuses the health intervention but 
requires it for his/her protection or the protection of others then that person is an involuntary mental health 
care user. Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. 
45 Section 27 (1) (a) (i) of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 
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particular will be repealed once the new Act commences fully. However some of the 
provisions of the new law have already replaced the operation of certain health services 
regulated through the Child Care Act. In this section the new provisions are set out and 
discussed in order to explore the impact that they have on children’s right to access health 
care services. This section of the chapter is set out as follows: A brief history of the new 
law is provided followed by a description of the new provisions. This is then followed by 
a discussion of the new law for an assessment of the improvements and challenges this 
new law will bring for the fulfilment of children’s health service rights.   
 
3.5.1 Background to the Children’s Act47
Ten years ago the South African Law Commission (the Commission) was instructed to 
review the Child Care Act and to make recommendations for law reform to the Minister 
of Social Development.48  Presented with this incredible task the Commission envisioned 
a law reform with the objective to produce a comprehensive children’s statute based on: 
constitutional protection for the rights of children as commanded by the Constitution, the 
enforcement of these rights through the courts, the impact of HIV/AIDS on children; and 
South Africa’s international obligations in terms of the Children’s Convention and the 
African Charter.49
 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002  
47 For a more detailed and comprehensive account of the law reform process resulting in the Children’s Act 
as it currently stands see  A Skelton and P Proudlock (2007) ‘Interpretation, objects, application and 
implementation of the Children’s Act’ in C Davel and A Skelton (eds) Commentary on the Children’s Act 
1-1 at 1-12-19. 
48 South African Law Commission ‘Review of the Child Care Act’ Discussion Paper 103 (Project 110) 
2002 Executive Summary at 1. 
49 Above note 48. 
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After considering children’s health rights, the Commission recommended that the age of 
consent for medical treatment without parental assistance should be lowered from 14 to 
12 but that children below 18 should not be allowed to consent to surgery without their 
parents.50  The Commission further recommended that there should be exceptions to the 
general rule in that a child of any age should be entitled to obtain information on and 
access to contraceptives and that any child should be able to obtain treatment for sexually 
transmitted diseases at any age.51   
 
Following its review process the Commission drafted a Children’s Bill which contained 
their recommendations and handed it to the Minister of Social Development in 2003.  
After considering the Bill in that same year it was tabled before Parliament. Due to the 
fact that the Bill contained provisions of current jurisdiction in terms of section 76 of the 
Constitution as well as provision in which national parliament had exclusive jurisdiction 
as set out in section 75 of the Constitution it was necessary to split the Bill into two parts. 
These two parts were then commonly referred to as section 75 Bill and the section 76 
Bill. The section 75 Bill was considered first by Parliament. This Bill contained the 
provisions relating to the issue of children’s consent to health care services. The Bill was 
                                                 
50 Above note 48 Chapter 11 at 470.  
51 The Commission’s recommendations were based on four factors which it considered, namely 
(1) the South African law and policy: here the Commission considered the Constitution, legislation and 
relevant case law, (2) the difficulties medical practitioners have in implementing consent provisions of the 
Child Care Act:  It was found that practitioners found it hard to obtain parental consent in non-emergency 
situations, (3) comparative law: The Commission found that many countries had exceptions to the general 
rules relating to consent (Such as exceptions allowing practitioners to treat a minor with a sexually 
transmitted disease without parental consent). The Commission found that in California children aged 12 
could consent to medical treatment but that other conditions had to be met as well. (4) An evaluation of the 
recommendations and comments received in this regard also contributed to the recommendations made by 
the Commission. Above note 48 at 464-471. 
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passed and signed by the President in 2006 and is now called the Children’s Act 38 of 
2005. As said before, the Act came into operation partially on 1 July 2007.52
 
3.5.2 Description of new consent provisions under Act 38 of 2005 
The relevant provisions regarding consent are set out in Chapter 7, Part 3 of the Act with 
the heading ‘Protective measures relating to the health of Children’. 
 
3.5.2.1 Consent to medical treatment 
This is covered in section 129 of the Act. This entire section is not in operation. In 
relation to medical treatment the relevant parts of section 129 (2) reads:  
129 (2) A child may consent to his or her own medical treatment or to the medical 
treatment of her child if- 
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
(b) the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to 
understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the 
treatment 
 
The Act will thus lower the age of consent to medical treatment from 14 to 12 years of 
age.  However a safeguard is created to further protect children by explicitly requiring the 
child to be of sufficient maturity and have the mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
risks and social implications of the treatment. This is referred to as the maturity test in 
this chapter (and in chapter 4) and will be elaborated on later in the chapter when the 
issue of maturity is discussed separately.  
                                                 
52 See Proclamation above note 3. The section 76 Bill which is now known as the Children’s Amendment 
Bill [B 19B—2006] has been passed by the National Council of Provinces in May this year and has also 
been passed by the National Assembly in November.  Once this Amendment Bill is finalised and signed by 
the President it will together with the Children’s Act of 2005 form the new children’s law in South Africa. 
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 3.5.2.2 Consent to surgical operations 
With regards to surgery, section 129(3) reads as follows: 
129(3) A child may consent to the performance of a surgical operation on him or her or 
 his or her child if— 
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
(b) the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand 
the  benefits, risks, social and other implications of the surgical operation; and 
(c) the child is duly assisted by his or her parent or guardian. 
 
At age 12 a child can thus consent to his/her surgical operation and the child must be 
sufficiently mature to understand the implications and consequences of the operation.  
The child also has to be duly assisted by his/her parent or guardian.  
 
3.5.2.3 HIV-testing, counselling and disclosing HIV-status53
There was no specific legislation that dealt with HIV testing before the new Act was 
promulgated. Much confusion existed as to whether HIV testing fell under the term 
‘medical treatment’, and according to a legal opinion given to the Department of Social 
Development; HIV testing did in fact fall under ‘medical treatment.54 This is however no 
longer an issue since the provisions in the Children’s Act relating to HIV testing have 
come into operation and deals with HIV testing separate from medical treatment. The 
                                                 
53 Sections 130-134 of the Act. 
54 L Gerntholtz . South Africa: Safeguarding Children’s Rights to Medical Care. Submission on the 
Children’s Bill. Portfolio Committee on Social Development. National Assembly, 27 July 2004. Human Rights 
Watch website.   http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/27/safric9150.htm [accessed 9 October 2007]. 
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sections stipulates that a child can only be tested for HIV where the test is in the best 
interest of the child and consent is provided, or where testing is necessary for the reasons 
set out in the Act.55  The relevant parts of section 130(2) provides the following: 
130 (2) Consent for a HIV-test on a child may be given by— 
(a) the child, if the child is— 
(i) 12 years of age or older; or 
(ii) under the age of 12 years and is of sufficient maturity to understand the 
benefits, risks and social implications of such a test; 
 
The ages of consent for an HIV test are reduced to 12 and lower if the child passes the 
maturity test. At face value it seems as if the Act does not require a 12-year-old to pass 
the maturity test. It is submitted however, that this ‘omission’ on the part of the 
legislature can be cured with the common law requirement of informed consent, which 
applies in all instances when any health care service is to be provided. The application of 
this requirement should thus prevent an immature 12-year-old from accessing an HIV 
test. These rules also apply in respect of children consenting to the disclosure of their 
HIV status.  
 
3.5.2.4 Contraceptives 
                                                 
55 Section 130 (1) 
 Subject to section 132, no child may be tested for HIV except when— 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child and consent has been given in terms of 
subsection (2); or 
(b) the test is necessary in order to establish whether— 
(i) a health worker may have contracted HIV due to contact in the course of 
a medical procedure involving contact with any substance from the 
child’s body that may transmit HIV; or 
(ii) any other person may have contracted HIV due to contact with any 
substance from the child’s body that may transmit HIV, provided the test has been authorised by a court. 
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The provisions in the Children’s Act regarding contraceptives are in operation and reads 
as follows: 
Section 134.  
(1) No person may refuse— 
(a) to sell condoms to a child over the age of 12 years; or 
(b) to provide a child over the age of 12 years with condoms on request 
where such condoms are provided or distributed free of charge. 
(2) Contraceptives other than condoms may be provided to a child on request by 
the child and without the consent of the parent or care-giver of the child if— 
(a) the child is at least 12 years of age; 
(b) proper medical advice is given to the child; and 
(c) a medical examination is carried out on the child to determine whether 
there are any medical reasons why a specific contraceptive should not be 
provided to the child. 
 
As was the case with HIV testing, there was also no particular legislation that previously 
governed access to contraceptives for children. There was however a Policy Guideline on 
Contraception.56 Furthermore, some contraceptives fell under medical treatment in terms 
of the Child Care Act and the age of consent for it was 14. This age threshold was also 
endorsed by the Policy.57 Under the Children’s Act children can now access 
contraceptives at the age of 12 if the conditions are complied with. 
 
3.6 ANALYSIS OF THE CHILDREN’S ACT 
What needs to be considered now is the effect that these new consent provisions have on 
children’s health rights. Does it advance or hamper their ability to exercise their rights? 
                                                 
56 National Department of Health  ‘Policy framework for the provision and use of contraceptives’ in 
National Contraception Policy Guidelines Part 1 1-11 Part 2 18-38 2001 
http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/policy-f.html Accessed 1 August 2007. 
57 Above note 56 Part 1 at 15. 
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What, if anything, are the complications and challenges it brings to children’s health 
service rights. This is discussed by considering four aspects in the Children’s Act 
regarding consent for children’s health care services, namely, (1) the reduction of the age 
of consent, (2) the right to refuse consent when it comes to children’s health care 
services, (3) the maturity test; and finally (4) general implications of specific provisions 
for children’s health rights.  
 
3.6.1 The age of consent 
Consent is necessary and needed at all times when obtaining health care services. The 
right to privacy and physical integrity guaranteed to everyone demands respect for human 
autonomy and it is this respect for human autonomy that sets the requirement of consent 
as a precondition for enabling a health practitioner to supply a particular health care 
service to a patient.58 When it comes to children legislatures around the world set 
particular ages for consent which would determine a child’s ability to consent to medical 
treatment or surgery on their own without the need to have their parents’ consent or 
assistance. This approach followed by legislatures is called the status approach.59 As is 
clear from the legislation set out above, South Africa has been following this approach 
for a while and continues to do so again in the Children’s Act. 
 
                                                 
58 Consent to health care services such as medical treatment or surgery is also necessary to protect the 
health care provider from possible litigation as a result of a lack of prior consent from the patient. 
59 This is an approach in which age restrictions are used by legislatures to determine a child’s competency 
to make informed decisions. It is one of three approaches used to determine capacity and competence of 
children’s decision making ability. See P Alderson and J Montgomery (1996)  Health Care Choices: 
Making decisions with children’ 72.  The other two approaches have been describes as follows: (1) the 
approach based on an assessment of capacity to perform the function of taking the decision in question and 
(2) the approach which relies on considering the wisdom of the outcome of the child’s decision. 
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The use of this approach could affect children’s ability to access health care services. It 
might have negative or positive outcomes for children’s fulfilment of their health service 
rights. In light of the continuous use of this approach particularly in health care 
legislation, it is submitted that a more focused impact analysis of this approach would 
benefit the health rights discussions being undertaken here. To this end a continuation of 
the investigation into the effects of the Children’s Act on children’s health service rights 
is undertaken in Chapter 3 where the impact of the status approach on children’s health 
rights will be explore separately.  Having said that, what must be dealt with here is the 
narrow point regarding the practical implications that reducing the age of consent would 
have on children’s ability to access health care services. 
 
3.6.1.1 Reduction of age of consent 
In the Children’s Act the legislature chose to lower the age of consent to medical 
treatment and surgery to 12 and even gives children below 12 the power to consent to 
HIV testing on their own. Setting the age threshold at 12 (and younger) is significant in 
itself,60 and has sparked different reactions from the public61  and academic experts.62 
But what are the practical implications of this age reduction?  
                                                 
60 Research indicates that the age group between 14-15 is set to be the ‘approximate age that marks the 
transition from incompetence to universal competence regarding any treatment procedure, whether they are 
medical or surgical.’ See Ngwena above note 19 note 20 at 138.  See also R Weir and C Peters (2005) 
‘Affirming the decisions adolescents make about life and death’ in M Freeman (ed) Children, medicine and 
the law  at p560 which outlines a study done by The Committee on Child Psychiatry where it was found 
when assessing adolescent decision-making capacity that ‘by 14 most children would be ready to 
participate meaningfully in the consent process in regard to research [and] there is little disagreement that 
above 14, all potential subjects must give their informed consent separate from their parents’ However 
others  have found that “the capacity to make an intelligent choice, involving the ability to consider 
different options and consequences, generally appear in a child somewhat between the ages of 11 and 14’ 
See M Slabbert ‘Parental access to minors’ health records in the South African health care context: 
Concerns and Recommendations' (2005) vol 24 No4  Medicine and Law 743. 
61 The following remarks appear from the Sowetan  newspapers: 
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 It has been noted in practice that ‘the issue of who can give consent for the treatment of 
children…can block children’s access to doctors offices and hospitals as much as lack of 
financial resources.’63 Situations where parents first need to be traced before a health care 
service can be provided to a child below the age of consent, yet competent to consent 
would result in that child’s access to health care services being delayed or postponed until 
such consent is obtained. The situation is even more problematic when there are no 
parents able to give the necessary consent. By lowering the age of consent the legislature 
increases the amount of children who will be able to access medical treatment and 
contraceptives without parental or guardian’s assistance, if they are mature enough to 
consent. For this particular group of children in need of medical treatment or 
contraceptives the reduction of the age of consent could diminish the amount of delays 
experienced when parental consent is required but is not readily available or not wanted 
by the child. The reduction of the age of consent with regards to surgical operations 
would also be considered a welcome change for those who have criticised the Child Care 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘The section about HIV testing in the Act will cause both physical and emotional trauma for 12 year olds” 
The consequences of HIV/AIDS results are too overwhelming for a 12 year old to handle’ See Z 
Mapumulo and R Mangope ‘Law allows kids private abortions’ Sowetan, July 5 2007 at14. 
‘12 year olds are too young and immature to make responsible decisions’ 
‘Only children older than 15 might be sufficiently mature to make decisions about their health’ See K 
Seekoei & M Buthelezi ‘Dads get rights’ Sowetan July 12 2007 at 3. 
‘For the government to burden 12 year olds with momentous decisions such as medical treatment, surgical 
operations and HIV-testing without parental consent is not right.” “At 12 the maturity level of a child is at 
its weakest point to cope with the result of their HIV status’ See Z Mapumulo ‘Act not good for children-
Mandela Fund’ Sowetan July 6 2007 at 9. 
62  A Skelton ‘Condoms for kids?’ Mail and Guardian July 13-19 2007 at 32. 
63 A Bittinger (2006) Florida Bar Journal 24. Retrieved 12 November 2007, from Westlaw online 
database.  
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Act for being overly restrictive by requiring the minor to be above 18 in respect of 
surgical treatment. 64  
 
A practical advantage of the reduction of the age of consent for children requiring surgery 
could be found in situations where young children below the current age of consent 
require surgery. In practice, a case could arise where a patient below 18 needs surgery 
which the responsible health care provider has advised him or her together with a parent 
to undergo, but the parent refuses to consent despite the child patient actually wanting to 
undergo the surgery. In this case the health care provider finds himself in the middle of 
conflicting interests between his or her patient and the person legally responsible for 
consenting to the surgery. The health provider will not be able to perform the surgery 
without the consent of the parent despite the approval of his patient and would either 
have to follow the instructions of the parent or attempt to get ministerial or court ordered 
consent. By lowering the age of consent for surgery to 12, the health care provider would 
be able to take instructions from his young patient who is assisted by a parent and would 
be saved in certain situations from having to deal with conflicting interests arising from a 
disagreement between a parent and a young patient below 18 years of age (but not 
younger than 12). 
 
On the other hand, the lowering of the age also has other implications for health care 
providers because they would now have to deal with an increased number of children 
capable of consenting to medical treatment without their parents. For example, in a case 
                                                 
64 To this end the South African legislature was said to be exercising far more circumspection then is 
warranted because empirical findings did not support such a high age to be required for children accessing 
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where a child’s age is questioned, health care workers have to follow certain procedure to 
determine the child’s age. With the increase in the amount of children now able to 
consent, health care workers may have to deal with an increased amount of children 
whose ages have to be determined if their age is not clear. Whereas health care workers 
only had to determine the age of those children who might or might not have been 14 
years of age for purposes of consent, they would now have to also determine the ages of 
those children who may or may not be 12 years of age for purposes of consent.  
 
 
3.6.2 Refusal of treatment 
 
Laws which give adolescents the right to consent often do not give them the right to 
refuse treatment.65 McQuoid-Mason notes that the right to consent to treatment includes 
the right to refuse treatment.66 It is submitted that health services rights read with the 
right to physical integrity protected under the Constitution entitles the right holder to 
obtain as well as to refuse health care services.67 Unlike the Child Care Act, the 
Children’s Act has specific provisions regarding the refusal of consent. Such refusal can 
also affect the ability of children to obtain health care services. This is explored below by 
looking at parents refusing treatment needed by their children and children refusing 
treatment for themselves. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
surgery’. See C Ngwena  above note 20 at 143 and 147.  
65 L Ross (2006) ‘Health care decision-making by children: Is it in their best interest?’ In M Freeman (ed) 
Children, medicine and the law 487 at 490. 
66 D McQuoid-Mason (2006) SAMJ 530 at 531. 
67 See Veriava above note 14  at 313. 
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The rules regarding refusal to consent to medical treatment and surgical operations are set 
out in section 129 of the Children’s Act and they read as follows: 
 
129 (7) The Minister may consent to the medical treatment of or surgical 
 operation on a child if the parent or guardian of the child— 
(a) Unreasonably refuses to give consent or to assist the child in giving 
consent; 
(b) is incapable of giving consent or of assisting the child in giving 
consent; 
(c) cannot readily be traced; or 
(d) is deceased. 
     (8) The Minister may consent to the medical treatment of or surgical operation
 on a child if the child unreasonably refuses to give consent. 
     (9) A High Court or children’s court may consent to the medical treatment of
 or a surgical operation on a child in all instances where another person that
 may give consent in terms of this section refuses or is unable to give such
 consent 
    (10) No parent, guardian or care-giver of a child may refuse to assist a child in
 terms of subsection (3) or withhold consent in terms of subsections (4) and
 (5) by reason only of religious or other beliefs, unless that parent or
 guardian can show that there is a medically accepted alternative choice to
 the medical treatment or surgical operation concerned. 
. 
 
3.6.2.1 Parents refusing consent  
When treatment for a child is withheld or delayed because a parent refuses to give 
consent a child’s right of access to treatment is again affected. Parents who refuse to 
grant consent to their children’s medical treatment or surgery usually do so for reasons 
that ‘pertain more to their rights as parents rather than the rights and interests of the 
child.’68  In most cases parents refuse to give the required consent for religious reasons.69 
Although there have not been cases in South Africa reported where adolescents sought 
                                                 
68C Breen (2006) Age Discrimination and Children’s Rights: Ensuring Equality and Acknowledging 
Difference 55. 
69 For an outline of comparative case law where parents refuse to consent to medical treatment for their 
children because of their religion see M Boyer (2004) Whittier Journal of Child and Family Advocacy 147. 
Retrieved, 12 November 2007, from Westlaw online database. 
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treatment despite parents refusal, there has been cases where younger children (mainly 
infants) needed treatment and parents refused, forcing the practitioner to apply for 
ministerial or court ordered consent. In this regard the case of Hay v B70 is instructive and 
its facts are briefly set out below. 
 
This is the most recently reported case in South Africa in which an infant needed urgent 
blood transfusion but the parents refused to consent to such treatment because of their 
religion.  Jajbhay J held that it was in the baby’s best interest that his right to life is 
protected and that the religious beliefs of his parents could not override this right.71  The 
result of the court’s findings is that where a situation occurs where parents refuse to 
consent to life saving treatment for their minor children based on religious believes then 
such a refusal can be considered unconstitutional and would therefore be unlawful.72  
 
In this decision the focus was more on the child’s right to life and the best interest of the 
child principle73 than the child’s right to access health care services. However the case 
clearly indicates the effect that a parents’ refusal has on the child’s ability to access 
treatment without delay. 
 
                                                 
70 Hay v B and Others 2003 (3) SA 492 (W) 
71 Above note 70 at p495. 
72 See D McQuoid-Mason (2006) SAMJ 29 at 29. 
73 The best interest principle operates in directing the court ‘to exercise the discretion it possesses in its 
capacity as upper guardian of minors to promote the interest of the child rather than focusing on the rights 
and entitlements of parents’. See I Currie and J de Waal (2005) The Bill of Rights handbook 617-618. The 
Court must make sure that ‘the best interest principle is not used by adults to override the wishes and 
interests of the child. See Wood and Tuohy above note 8 at 208. The authors suggest that ‘a balance can be 
achieved by ensuring that children are well informed to their level of understanding and that their views are 
taken seriously’. 
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Many of the cases involving parents refusing to consent to treatment for their children are 
not reported in the law books but are highlighted in newspapers. Two such cases were 
reported in the Pretoria Newspaper. The first case involved a father who refused to 
consent to a brain operation for his child. The Centre for Child Law at the University of 
Pretoria intervened and was about to launch an urgent application to the Pretoria High 
Court to obtain court ordered consent when the Minister of Social Development gave the 
necessary consent overruling the father’s refusal.74 In another incident reported in the 
newspaper earlier this year the mother of a sixteen year old refused permission for a 
Limpopo hospital to conduct a scan on her daughter who was possibly suffering from a 
life threatening cancer. The mother’s refusal was based on her belief that traditional 
healers could treat the child (despite an earlier failed attempt by a traditional healer to 
treat the child). The court granted an interim interdict to the hospital to prevent the 
mother from removing the child and allowing the scan to be conducted.75  
 
The provisions of the Children’s Act set out in section 129(10) above respond to these 
situations and will thus not allow parents to refuse to consent to their children’s medical 
treatment or operation based on their religions unless those parents could show that the 
alternative treatment of their choice is medically acceptable. The onus is a stringent one 
seeing that it would be easier for people in the medical profession to show that the 
alternative chosen by the parent is not medically acceptable then it would be for parents 
to show that it is medically acceptable. However, the objectives of these provisions and 
the Hay judgment are to prevent parents from frustrating children’s access to health care 
                                                 
74 Z Venter ‘Girl to go under the knife on Monday’ Pretoria News; Wednesday 1 November 2006. 
75 Z Venter “Tug-of-war over teen stricken by cancer” Pretoria News (Ed 1) 26 January 2007 at p 3. 
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services because of their religious convictions or their lack of faith in modern medical 
procedures. This objective serves the rights of the child and should not be overshadowed 
by issues regarding onus.  
 
3.6.2.2: Refusal of consent by a minor 
Does a minor who has the capacity to consent also have the right to refuse to consent? 
 In almost all instances the child’s competence to consent becomes questionable only 
when there is disagreement between the child, the parent and/or the practitioner.76 Not 
only is the child’s competence to refuse at issue but the child’s right to refuse treatment is 
questioned.  
 
In terms of current law in the forms of the National Health Act, health care users are 
expressly given a right to refuse consent.77 ‘User’ in terms of section 1 of the Health Act 
refers to a child above the age of consent as set out in the Child Care Act. As said before, 
once the Children’s Act replaces the Child Care Act this reference to ‘user’ will apply to 
children competent to consent under the Children’s Act. But does the Children’s Act also 
make provision for children refusing treatment? 
 
The Children’s Act does not explicitly give children with the capacity to consent the right 
to also refuse treatment. This right could however be implied from section 129(8) read 
                                                 
76P Alderson (2005) ‘In the genes or in the stars? children’s competence to consent’ in M Freeman 
Children, medicine and the law 550. See also I Kennedy (1988) Treat me right: :essays in medical law and 
ethics’ 55. 
77 Section 6(1)(d) reads: 
Every health care provider must inform a user of- 
(d) the user’s right to refuse health services and explain the implications, risks, obligations of such refusal. 
 72
with section 129(2) of the Act. Section 129(8) authorises the Minister of Social 
Development to give consent to medical treatment or surgery for the child if the child 
unreasonably refuses. This implies that the child may refuse the health care service but 
cannot do so unreasonably.  
 
The section does not give any indication of what could be considered unreasonable and 
how the Minister would go about enquiring on the reasonableness or otherwise of the 
child’s refusal. What would the Minister take into account when considering whether the 
child’s decision is reasonable or not? It is submitted that the reasonableness of the 
decisions should take into account inter alia the following: 
(a) the maturity of the minor to refuse treatment 
(b) informed refusal (i.e that the child’s refusal was based on information supplied to 
him informing him of the implications of a refusal and the child still refused the 
treatment) 
(c) The benefits, risks and other consequences of the refusal for the minor and his 
family, and  
(d) The best interests of the minor.   
 
The maturity test should ensure that the minor is capable of consenting in the first place. 
In light of the elements of informed consent as set out in the Christian Lawyers case78, 
the elements must also be applied to situations where consent is refused. Thus, all the 
information should be given to the minor, including information on the benefits, risks and 
other consequences of the refusal. The best interest principle should then be used to 
 73
ensure that the minor’s best interest is given paramount consideration in cases where he 
or she refuses treatment.  
 
 Section 129(9) authorises the High Court to consent to treatment or surgery of the child 
in any instance where the person who is allowed to give consent in terms of section 129 
refuses to give it. Those capable of consenting include children who are 12 years and 
older and are mature enough to consent to give consent. This means that those children 
would also be able to refuse treatment.  
 
Refusal by minor who lacks capacity to consent 
In her article Margaret Brazier notes that ‘[a] … difficult issue surfaces where an 
intelligent child suffering from no degree of mental disorder refuses treatment. If he 
makes a decision which the law would be obliged to accept were he 18 [or 12 in terms of 
the Children’s Act], is coercion on the ground of minority justifiable?’79  Coercion here is 
a result of a third party having the power to override the decision of the child even when 
the child has the competence but not the capacity to refuse the treatment. This is a 
dilemma faced by many practitioners80and research has shown that in other jurisdictions 
there is no set way of dealing with such minors refusing consent. In Canadian cases for 
example the consensus is that children can consent or refuse medical treatment if they are 
mature and understand the nature of the treatment and the consequences of not receiving 
                                                                                                                                                 
78 See above note 23. 
79See M Brazier and C Bridge (2005) ‘Coercion or caring: analysing adolescent autonomy’ in M Freeman 
(ed) Children, medicine and the law  84 at 103. 
80 It has been said that although legally the practitioner is obliged to do what the parent wants when the 
child is incapable of consenting but “[e]thically, the physician should be guided by considerations of 
patient autonomy and the power of moral persuasion to follow the instructions of the adolescent, unless a 
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that treatment.81 However English cases seem to take a different approach. When it 
comes to minors refusing treatment the English court seems to take a more strict 
approach and not limited to the mature minor test created in the groundbreaking case of 
Gillick.82 Recent cases indicate the willingness of English courts to override the decisions 
of a minor even if he or she was competent. In some cases the court would more readily 
decide that the child was not competent to make it easier to override the child’s 
decision.83
                                                                                                                                                 
particular adolescent demonstrates that he or she lacks sufficient decisionmaking capacity…” See Weir and 
Peters above note 60 at 566. 
81 C Burden-Osmond (2002) Defence Counsel Journal. Available at 
http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/contracts-agreements/1067823-1.html [Accessed 12 November 2007]  
82 In Gillick above note 19,  the court created the mature minor doctrine which required a minor only to be 
sufficiently mature and have the intelligence to understand the treatment being proposed before such 
treatment could be given. Thus age was not considered the determining criteria to consider when a child 
wanted to access health care services without parental or guardian consent. Later cases dubbed the court 
criteria as the Gillick test, and a child had to be Gillick competent before the child could get treatment 
without parental or guardian assistance. There has however been a move away from the Gillck approach as 
far as children refusing consent are concerned.  
83Examples of English Court cases in which the minor’s refusal of medical treatment was at issue: 
 Re R a 15 [1991] 4 All ER] 177 year old refused consent to the administration of medication. She was 
found not to be Gillick competent. The court found that where the child was a ward, and as a wardship 
court it had the power to override a Gillick-competent child.  In Re (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical 
Treatment 1993 1 FLR 386 a fifteen year old suffering from leukaemia in need of blood transfusion refused 
treatment because of his religion. His parents also refused the treatment. The hospital applied to the court 
for an order overriding their refusal and to provide the treatment. The court  considered the boy a ward of 
the state and approved the hospital’s application holding that the boy ‘[did] not have a full understanding of 
the whole implication of what the refusal of that treatment involves’ at 386. Another minor aged 10  who 
refused to consent was overridden by a court order in  Re S (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) 1994] 2 FLR 
1065. This was done for the following reasons ‘[fi]rstly, the influence of the religion and in particular the 
mother’s influence and secondly the nature of the child’s chronic illness, her reaction to it and her 
understandable reluctance to continue the arduous course of treatment’. In Re S [1994] 2 FLR 1065 a 15-
year old Jehovah’s Witness was forced to undergo a blood transfusion because she was not considered 
Gillick competent. Re L [1998] 2 FLR 810 concerned a 14 year old Jehovah’s Witness who was also forced 
to undergo blood transfusion because the court held that she lacked the constructive formulation of an 
opinion which occurs with adult experience, at 812. Re W [1992] 4 All ER 627 involved a competent 16-
year-old who suffered from anorexia who was refusing treatment for her disorder. Taking into account 
what is in the best interest of the child, the rights of the parents, and the doctor’s position the court found 
‘No minor of whatever age has power by confusing consent to treatment to override a consent to treatment 
by someone who has parental responsibility for the minor’ at 639. It was found further that the doctor only 
needs the consent of one person and he can proceed, see 635. Re M [1999] 2 FLR 1097. Here a 15 year old 
who was not found not to be Gillick incompetent was still forced to undergo a heart transplant (contrary to 
her wishes) because the court found that it was obliged to prevent underage minors from making dangerous 
mistakes. Re P [2004] 2 FLR 1117 involved a nearly 17 year old Jehovah’s Witness who suffered from a 
condition which created a tendency of bleeding. In light of this it was likely that at some stage he would be 
in need of blood or blood products. His competence to refuse treatment was not in question but the court 
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 The fact that capacity to consent depends not only on the child’s maturity but mainly on 
the child’s age as well creates difficulties for children who are mature enough to consent  
or refuse treatment but have not reached the age of consent yet. As indicated above, the 
right to consent also includes the right to refuse treatment, so if the child is mature 
enough to consent he should also be mature enough to refuse treatment and in such cases 
the age of the child should not prevent the child from being able to refuse treatment. It 
has been suggested that ‘consent to and the refusal of medical treatment are not 
necessarily equivalent and that ethically speaking, a higher level of competence is 
required to refuse than consent to such treatment’. 84 Even if this is true, it is submitted 
that the problem is not with the need to test the maturity of the child but rather that the 
child’s age could prevent him or her from refusing (or accepting without parental 
assistance) medical treatment despite the child passing the maturity test. This point again 
engages the issue of the use of the status approach in determining the child’s capacity to 
consent which is discussed more in chapter 4. The discussion on aspects of the Children’s 
Act impacting on children’s health service rights continues below.  
 
3.6.3 The Maturity test85
                                                                                                                                                 
found that it had a duty to ensure that children survive to attain majority. For a more detailed discussion of  
these cases see: M Freeman (2005) International Journal of Children’s Rights 201 at 205-209. 
84 See J Will (2005-2006) Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy 233 at 289 & 295. Retrieved 12 
November 2007, from WESTLAW online database.  
85 The mature minor doctrine is based on rules which ‘allows a minor who is sufficiently intelligent and 
mature to understand the nature and consequences of a proposed treatment to consent to medical treatment 
without consulting his or her parents or obtaining their permission’ See H Boonstra and E Nash (2000) The 
Guttmacher Report on Public Policy 4. Available at  
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/4/gr030404.html [Accessed 12 November 2007] 
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As said before, the provisions of the Child Care Act regarding consent to medical 
treatment and surgery are still in operation since the relevant sections of the Children’s 
Act are yet to commence. The Child Care Act and the other Acts mentioned in section 2 
do not explicitly require a child to be mature enough to make a health care decision. 
However, as stated before the maturity requirement falls within the rules of informed 
consent. The explicit inclusion of the maturity test in section 129 of the Children’s Act is 
however significant and will affect children’s health service rights.  
 
 By explicitly requiring the child to be mature enough to understand the consequences of 
consenting to the necessary health care service the Children’s Act strengthens the 
protection of immature children. It should ensure that the child’s maturity is actually 
tested which might not occur in the application of the Child Care Act which fails to 
explicitly require health care workers to test the child’s maturity.  
 
 Other problems with the maturity test have been identified in Canada, where the mature 
minor doctrine is also used and these are instructive. One of the problems is the lack of a 
standardised test to determine maturity and the other one involves the identification of 
who is suppose to assess maturity. 86
 
 A lack of a standardised test in the Act for determining maturity could create 
inconsistency in the treatment of children not only by practitioners but also courts. To 
this end it has been suggested that ‘[a] standardized test such as a mandatory 
psychological analysis or evaluation would provide a consistent method for courts to 
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determine a child’s maturity level and understanding of the consequences of rejecting 
medical treatment.’87 The problem relating to non-identification of precisely who is 
supposed to assess maturity is also created in the new provisions in the Children’s Act. In 
many instances it is assumed (and may in fact be) that the practitioner is the one 88who 
would assess maturity but in practice it may be different.89  Where the practitioner is in 
fact the one who obtains the necessary consent, he or she is responsible for assessing 
maturity. The problem is that practitioners are not trained to assess the decision making 
ability of children and there is no test to evaluate maturity.90  
 
3.6.4 Other general implications of these consent provisions 
 3.6.4.1 Requirement of ‘assistance’ for surgical operations 
Section 129 of the Children’s Act requires the child to be duly assisted by a parent when 
the child consents to surgery. The Act does not make it clear what is meant by ‘duly 
assist’. This is problematic because the absence of a definition creates confusion about 
whether this requirement of parental assistance refers to parental advice or supplementary 
                                                                                                                                                 
86 Above note 12.  
87 Above note 12. 
88 To the extent that the assumption is true it is was found that the heavy responsibility that the test places 
on medical practitioners is acceptable because the responsibility is in the hands of a “learned and highly 
trained profession regulated by statute and governed by a strict ethical code which is vigorously enforced” 
See above note 97. The Law Reform Commission of New South Wales (NSW) ‘Minors’ consent to 
medical treatment’ Issue Paper  (2004) 24 at para 2.10 
89 The Children’s Institute of the University of Cape Town held a consultative workshop on draft 
regulations to the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 pertaining to consent to medical treatment, surgical operations 
and HIV testing on 11 June 2007.  Some health practitioners were present and discussed regulations 
regarding the consent provisions in the Children’s Act. At the workshop it became evident that in practice 
the person who obtains the necessary consent is not the practitioner in most cases. In some instances the 
clerk obtains the consent. Since the person who obtains the consent should be the one to assess the capacity 
to consent it would seem that practitioners are not the only ones who would under the new provision be 
responsible for assessing maturity.  
90 Ross above note 65 at 490.  
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support, or whether it entails parental approval.91 It is submitted that an interpretation 
given to ‘duly assist’ should not include a power to enable parents to prevent a competent 
child from accessing the required surgery. This is so because ‘assistance’ is a 
responsibility placed on the parent in respect of the child, but such responsibility should 
not determine the ability of the child to exercise the right to consent to the surgery.  
 
3.6.4.2 Requesting contraceptives 
Section 134 of the Children’s Act regulates the age at which a child can, without parental 
assistance, request and be provided with contraceptives. The section does not appear to 
engage the issue of consent (by the child) or the maturity of the child and focuses on the 
ability of the child to access contraceptives on request. This makes the section 
(particularly the provision dealing with contraceptives other than condoms) problematic. 
This is so because children might be forced by their abusers, boyfriends or peers to use 
contraceptives even if they don’t want to. If consent was a necessary requirement then in 
such cases there could be no valid consent because the consent is not given freely.  
 
Section 134(2)(a) requires proper medical advise to be given to the child when she 
requests contraceptives like for example, the pill or the injection. However the child is 
not engaged in discussion by this section because it doesn’t require the child to 
understand the advice being given (no maturity test required). By not requiring proper 
consent from the child who requests contraceptives the provisions fail to command the 
health care provider to ensure that the child actually understands the information 
supplied.  
                                                 
91 Slabbert above note 60. 
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 This does not mean however that all that is required for a 12 year old to access 
contraceptives is that she is 12 years or older, has been given proper medical advice and 
has passed a medical examination.  Section 134(2) provides that contraceptives other than 
condoms may be provided to the child on request by the child if requirements (a) to (c) 
have been complied with. The section does not say that the contraceptives must be given 
to the child when those requirements have been met.  This section could thus be 
interpreted to mean that even if the child is 12, has been advised on the use of a particular 
contraceptive and passed the medical examination that child can still be refused 
contraceptives because of factors such as, maturity, undue pressure to obtain 
contraceptive or other factors which the health care worker took into account. 
 
3.6.4.3 Care-givers and guardians’ consent 
Access to health services for children is not only increased through the lowering of the 
age of consent but also through the added amount of people authorised to consent to the 
treatment of children. Currently (under the Child Care Act) caregivers92 are not permitted 
to consent for children’s medical treatment and this necessitates the need for court 
ordered or ministerial consent, which would generally hold the consequences of delay 
                                                 
92 Defined in the Children’s Act as meaning any person other than a parent or guardian, who factually care 
for a child and includes- 
(a) a foster parent; 
(b) a person who cares for a child with the implied or express consent of a parent or guardian of the 
child; 
(c) a person who cares for a child whilst the child is in temporary safe care; 
(d) the person at the head of a child and youth care centre where a child has been placed; 
(e) the person at the head of a shelter; 
(f) (f) a child and youth care worker who cares for a child who is without appropriate family care in 
the community; and 
(g)  the child at the head of a child-headed household; 
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and prevention of health services for children with no parent or guardian but who have 
only caregivers. With caregivers such as the head of a shelter or a child and youth care 
worker, being authorised under the Children’s Act to consent to the treatment of children 
living outside their family environment like children living on the streets the delay effect 
that the current laws have on the exercise of such children’s health care rights would thus 
be reduced.  
 
On the other hand, the Children’s Act does not allow a caregiver to consent to surgery on 
behalf of a child.93  So for example a person heading a shelter will not be able to consent 
to a surgery for a child under 12 who has no parents, lives on the street and makes use of 
the shelter.  Even section 32 of the Act which gives persons who have no parental rights 
and responsibilities but who cares for a child (such as a child’s granny) the right to 
consent to the medical treatment of the child does not allow for consent to surgery by that 
person.  A reason advanced for this ‘omission’ in the Act was that it would be easier for a 
medical person to ascertain whether someone was a parent, than it would be to ascertain 
whether that person was a caregiver or primary caregiver.94
 
Also, when it comes to children incapable of consenting to an HIV test, section 130(2) 
does not mention guardians as people empowered to consent on behalf of such children. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
93 Section 129 (5) 
The parent or guardian of a child may, subject to section 31, consent to a surgical 
operation on the child if the child is— 
(a) under the age of 12 years; or 
(b) over that age but is of insufficient maturity or is unable to understand the benefits, risks and social 
implications of the operation. 
94 Parliamentary Monitoring Group Minutes 24 May 2005 
http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=5883  Accessed 3 August 2007 
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This is odd seeing that the other consent provisions clearly include guardians as having 
decision making powers. It could however be a mere technical error made in the drafting 
process but it does need to be rectified to enable guardians to consent to an HIV test on 
behalf of the children they have guardianship over. The inability of guardians to consent 
could again lead to delays of accessing this particular health care service for the children 
involved, because the health care worker would have to obtain consent from the 
provincial head of social development which could be time consuming. 
  
3.6.5  Conclusion 
It is true that although many children were born after the 1994 elections, they continue to 
face many challenges including a lack of access to services.95 The Constitution 
guarantees children the right to basic health care services and a right of access to health 
care services including reproductive health care services. These rights read together 
create an entitlement of children to be able to access health care services. It is not only 
physical or economic access to services that must be protected but also access to services 
enabled by consent laws.  
 
By reducing the age of consent, creating the maturity test and authorising previously 
unauthorised persons to consent to the treatment of particular children, children’s chances 
of accessing health care services are effectively increased. However the new law is not 
without challenges. The lack of a standardised test for maturity could lead to a 
discrepancy in the way health practitioners assess maturity which could negatively affect 
                                                 
95 Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in South Africa: A Report by the Community Agency of Social 
Enquiry (CASE) Commissioned by Save the Children Sweden. April 2005. Executive Summary. 
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children’s ability to access health care services.  The lowered age of consent increases the 
amount of children able to access health care on their own and places many more 
responsibilities on health care providers. Given the crises in the shortage of health care 
professionals available in the country96, the health system might not be able to respond to 
these added responsibilities created by the Act. However, despite these and other 
challenges brought about by the consent provisions in the Children’s Act, such challenges 
are to be expected since no new law comes without them. Compared to the Child Care 
Act and other health care legislation the Children’s Act creates more obligations and 
safeguards for children needing health care services and could respond more effectively 
to the current health care needs of minors once fully and accurately implemented. The 
Act is thus an improvement on laws giving effect to children’s health service rights.  
 
                                                 
96 L Comins ‘Come back home, teachers and nurses-there’s work to do here’ Pretoria News, July 23 2007, 
Front page. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATUS APPROACH 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The essence of the last two chapters revolved around the meaning and legislative 
implementation of children’s health service rights. One particular aspect of children’s 
health rights was the focus of chapter 3, namely, the issue of consent. In light of the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 which has already transformed current child law and will 
continue to do so once it becomes completely operational, chapter 3 considered 
implications of new consent provisions for children’s health service rights. This chapter 
continues to probe the implications of the Children’s Act, by considering a particular 
aspect of the issue around consent, namely, the status approach. This chapter is not 
concerned specifically with the practical problems and challenges which arises and will 
still arise from the operation of the consent provisions in the Children’s Act as discussed 
in the previous chapter, but rather looks at a constitutional challenge or problem which 
could arise from the use of the status approach in the Act.  
 
The status approach entails using age as a determining factor regulating children’s ability 
to access health care services with or without parental or guardian assistance. As seen in 
chapter 3, much health care legislation as well as provisions in the Children’s Act makes 
use of the status approach to grant children the right to consent to or refuse health care 
services on their own. This chapter will explore the constitutional impact of this approach 
in the Children’s Act on children’s health service rights.1 This will be done by first, 
                                                 
1 Please note that the term ‘health service rights’ is used to refer to the right to access health care services in 
section 27(1) and children’s right to basic health care services in section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. The 
reasons for this are the same as those set out in section 1.1 of Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
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considering and discussing arguments made in support of and arguments made against 
the use of the status approach. Secondly, an attempt will be made to test these and other 
arguments against the general limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution. The 
purpose of the inquiry is to determine the strengths of the arguments on the status 
approach to withstand constitutional scrutiny in light of the allegations they contain. To 
this end the chapter is set out as follows, Section 4.2 will look at the arguments for and 
against the use of the status approach and Section 4.3 will apply these and other 
arguments to the general limitations clause in section 36(1). Section 4.4 will be an 
evaluation in terms of section 36 and will conclude the chapter. 
 
4.2 THE STATUS APPROACH  
One of the ways in which the state supervises how children exercise their health rights is 
through the inclusion of consent provisions in legislation regulating access to health care 
services. A common trend in consent laws globally is the imposition of ages of consent 
for children in order for them to access health care independently. This is essentially the 
status approach. What this chapter generally aims to do is to establish the impact of the 
use of this approach on children’s health service rights. In order to establish the general 
impact of the use of this approach, it is necessary to get a broader understanding of 
general arguments in respect of this approach. To this end the section below will outline 
arguments in favour of and arguments against the use of this approach. This is done as a 
basis for the constitutional inquiry to follow in section 4.3.    
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The difference between this section and section 4.3 is that this section considers the use 
of the status approach in general and does so through reviewing arguments made in 
respect of this approach. As the discussion of these arguments progress it will be seen 
that certain allegations flow from them, which triggers the need for the evaluation to be 
done in section 4.3. Section 4.3 thus, takes an example of the use of the status approach 
from certain sections of the Children’s Act and then uses the arguments advanced in this 
section together with other arguments to evaluate the constitutionality of this approach in 
those provisions of the Act.  
 
4.2.1 Arguments in favour of the use of the status approach 
Four main points emerge from the arguments in favour. Firstly, children below a certain 
age are presumed to be incompetent to consent and thus in law lack the capacity to 
consent. This presumption stems from the belief that most children are ignorant, irrational 
or unthinking beings2 and that they are ‘less secure about their identity and less 
autonomous than adults’.3 Generally, the law regards certain children as incapable of 
consenting to agreements because they are deemed not sufficiently mature enough to 
understand and respond to the consequences attached to them. In order to protect children 
against their own immaturity and their inability to make value judgments due to their lack 
of experience which could result in an inability to assess a particular situation,4 the law 
                                                 
2 P Alderson and M Goodwin (1993) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 303 at 305. 
3 G van Bueren (1998) ‘Children’s rights: balancing traditional values and cultural plurality’ in G Douglass  
and L Sebba (eds) Children’s rights and traditional values 21. Philosophers also label children as 
incompetents ‘because they are suppose to be incapable of ‘cognitive-complexity, to have unstable, 
transient values, no real concept of ‘the good’, of death, of their future, or of their likely future values.’ See 
P Alderson (2005) ‘In the genes or in the stars? children’s competence to consent’ in M Freeman Children, 
medicine and the law 551. See also J Kruger (2006) THRHR 436 at 439.  
4 T Davel (2000) ‘The status of children in South African Private Law’ in Davel CJ (ed) Introduction to 
Child Law in South Africa, (2000) 1 at 20. See also H Kruger  (2005) Codicillus 1 at 6. 
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creates safeguards through the use of consent laws. Adults are thus given decision 
making powers in respect of their children based on these classical liberal theories which 
deem children to have an irrational and dependent nature.5 This is the child protection 
approach supported by those against giving children decision making powers. 6
  
Secondly, parents are primarily responsible for protecting their children. This 
responsibility is enumerated in the Constitution7 where it provides every child with the 
right to parental or alternative family care.8  This right places an obligation on parents to 
provide children the care and protection they need.9 This thus accords with health 
legislation requiring the parents to consent before any treatment is administered to their 
children. In this way the status approach operates to protect younger children and to 
allow for their parents to make decisions for them. The child’s right to parental care is 
thus given effect to through such consent laws.  
 
Thirdly, South Africa has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)10 in 
1995. The CRC provides that, the state has to respect the responsibilities, rights and 
                                                 
5 C Breen (2006) Age Discrimination and Children’s Rights: Ensuring Equality and Acknowledging 
Difference 4-5.   
6 Ross argues that generally parental autonomy promotes the interests and goals of both the child and the 
parent and ‘[b]y deciding that the child’s decision should be respected over the parent’s decision, 
physicians are replacing the parents’ judgment that the decision should be overridden with their judgment 
that the child’s decision should be respected. To do so makes this less an issue of respecting the child’s 
autonomy, and more about who knows what is best for the child’ See L Ross (2006) ‘Health care decision-
making by children: Is it in their best interest?’ In M Freeman (ed) Children, medicine and the law 487 at 
490. This article considers various other reasons why children’s decision making capacity should be 
limited. 
7 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
8 Section 28 (1)(b) of the Constitution. 
9 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
para 77-78. 
10 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990. 
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duties of parents and when applicable members of the extended family or community.11 
This includes the parents’ right to make decisions which are in the best interest of the 
child, such as decisions relating to the child’s health. Furthermore, parents and family 
have a right to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, 
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of rights recognised in the 
Convention. Thus legislatures also give effect to this right by requiring parental or 
guardian’s assistance when children have to exercise their health service rights.  
 
Finally,  there appears to be a consensus ‘that the age limit must be drawn somewhere, 
and that legislators and courts are not unreasonable in setting an average age requirement 
where a particular function is concerned, as long as the age set is not completely out of 
touch with custom and mores’.12 It is unclear what this consensus is based on but one 
basis for it is possibly the certainty it gives health care professionals to know who is able 
in terms of the law to consent to treatment without parental assistance.13
 
Thus the main arguments in favour of using this approach can be summed up as follows: 
children’s need for protection, their right to parental care and possibly the need to create 
certainty for health care workers to know which children can consent to treatment 
without parental or guardians’ assistance. Thus this approach opens the door for young 
persons who have reached the legal age of consent to be able to access health care 
services without the need for parental assistance (if they have the competence to consent). 
                                                 
11 Art 5 of CRC. 
12 H Kruger above note 4 at 3. 
13 J Sloth-Nielsen (2007) ‘Protection of children’ in C Davel and A Skelton (eds) Commentary on the 
Children’s Act 7-1 at 7-31. 
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This protection approach also absolves children below a certain age from the 
responsibility that goes along with giving consent and places it on adults who are likely 
to be in a better position to take on the responsibility of consenting. Furthermore, if there 
is certainty about who is able to consent and who is not, then health practitioners should 
not be able to turn away children capable of consenting to services on the grounds that 
their parents need to be present. 
  
4.2.2 Arguments against the use of the status approach 
These arguments are set out by considering four points; (1) academic opinion on the 
status approach, (2) practical problems with the approach, (3) non use of the status 
approach for certain health care services and finally (4) will look at the status approach 
versus international law.  
 
4.2.2.1 Academic opinion on the status approach 
The status approach has been criticised as being arbitrary14 and in conflict with the notion 
of individuality and being in contrast with children’s right to self-determination.15Some 
writers have declared that ‘…if children are defined by their incompetence, ignorance 
and folly, then ‘children’s rights’ is essentially a contradictory term.’16 Others contend 
further that ‘[s]ince maturation is a process that will necessarily vary from individual to 
individual, to adopt one particular age…as the benchmark of maturity in all persons is 
                                                 
14 See M Brazier and C Bridge (2005) ‘Coercion or caring: analysing adolescent autonomy’ in M Freeman 
(ed) Children, medicine and the law  84 at 88.  
15 I Kennedy (1988) Treat me right: :essays in medical law and ethics 57. 
16 P Alderson and M Goodwin above note 2 at 308. 
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clearly untenable17 and that ‘[a]ny specific finding about age…should not be regarded as 
sacrosanct but as no more than a rule of thumb guide’.18  
 
4.2.2.2 Problems in practice 
When a situation arises in practice where a child, below the age of consent, and in need 
of health care services goes to or is taken to a health facility unaccompanied by a parent 
or a guardian the law requires the health provider to respond in a specific way. The health 
provider must either ask the minor to return with his or her parent before the health 
service is provided or in more serious cases, but not an emergency, the health provider is 
required to inquire as to the whereabouts of a parent or guardian and to attempt to contact 
them.19 As a result, for example, ‘[m]any surgeries have been delayed and cancelled 
while a hospital’s risk management department, a child’s social worker, and the … courts 
try to identify [and get hold of] a legal representative who can consent to the child’s 
surgery.’ 20   
 
                                                 
17Kennedy above note 15. This is also accepted by Ngwena when he states that ‘….developmentally 
childhood is not a static condition’ See C Ngwena (1996) Acta Juridica 132 at 133. See also H Kruger 
above note 4 at page 5 where she notes that ‘[c]hildhood is a process of continuous change, which takes 
place as the child develops from newborn to adolescents’. 
18 Ngwena above note 17 at 139. 
19 In its review of the Child Care Act the South African Law Commission (as they were called then) 
identified several problems experienced by practitioners in applying the consent provisions in the Child 
Care Act, one of them related to most practitioners, particularly those working in hospitals reporting  
problems with obtaining consent for non-emergency procedures from parents or guardians who lived far 
from the child. See South African Law Commission ‘Review of the Child Care Act’ Discussion Paper 103 
(Project 110) 2002  453 at 466. 
20 See A Bittinger (2006) Florida Bar Journal 24. Retrieved 12 November 2007, from Westlaw online 
database.  This is also the case in South Africa where the requirement of obtaining ministerial consent has 
led to delays and /or cancellations of the intended surgery or institution of appropriate therapy. See J 
Karpelowsky and H Rode (2006) SAMJ 505 at 505. 
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The problem is worse when there are no parents or guardians able to consent to the 
treatment. 21 In these cases problems are created by the law requiring the practitioner to 
jump through many hoops to get the necessary consent, even when the patient is mature 
enough to give the necessary consent. The argument here is not that the law should not 
have those procedural requirements which the health provider must fulfil in order get the 
necessary consent. Rather the argument is that the law should create the opportunity for a 
mature minor to consent to treatment despite his or her age and this would minimise the 
health provider having to go through so much trouble to get consent from someone else 
in cases where the patient is in fact capable of consenting. 
 
4.2.2.3 Non use of status approach for certain health services: contradictions in law?  
                                                 
21 The problems created by the Child Care Act provisions regarding consent are clearly illustrated by the 
case of Ex Parte application of Nigel Redman N.O Case No 14083/2003 and Ex Parte application of Nigel 
Redman N.O Case No 18476/2003 WLD (unreported). This case involved an urgent application by the Aids 
Law Project (ALP) to obtain consent from the High Court to provide antiretroviral therapy needed by four 
orphaned children with HIV/AIDS who had no parents. These children were below the age of 14 and 
needed parental or guardian consent to obtain medical treatment. The urgent health needs of the children 
necessitated the ALP to bypass the Minister of Social Development and go directly to High Court to get the 
required consent because the process of obtaining ministerial consent was found to be time consuming. The 
application was successful  This was followed by several requests made to the Minister to obtain consent to 
provide some forty children also needing antiretroviral treatment and HIV testing and who could not get 
parental consent. The Minister only consented to the treatment of five children. The ALP had to lodge 
another urgent application to the High Court to get consent for the rest of the children. The application 
succeeded as well. Although the applications were successful the case illustrated various problems arising 
from attempts to comply with the consent provisions of the Child Care Act when parental consent is 
unobtainable. Particular difficulties include the following: 
1. Applications to the High Court proved to be time consuming, causing delays to important medical 
treatment for children. 
2. The reach of the Courts’ decision was limited because the legal circumstances of other children in 
South Africa in the same situation remained unchanged. 
3. Fresh applications have to be made to the Court or new requests to the Minister have to be made 
for consents on every occasion. 
4. To institute a High Court application every time a child without a legal guardian or parent requires 
HIV testing or treatment is costly, prohibitive, impractical and inconvenient.  
See L Gerntholtz. South Africa: Safeguarding Children’s Rights to Medical Care. Submission on the Children’s 
Bill. Portfolio Committee on Social Development National Assembly, 27 July 2004. Available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/27/safric9150_txt.htm [accessed 23 October 2007]. 
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In short, this argument entails the use of the status approach in cases involving for 
example medical treatment, surgery and HIV-testing but the non-use of this approach for 
other health care services such as a termination of pregnancy. The argument is based on 
questioning the legislative choice to use age as a determinant for children needing to 
access medical treatment and HIV testing when it is not a determinant for pregnant girls 
needing abortions. The argument is fully discussed below. 
 
The legislature chose not to use the status approach for girls needing to terminate their 
pregnancies. In terms of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 0f 1996 a girl of 
any age has a right to terminate her pregnancy. This choice by the legislature was 
considered in the case of Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others 
(Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus Curiae).22 The court found justification for this 
approach based on inter alia, the fact that by not prescribing age limitations for girls 
needing to access termination of pregnancy services the provision ‘prevents frustration of 
a constitutional right when the minor is in fact emotionally and intellectually able to give 
informed consent to the procedure.’23 Furthermore, the court emphasized the 
constitutional recognition of the right to individual self-determination24 and held that the 
plaintiff’s approach of setting age limits for girls to access abortion services was a rigid 
approach to maturity which failed to accommodate individual difference. 25  In the end 
the Court found that the Act required the women to give informed consent and that this 
would determine her ability to access a termination of pregnancy no matter what her age 
                                                 
22 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health and Others (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus 
Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 509 (T). 
23 Above note 22 at 517. 
24 Above note 22 at 518. 
25 Above note 24. 
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was. The approach taken by the legislature was found to be consistent with the 
Constitution.   
 
It is submitted that the very arguments used to justify the legislatures’ decision in the 
Christian Lawyers case not to use the status approach for children’s termination of 
pregnancy can also be used to argue for non-use of this approach when it comes to other 
health care services for children.   
 
4.2.2.4 The status approach and international law 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has been ratified by 
South Africa and its provisions are thus binding on the state. 26 Section 28 is based on the 
provisions and principles of the CRC which has become the international standard against 
which to measure legislation and policies.27 Some of the articles contained in the CRC 
seem to support arguments against the use of the status approach when it comes to health 
care services for children. The CRC makes provision for recognizing the evolving 
capacity of the child when the child exercises his or her rights.28  Consent laws 
prescribing rigid age restrictions fail to recognise this evolving capacity of the child. 
Brazier and Bridge, note that ‘[f]ocusing on chronological age alone ignores the 
development of that individual and flies in the face of notions of evolving autonomy.’29 
The maturity test is applied to children who have the capacity to consent but does not 
                                                 
26 Convention on the Rights of the Child above note 10. Ratified by South Africa in June 1995. 
27 S v M Case CCT 53/06 September 2007 (unreported) at para 16. 
28 Article 5. 
29 See Brazier and Bridge above note 14 at 26. 
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come into play for children below the age of consent and for that reason it is argued that 
age being the determining factor ignores evolving capacity of the child.   
 
The CRC also provides children with the right to participate in decisions affecting them, 
this includes decisions in respect of their well being of which health is a component.30  
This particular right is extremely important when it comes to children accessing health 
care services because the notion of consent is embedded in the right to participate in 
decisions affecting the child’s life. The amount of weight to be given to the child’s views 
(besides depending on the child’s age and maturity) depends on the ‘imminent and 
heavy’ consequences which the decision would have on the child.31 Article 12 also 
implies that ‘although adults have the duty to protect children from ill-treatment, children 
are [also] protected…by giving [them] power to consent to and challenge decisions which 
affects their lives…’32 Although article 12 only gives the child the right to be able to 
express his views and does not provide the child the right to actually consent, the status 
approach also negatively affects this right in that the views of children below the age of 
consent are generally ignored because their immaturity is assumed. 
 
The arguments against the status approach can be summed up in four points: (1) The 
status approach does not recognise the individuality of each child because it is based on 
assumptions of immaturity. (2) Practical problems experienced by health care providers 
when they have to trace parents or guardians or make court applications first before 
                                                 
30 Art 12 of CRC reads:‘States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being 
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.’ 
31 M Lucker-Babel (1995) International Journal on Children’s Rights 391 at 399. 
32Van Bueren above note 3 at 21. 
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supplying a health care service to a child could be alleviated where a child patients’ 
maturity could allow him or her to consent to the necessary health care service despite his 
or her age. (3) In light of the Termination of Pregnancy Act which allows girls of any age 
to access abortion services with the main determinant being the girls’ ability to give 
informed consent rather then age there is no reason why this approach should not also 
apply to other health care services for children. (4) The status approach contravenes 
provisions of the CRC in that it fails to recognise the evolving capacity of the child and 
does not adequately protect children below the age of consent of their right to express 
their views and to have those views be given due weight.  
 
It must be noted that the arguments against the use of the status approach should not be 
construed to advance an absurd contention that all children should be given the right to 
consent regardless of their stage of development.  The arguments against the status 
approach advance the notion that all children should be given the right to consent taking 
into account their stage of development.  
 
4.3: TESTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE STATUS 
APPROACH 
What would the possible finding of the Constitutional Court be if it was faced with a case 
in which a minor claimed that the status approach limited her health service rights in 
section 28(1)(c) and 27(1) of the Constitution and that the limitation cannot be justified in 
terms of the general limitations clause? This section attempts to answer this question by 
considering a hypothetical example of a case and applying arguments for and against the 
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status approach to the general limitations clause. Before embarking on this exercise one 
cannot ignore the issues surrounding the relationship between the general limitations 
clause and the internal limitations as found in section 27(2) which would apply to this 
hypothetical scenario.   
 
4.3.1 Relationship between section 36 and internal limitations in section 27(2) of the 
Constitution 
In the Khosa case the Court noted the difficulty in applying section 36 of the Constitution 
to the socio-economic rights in sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution.33 It noted, without 
discussing this, that in a case where a court has found that the state failed the 
reasonableness test in section 27(2) or 26(2) that section 36 could only be relevant if 
‘what is “reasonable” for the purposes of .. section [36], is different to what is 
“reasonable” for the purposes of sections 26 and 27.’34 In Jaftha35 the Court did not have 
a chance to elaborate on this although the applicants in that case also claimed that their 
right of access to housing was violated triggering the Court to undertake a section 36 
inquiry. The difference with Jaftha was that the Court considered the negative obligations 
on the state in terms of section 26(1) and it was found that the obligations in 26(2) did not 
apply to the negative aspects of the rights to access housing. So the Court did not engage 
section 26(2) and the difficulty in applying this section to section 36 did not arise.  
 
The Court in Khosa said that section 36 can only be relevant in a case involving breach of 
the state’s obligations in section 27 if the reasonableness inquiry in section 27(2) is 
                                                 
33 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 83. 
34 Above note 33. 
35 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC). 
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different from the reasonableness inquiry in section 36. Although the Court did not take 
the matter further, some academics are of the view that the two inquiries are different,36 
but they also accept that the same contextual considerations are focused on in the two 
types of reviews.37  In Khosa the Court was satisfied that even if the reasonableness 
review in 27(2) was different to reasonableness in section 36 the state’s exclusion of 
permanent residents from the social security scheme was not reasonable or justifiable 
under section 36. This acceptance by the Court accords with the conclusion reached by 
Woolman and Botha that considering the socio-economic rights cases which the Court 
have dealt with thus far there appears to be no reason to think that there may be grounds 
for justification that the state could assert under section 36 that are unavailable to it under 
section 26(2) or section 27(2).38 Rautenbach argues further that the way the factors in 
section 36 are also taken into account in the reasonableness review in section 27(2) 
suggests that it overlaps with the general limitations clause to such an extent that there 
                                                 
36 Woolman and Botha notes a distinction between section 27(2) and 36(1) founded on the texts of these 
provisions. They note that the language of these two provisions indicate different ground of justification 
when these enquiries take place. ‘Whereas section 27(2) appears to limit our considerations to those 
justifications related to the means required to realize the purpose of the right (eg, money) or the end of the 
right itself (eg, social security), [section] 36 tells us that we may cast our justificatory nets as far as the 
needs of an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom will allow’. See S 
Woolman and H Botha (2007) ‘Limitations’  in S Woolman, T Roux and M Bishop Constitutional law of 
South Africa, Student Edition 34-1at 34-40. Illes notes the following differences between the 
reasonableness test in section 26(2) and the reasonableness inquiry in section 36 (1) first he states that 
reasonableness test as developed in Grootboom concerns inter alia issues like how and when the content of 
the right will be extended, ‘the order in which the state plans to cater for those in need and  the resources 
that the state has deployed towards realising its stated plan including the inter-governmental allocation of 
tasks and responsibilities’. Whereas section 27(2) reasonableness examines the states’ plan for realising the 
right, section 36 reasonableness does not focus on the plan but examines the reasonableness of measures 
that limit rights. K Iles (2004) SAJHR 448 at 456. Bilchitz notes that the internal limitation is focused on a 
particular right: ‘in this context, the right to have access to health care services. The enquiry requires us to 
consider whether, in the context of this particular right, and the competing priorities in relation to this 
particular right, the measures taken by the State are reasonable’. On the other hand a section 36 inquiry 
requires a comprehensive analysis of the right and the measures the state adopted by taking into account 
other rights and other interests involved. ‘It allows for the consideration of legitimate government purposes 
other than those relating to the particular right that has been limited, and requires consideration of a 
measure’s impact on society beyond the sphere of health care’. See D Bilchitz (2007) ‘Health’ in S 
Woolman, T Roux and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa, Student Edition 56A at 56A-16. 
37 Woolman and Botha  above note 36  at 34-32. 
38 Above note 36 at 34-39. 
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seems to be no room for applying the general limitations clause after finding that the state 
could not justify its failure to meet its obligations in section 27(2).39  
 
The Court in Khosa focused on the reasonableness review in terms of section 27(2) rather 
than the general limitations clause because no arguments were made in respect of section 
36.  Iles critisises the approach taken by the court and argues that ‘[o]nce the Court 
admitted that it was not dealing with the content of the right but rather with access to the 
right, the internal limitations clause became irrelevant and the analysis should instead 
have centred around the justifiability of failing to provide access to certain groups in 
terms of the limitations clause’.40
 
Whether or not the approach followed in Khosa was correct or not is not necessary to 
decide here. It is submitted that if it is accepted that there is a difference between section 
27(2) inquiry and a section 36 inquiry, but that the same factors or contextual 
considerations are taken into account no matter which inquiry a court chooses to follow ( 
depending on whether or not the applicant gives arguments relevant to a certain inquiry) 
and that the outcome would be the same either way, then it could be more a matter of 
choice between two inquiries and not so much a matter of reconciling the two 
approaches. If this is correct, Woolman and Botha argue that a court faced with going one 
way or the other is more likely to follow its sections 26(2) and 27(2) reasonableness 
                                                 
39 I Rautenbach (2005) TSAR 627 at 653. 
40 K Iles above note 36 at 464. 
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review than to create ‘a meaningful allocation of analytical responsibilities between these 
sections and section 36’.41
 
In the hypothetical case to be analysed below, a different view is taken. It is assumed that 
the Court chose to undertake a section 36 inquiry instead of a section 27(2) 
reasonableness analysis and it is further assumed that the outcome would be the same 
whether or not the inquiry is done under section 27 or under section 36, thus a section 36 
inquiry is preferred in this particular case as a matter of choice only. For the purposes of 
the case it is assumed further that the relevant provisions in the Children’s Act have come 
into operation. 
 
4.3.2 Analysing the status approach under section 36 
In what follows the status approach is evaluated in terms of the limitations clause. This is 
done in the context of a hypothetical scenario in which the status approach is challenged 
in the Constitutional Court. In this scenario an application is made by K a 10 year old 
minor alleging that her health service rights in sections 28(1)(c) and section 27(1)(a) are 
violated by the status approach as used in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. In terms of 
section 129(2)and (3) of the Children’s Act children aged 12 who are mature can consent 
to medical treatment without parental assistance and those who are in need of surgery and 
also 12 years and older can also consent to such surgery but must also be assisted by their 
guardians or parents. K contents that these sections are unconstitutional to the extent that 
it prevents mature minors below the age of consent, such as herself, to access health care 
services like medical treatment and surgery on their own and further that the status 
                                                 
41 Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-31. 
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approach in general is unconstitutional when used in legislation aimed at fulfilling the 
right to access health care services and children’s right to basic health care services. She 
contends further that this approach leads to mature minors below the age of consent being 
unable to access health care services on their own whereas those above that age can do so 
without parental assistance and that this amounts to unfair discrimination on the basis of 
age and on the basis of health care needs seeing that mature girls of any age can consent 
to a termination of pregnancy without involving their parents or guardians and that this is 
in contravention of section 9 of the Constitution. Finally, it is contended that these 
limitations cannot be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitutions. For ease of 
reference to the hypothetical scenario it will also be referred to as ‘the K matter’. 
 
These contentions must undergo a limitation analysis so as to establish their validity. 
When it comes to an investigation into the limitation of rights a two stage enquiry ensues. 
At the first stage the question is asked whether there was an actual limitation of the 
relevant right. If the answer is positive to the first question then the second stage is 
triggered and the question asked there is whether the limitation can be justified or not.   
 
 The Limitations analysis:  
4.3.2.1 Does section 129 subsections (2) and (3) and the use of the status approach in 
general limit children’s health rights? 
At this stage what needs to be determined is the scope of the right. 42 The question is 
whether the law or conduct restricts an activity which falls within the protected scope of 
                                                 
42 K Iles (2007) SAJHR 23 at 71. 
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the right.43 What the applicant in the K matter must show is that the ambit of the right 
covers the conduct which she seeks to protect.44 The applicant in this case must thus 
show that accessing medical treatment and surgical operations are part of her health 
service rights in sections 27(1) and 28(1)(c) and that the sections in the Children’s Act 
restricts her from enjoying these rights.  
 
In Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)45 and Khosa the Court found that the 
ambit of the right in section 27(1) and 26(1) must be determined by also considering 
section 27(2) and section 26(2). In TAC it was said that ‘sections 27(1) and 27(2) must be 
read together as defining the scope of the positive rights that everyone has and the 
corresponding obligations on the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil such rights. 
The rights conferred by sections 26(1) and 27(1) are to have ‘access’ to the services that 
the state is obliged to provide in terms of sections 26(2) and 27(2).46  
 
‘Access’ in the context of health care has been defined as ‘a multidimensional concept 
that describes people’s ability to use the necessary health care, immediately wherever 
they are’.47 ‘Accessibility to health care is concerned with the ability of a population to 
                                                 
43 Above note 42. For an in depth discussion on what is meant by the term ‘protected conduct’ or ‘protected 
interest’ see also G van der Schyff (2005) Limitation of rights: A study of the European Convention and the 
South African Bill of Rights 31-40  and again from 91-104.  
44 Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-4. 
45 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
46 Above note 45 at para 39. 
47 N Bagheri , G Benwell and A Holt (2006) Health Care & Informatics Review Online. Available at 
http://hcro.enigma.co.nz/website/index.cfm?fuseaction=articledisplay&FeatureID=010906  [Accessed 12 
November 2007] 
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obtain a specific set of health services’.48 In terms of section 28(1) (c) children have a 
right to basic health care services. Although section 28 does not mention the word 
‘access’ it is still an element of the right to basic health care services.  Thus, section 28 
might not create a limited right of ‘access’ to health care services like section 27, but it 
includes in its broad form a right of children to be able to access basic health care 
services.  
 
The Children’s Act and its individual provisions are meant to give effect to children’s 
health service rights. It cannot be denied that medical treatment and surgery are forms of 
health care services which are protected under the health service rights in section 28(1)(c) 
and section 27(1).49 These rights entitle children to be provided with health care 
services50, and they must thus be able to access those services.  The state must facilitate 
this access by putting measures in place to assist children in accessing the necessary 
health care service.51 In Jaftha the Court found that if a measure permits a person to be 
deprived of existing access to housing then it limits the right protected in section 26.52  
 
The hypothetical scenario used here as a basis to analyse the status approach is however 
not concerned with the limitation of existing (albeit limited) enjoyment of health service 
rights but is rather concerned with the limitation of the full enjoyment of health rights, 
                                                 
48 S Ebener, Z El Morjani, N Rav and M Black ‘Physical Accessibility to health care: From Isotropy to 
Anisotropy’. Online at http://www.gisdevelopment.net/magazine/years/2005/jun/care.htm [Accessed 23 
October 2007] 
49 See for example Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (PTY)TLD  and Others 
(Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amici Curiae)  2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) at para 514 and 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal v  Soobramoney  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at para 19.  
50 Soobramoney  above note 49. 
51 Grootboom above note 9 at para 93 
52 Jaftha above note 35 at para 34.  
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like the Khosa matter. Quoting from Grootboom where it was held that subsection 1 of 
section 26 places a negative obligation on the state to desist from preventing or impairing 
the right of access to adequate housing, the Court in Khosa held that the same applies to 
section 27 as well.53 This means that the state should not prevent or impair the right to 
access health care services. 
 
What is clear from the above is that the ability to access a health care service is a 
protected activity of the right to health care services in both sections 27 and 28 of the 
Constitution.  The state is obliged not to prevent children from accessing such services 
because ‘rights [which] describe the duties of those bound by the rights are de facto 
limited when these duties are not observed’.54 Section 129 limits the health service rights 
of mature minors below the age of consent in the following way. The section interferes55 
with their ability to access services in the same way as those above the age of consent 
because they may only access the services if they are accompanied by a parent or 
guardian. Thus their ability to access the necessary services is conditioned and unless the 
condition is complied with they cannot obtain the health care service. Even if they are not 
comfortable with the idea of involving their parents in a particular situation the health 
service will be refused and they will be turned away if they are not with their parents. In 
such a situation access to the health service is completely denied preventing the factually 
mature minor from enjoying an activity which falls within the scope of the right, namely, 
the ability to access a health care service.  
                                                 
53 Khosa above note 33 para 109. 
54Rautenbach above note 39 at 629. 
55 ‘An interference is described more closely as a state of affairs, be it occasioned by an action or in-action, 
which causes the exercise of the protected conduct or interests to be impaired or hindered.’ Van der Schyff 
above note 43 at 41.  
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 Do the sections unfairly discriminate against mature minors below the age of consent? 
The achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms are part 
of the founding values of South Africa’s democratic state.56 Section 9 of the Constitution 
promotes the value of equality and prohibits unfair discrimination. The section reads as 
follows: 
 
9: Equality 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit 
of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken. 
(3)  The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted 
to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair 
unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
 
                                                 
56 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
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In the case before the Court the applicant makes claims of unfair discrimination on two 
grounds, that of age and that of health care needs. In the first instance the applicant 
contends that the provisions of the Children’s Act discriminate against mature minors on 
the basis of age because children above the age of consent are treated differently to those 
below that age and that it is this different treatment that results in mature minors below 
the age of consent not enjoying their right to access health care services fully and equally 
to those children above the age of consent. Secondly the applicant claims that seeing that 
the legislature does not use age restrictions when it comes to a termination of pregnancy 
for girls but sets such age restrictions for health services like medical treatment and 
surgery this, too, amounts to unfair discrimination on the basis of health care needs. The 
factors to be considered when someone alleges unfair discrimination are dealt with first. 
 
In Harksen v Lane57 the Court set out the criteria for determining unfair discrimination. 
Four questions must be asked, namely, (1) is there a differentiation? (2) does the 
differentiation amount to discrimination, (3) is the differentiation unfair? and (4) if it is 
unfair discrimination because it is on a listed ground then the question that must still be 
answered is whether it is in fact unfair discrimination.  
 
4.3.2.2 Determining differentiation 
Here the Court has to look at whether the provision differentiates between people or 
categories of people and if the differentiation bears a rational connection to a legitimate 
government purpose.58 In Prinsloo v Van der Linde,59  the Court explained that:  
                                                 
57 Harksen v Lane No and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 53. 
58 I Currie and J de Waal (2005) The Bill of Rights handbook  239. 
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'In regard to mere differentiation the constitutional State is expected to act in a 
rational manner. It should not regulate in an arbitrary manner or manifest ''naked 
preferences'' that serve no legitimate governmental purpose, for that would be 
inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental premises of the 
constitutional State.’60
 
Thus, the differentiation will amount to discrimination if it is arbitrary, irrational or it 
manifests a ‘naked preference’. However, this is not the only way to establish the 
presence of discrimination when it comes to differentiation. Even if the differentiation 
does serve a non arbitrary or rational government purpose it can still amount to 
discrimination61 because differentiation on one of the listed grounds set out in section 
9(3) amounts to discrimination.62  
 
The distinction between mere differentiation and discrimination is very important to the 
applicants’ second claim of unfair discrimination and is considered first. What the 
applicant in the K matter basically complains of is that the legislature treats children 
under the age of consent (i.e 12) worse when it comes to their health needs compared to 
the way it treats girls needing a termination of pregnancy which is also a health need. It 
can be accepted that there is differential treatment when it comes to girls needing 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) 
60 Above note 59 at para 23. 
61 Harksen above note 57 at para 53. 
62 Harksen above note 57 at para 46. Currie and de Waal explain that ‘discrimination is differentiation on 
illegitimate grounds’ whether listed in section 9(3) or analogous to those listed in section 9(3). See Currie 
and de Waal above note 58 at 243-244. In Harksen the Court also established that ‘There will be 
discrimination on an unspecified ground if it is based on attributes or characteristics which have the 
potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a 
comparably serious manner.’ Harksen above note 57 at para 46. However discrimination on an unspecified 
ground is not relevant to this case and thus needs no further consideration. 
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abortions. Those girls could get such services no matter what their age without involving 
their parents if they are competent to consent, compared to how children needing other 
health care services are treated, in that besides having to pass the maturity test, they also 
have to be of a certain age or older in order to consent to health serves without the need 
to get parental of guardian assistance.  
 
The issue here is not differentiation on the ground of age (which is discussed later) but 
whether the differentiation regarding different health needs, for example surgery, medical 
treatment etc can also amount to discrimination. Based on the conclusion reached in this 
regard it is unnecessary to determine whether differentiation based on ‘health needs’ as 
opposed to ‘health status’ can be deemed a non-listed ground which could still amount to 
unfair discrimination in terms of section 9(3). The issue of possible discrimination on the 
basis of health needs is briefly considered and promptly dismissed below. 
 
The Equality Act63 defines discrimination as  
‘…any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation which 
directly or indirectly- 
(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantages on; or 
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or more of 
the prohibited grounds..’ 
 
The issue of disadvantage or prejudice as a result of a law plays an important role in 
establishing discrimination. In Hugo the Court held that ‘the advantage of releasing 
                                                 
63 Act 4 of 2000. 
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mothers of small children, through a presidential pardon, which was not afforded to 
fathers of small children was enough to establish discrimination within the context of s 
8(2) of the interim Constitution’.64 Similarly the Court in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie and Others held that the exclusion of same sex couples from the benefits of 
marriage law constituted a denial of their right to equal protection and benefit of the law 
and this was as a result of prolonged discrimination based on their sexual orientation.65 It 
is clear in the case at hand that the disadvantages alleged to be suffered as a result of the 
status approach flows directly from the age restrictions the legislature chose to put in 
place and does not flow from her specific health needs. For this reason the focus must be 
on the claim of discrimination on the basis of age and not the alleged discrimination on 
health needs.  
 
4.3.2.3 Age-based Discrimination 
It is alleged that the status approach discriminates on the grounds of age. Returning to the 
Harksen test for discrimination the questions to be asked is whether there is 
differentiation and if this differentiation amounts to discrimination. 
 
The relevant parts of section 129 of the Children’s Act are set out here again for 
convenience; 
129(2) A child may consent to his or her own medical treatment or to the medical
 treatment of his or her child if— 
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
                                                 
64 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997(4) SA 1 (CC) para 33. 
65 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie  2006 (1) SA 530 para 75-76. 
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(b) the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand 
the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the treatment. 
        (3) A child may consent to the performance of a surgical operation on him or her or
 his or her child if— 
(a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
(b) the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand 
the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the surgical operation; and 
(c) the child is duly assisted by his or her parent or guardian. 
      (4) The parent, guardian or care-giver of a child may, subject to section 31, consent to
 the medical treatment of the child if the child is— 
(a) under the age of 12 years; or 
(b) over that age but is of insufficient maturity or is unable to understand the 
benefits, risks and social implications of the treatment. 
      (5) The parent or guardian of a child may, subject to section 31, consent to a surgical
 operation on the child if the child is— 
(a) under the age of 12 years; or 
(b) over that age but is of insufficient maturity or is unable to understand the 
benefits, risks and social implications of the operation. 
  
These provisions indicate that when a child is older then 12 and mature enough to 
consent then he or she can give the necessary consent on their own without assistance 
from parents or guardians, but when it comes to surgical operations the child must be 
assisted by a parent. The question on whether the child’s right to consent to surgery 
depends on whether or not he or she has been duly assisted has been considered 
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somewhere else66 and is not relevant here.  It is clear that different rules apply regarding 
consent by children who need medical treatment or surgery and the different rules depend 
on the age of the child. These different procedures is a direct result of the law treating 
children above the age of consent different-their capacity to consent only depend on their 
maturity-to those below the age of consent-they lack capacity to consent despite their 
maturity. Thus differentiation has been established. 
 
As said before, the Court held in Harksen that when there is differentiation on a ground 
listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution then discrimination is also established. Section 
9(3) prohibits discrimination on the ground of age67 and thus the fact that section 129 
differentiates between children above 12 and children below 12 years of age it is found 
that there is discrimination. 
 
4.3.2.4 Unfair discrimination  
Section 9(5) of the equality clause creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
discrimination is unfair if it is based on a listed ground as set out in 9(3).68 Thus in this 
case the discrimination resulting from section 129 is presumed to be unfair unless proven 
otherwise. The state has to prove that the discrimination is not unfair.69 In Hugo it was 
established that  
                                                 
66 See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
67 The Equality Act defines ‘age’ as follows:  'age' includes the conditions of disadvantage and vulnerability 
suffered by persons on the basis of their age. See section 1 of the Act above note 63. 
68 ‘even in cases of discrimination on the grounds specified in section 8(2), which by virtue of section 8(4) 
are presumed to constitute unfair discrimination, it is possible to rebut the presumption and establish that 
the discrimination is not unfair’ Harksen v Lane above note 57 para 45 
69 Section 13(2) (a) of the Equality Act above note 63. 
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‘We need, therefore, to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which 
recognises that, although a society which affords each human being equal 
treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve 
that goal by  insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that 
goal is achieved’.70
 
Unfair discrimination is determined by looking at the impact of the discrimination on the 
person discriminated against.71 To determine the impact of the discrimination the 
following factors can be considered, the position of the complainant in society and 
whether he or she suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers 
from such patterns of disadvantage, the nature and extent of the discrimination; whether 
the discrimination has a legitimate purpose; the nature of the interest which has been 
affected by the discrimination.72
 
These factors are strikingly similar to the factors a court considers in the section 36 
analysis of the reasonableness and justifiability of a law limiting a right. Having regard to 
this the arguments advanced here will not all be repeated when the latter exercise is 
undertaken if it is found that the discrimination is indeed unfair. 
 
In this case (the K matter) the discrimination is directed at very young children. We are 
not concerned with infants whose level of maturity will not allow them to understand the 
                                                 
70 Hugo above note 64 at para 41 
71 Khosa above note33 para 72. 
72 Hugo above note 64 at  para 47, Harksen above note 57 at para 51, Khosa Id and the Equality Act above 
note 63 section 14 (3) 
 111
benefits created by the Children’s Act but with adolescents who have reached a stage of 
development which does allow them to be aware of and use their rights contained in the 
Constitution. This is the group of children in the position of the applicant for which we 
have to determine what impact the discrimination has on them.73  Children in general are 
a vulnerable group in society because they are part of a minority. They are dependent on 
adults for almost everything that they need in order to reach a stage of adulthood where 
they could be released from that state of dependence.  
 
However this dependent nature of children does not make them all irrational and 
immature beings incapable of making important decisions concerning their lives. In fact 
the legislature successfully made a case against such assumptions in the Christian 
Lawyers case where it was argued that girls under 18 are incapable of consenting to a 
termination of pregnancy because they are too young.  
 
In the Fourie case the Court found that the more vulnerable the group affected by the 
discrimination the more likely is it that such discrimination will be deemed unfair and 
that vulnerability also depends on patters of stereotyping.74 The position of children can 
be equated with that of women centuries ago when women were considered to lack the 
ability to make decisions because of their gender and their husbands had all the decision 
making powers. Another stereotype applied to women by society because of their gender 
was that they were mainly responsible for the upbringing of children and were thus not 
                                                 
73 The Constitutional Court has on many occasions considered the position of people who would be in the 
same position as the applicant but who are not party to the proceedings. See minority judgment in Masiya v 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Another, 
Amici Curiae) 2007 (5) SA (CC) 
74 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie above note 65 at para 50. 
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considered to have equal rights with husbands to seek and be employed. In Hugo the 
Court found that ‘[t]o use the generalisation that women bear a greater proportion of the 
burdens of child rearing for justifying treatment that deprives women of benefits or 
advantages or imposes disadvantages upon them would clearly, therefore, be unfair’.75 
Cannot the same views apply to children who are assumed immature and are thus 
deprived of societal and constitutional benefits like respect for autonomy?76 It is a 
presumed characteristic of young children that they are incapable of making informed 
decisions and in the Fourie case it was held that ‘[s]ome minorities are visible, and suffer 
discrimination on the basis of presumed characteristics of the group with which they are 
identified’.77
 
To determine whether the law has an unfair impact on the complainant the extent to 
which the discrimination impairs the right of the complainant must also be considered.78 
This impact inquiry can be done by looking at the advantages and disadvantages which 
stem from the provision, in this case the advantages of section 129 of the Children’s Act 
in relation to the right to access health care services should thus be considered. In other 
words the question is really what benefits does the right to access health care services 
provide mature minors (and everyone else) and what disadvantages would mature minors 
below the age of consent in section 129 of the Children’s Act suffer if they are excluded 
from the full benefits of this right?79  
                                                 
75 Hugo above note 64 at para 39: 
76 ‘Child liberationists argue that children are the last oppressed group in society’ See Ross above note 6 at 
489. 
77 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie above note 65 at para 77 
78 Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 245. 
79 Examples of cases where the Court considered the impact that the exclusion had on the individuals who 
were excluded from certain provisions. Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 
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 The Equality Act defines equality as follows: 
‘'equality' includes the full and equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms as contemplated 
in the Constitution and includes de jure and de facto equality and also equality in terms of 
outcomes’80
 
In the context of this case the full enjoyment of health service rights means not having 
that right being interfered with by legislation. The right is interfered with here to the 
extent that the assumption of immaturity operates against a minor who is in fact mature 
who will need to at all times (until the age of consent is reached) be assisted by a parent 
or adult when she  or he seeks medical treatment. The problem arises where the minor 
may not want to have the parent present for example if she needs treatment for an STD or 
STI but is below the age of consent for such treatment (disregarding for a moment that 
she is below the legal age to consent to having sex in the first place) so would not have a 
choice but to involve a parent or guardian. The mature minor above the age of consent is 
advantaged in that she would be able to access the services without having to disclose her 
sex related infection to a parent. 
 
In another instance where a minor suffers from something more serious and she or he is 
accompanied by a parent but the minor disagrees with the decision of the parent if for 
example the parent wants to refuse treatment being advised by the health provider. In 
such a case the health practitioner will be forced to do what the parent says or make 
                                                                                                                                                 
2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (2002 (9) BCLR 986); Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development and Others (Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC), 
Hugo above note 64.  
80 Above note 63, Section 1. 
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application for ministerial or court ordered consent. The minor’s access to the treatment 
could be denied or delayed depending on what the practitioner would choose to do, but if 
the minor was mature enough to make the decision then the delay or denial could have 
been avoided.  The minor’s maturity does not even come into the picture where she or he 
is below the age of consent because immaturity is assumed by operation of consent laws.  
 
The advantage that the approach has for children above the age of consent is also clear 
when one considers section 13 of the Children’s Act. This section gives every child the 
right to access information regarding his or her health status and regarding treatment for 
his or her health status. Take for example a situation where a child below the age of 
consent goes to a clinic with a parent for some or the other blood test (besides one for an 
HIV test) that child will not be able to get the results of the test without a parent so his 
right to access information regarding his health status will be impaired not to mention his 
right to privacy. If that same child does show up at the clinic with a parent and receives 
information regarding his health status and possible treatment which he might need the 
child cannot act on the information given by for example consenting to or rejecting the 
treatment proposed because the parent has decision making power. Given that section 13 
requires the information to be given to the child in a manner which the child will 
understand the child should then also be able to understand the consequences of decisions 
made in accordance with the information being provided. The minor above the age of 
consent will be able to act on the information given if she is mature and understand it and 
if a parent for example disagrees with the minor’s decision that parent might be able to 
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take the matter to court but the provisions of the Children’s Act does not seem to give the 
parent the right to overrule the decision of a mature child who is over the age of consent.  
The state’s primary aim for setting age limitations is to protect young children who do 
not understand the implications of giving consent. Actual understanding of the 
consequences of one’s decision is part of the requirement for giving informed consent. 
The question is whether the criterion used by the legislature to achieve its objective 
results in unfair discrimination. The Court in Khosa held that ‘[t]he fact that the 
differentiation between citizens and non-citizens may have a rational basis does not mean 
that it is not an unfairly discriminatory criterion to use in the allocation of benefits’.81 
The legislature wants to give effect to children’s health service rights that is why section 
129 is in the Children’s Act in the first place, but the criterion it uses to do so, namely, 
setting age limitation results in mature minors below that age being disadvantaged.  
 
The right to access health care services is integral not only to the right to dignity and 
equality but also to the idea of self-determination and autonomy.82 Presumptions of 
immaturity do not respect individuality and the right to self-determination. South Africa 
also has international obligations to promote equality and to prohibit unfair 
discrimination. The Committee on the Rights of the Child responsible for interpreting the 
provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (which has been ratified by South 
Africa) produced a General Comment regarding adolescent health.83 In terms of this 
General Comment the Committee notes that ‘[h]’ealth facilities, goods and services 
                                                 
81 Khosa above note 33 at para 68. 
82 C Ngwena (2005) ‘Rights concerning health’ in D Brand and C Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in 
South Africa 107 at 131. 
83 Committee on the Rights of the Child: General Comment No. 4. (2003) Adolescent health and 
development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. CRC/GS/2003/4. 
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should be known and easily accessible (economically, physically and socially) to all 
adolescents without discrimination’.84 The health service rights in the Constitution are 
not guaranteed to the extent that the person exercising the right must be of a certain age. 
The right to freedom and security of the person which is closely related to health service 
rights gives everyone the right to have control over his or her body and thus to make 
decisions regarding their body. In the exercise of this right too- age is not a precondition 
for exercising the right, thus ‘age should not be mechanically related to decision-making 
capacity or maturity thereby denying equal rights to make decisions to those who are in 
fact able to do so’.85  
 
Having regard to the impact that the discrimination has on mature minors below the age 
of consent in that the presumption of immaturity result in them being disadvantaged as a 
result of a lack of respect for their autonomy it is found that the discrimination is unfair 
notwithstanding the importance of the purpose of the discrimination. 
 
What must now be determined is whether the limitations placed on children’s health 
rights as discovered above can be justified in terms of the general limitations clause. 
 
4.3.2.5 Reasonable and justifiable limitation in an open and democratic society 
Section 36 
1. The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
                                                 
84 Above note 83 at para 41. 
85 See, Breen above note 5 at 24 footnote 96. 
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and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including- 
(a) the nature of the right 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
2. Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, 
no law my limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
 
In conformity with the rule of law, section 36 authorises only a law ‘of general 
application’ to limit the rights in the Bill of Rights. 86 Legislation (including subordinate 
legislation), common law and customary law all fall under the concept of a ‘law’ of 
general application.87 To be considered ‘of general application’ the ‘law’ must be clear, 
accessible, not arbitrary, and precise and apply equally and generally to all.88
 
                                                 
86 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi & Another v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister 
of Home Affairs 2000 (3) (CC) at para 47,  Hugo above note 64 at para 102. 
87 Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 169. See also  Iles above note 42  at 76 and Woolman and Botha 
above note 36 at 34-51-52. 
88 Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 169 and 172. See also Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-48-
50. For a broad discussion of the features and criteria of a law of general application Woolman and Botha 
also at 34-55-67. The majority in  the Hugo case found that the exercise of presidential power did not 
constitute a ‘law of general application’. In S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) it was 
contended that the section of the Criminal Procedure Act which allowed the death penalty did not constitute 
a law of general application because it did not apply uniformly throughout South Africa. The Court held 
that disparities between the legal orders in different parts of the country, as a result of the s 229 of the 
Constitution did not render the laws such that they are not of general application. See the judgment at para 
32. 
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The Children’s Act is legislation which is accessible and applies equally and generally to 
all children in South Africa and thus complies with the requirements of being a law of 
general application. 
  
The law that is permitted to limit the right must be reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. This means that 
‘the law in question [must] serve a constitutionally acceptable purpose and that there is 
sufficient proportionality between the harm done by the law…and the benefits it is 
designed to achieve….’89 This is the proportionality enquiry.90
 
In order to determine whether the law limiting the right is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society section 36 gives five factors for a court to consider. These 
factors are not the only factors a court could consider and are also not a ‘checklist of 
requirements’91  which a court must look out for when determining the reasonableness 
and justifiability of the law limiting the right. These and other factors must be balanced 
against each other. This balancing exercise requires a court to ‘place the purpose, effects 
and importance of the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and 
effect of the infringement caused by the legislation on the other.92 The factors set out in 
section 36 are explored below and applied to the facts of the K matter. 
 
 
                                                 
89 Currie and de Waal  above note 58 at 176. 
90 See S v Makwanyane above note 88 for more on the proportionality analysis. 
91 Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 178. See also Khosa above note 33 at para 79. 
92 S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 18. 
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The first factor regarding the nature and importance93 of the right requires firstly a 
determination of whether or not the right is capable of being limited94 and how important 
the interest are which the right is aimed at protecting.95 The importance of the right 
establishes what value a right has in an open and democratic society. The more important 
the right is to an open and democratic society based on dignity, equality and freedom the 
more compelling any justification for limiting that right must be.96  In Magajane v 
Chairperson, North West Gambling Board and Others the Court held that this factor 
‘focuses the court on the purpose of the right, the context that resulted in the right being 
enshrined in the Constitution and the seriousness of limiting the right’.97  
 
Socio-economic rights like any other rights in the Bill of Rights are capable of being 
limited.  The case of Soobramoney is a great example of the fact that the right to access 
health care services can indeed be limited. Of course the fact that no rights are absolute 
and are all thus capable of being limited does not detract from the importance of the right. 
 
Although the Constitutional Court has not been explicitly invited to consider in detail the 
importance of health service rights in a section 36 analysis, such importance can be 
deduced from their judgments. In TAC the court held that a government programme 
                                                 
93 Although the phrase as found in section 36 does not include the word ‘importance’ this was added by the 
Court in Makwanyane (under the Interim Constitution’s section 33) and was subsequently applied by courts 
throughout the development of the limitations jurisprudence over the years. See Iles above note 42 at 77-
78.  Ackermann J made the point in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v  D  Minister of 
Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) in para  34 that, although the section did not expressly mention the importance 
of the right infringed, 'this is a factor which must of necessity be taken into account in any proportionality 
evaluation'.   
94 Iles above note 42 at 80. 
95 Rautenbach (2005) above note 39 at 631-634. 
96 Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-48-50. See also Van der Schyff above note 43 at 279. 
97 Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling Board and Others 2006(5) SA 250 (CC) at para 62. 
 120
which prevents HIV positive pregnant mothers from accessing the essential drug, 
nevirapine, could not withstand constitutional scrutiny, indicating how highly the right to 
access health services is valued when weighed against government actions affecting such 
rights. In Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa98 and in 
Soobramoney it was established that the right to access health care services in section 27 
included the right to medical treatment and the right to access affordable medicine and to 
this end the Court on those occasions illustrated the importance of accessing medical 
treatment and affordable medicine in light of the right to access health care services. 
 
Furthermore, health service has great value for a democratic society based on dignity 
equality and freedom. In Makwanyana the Court held that the right to life and dignity are 
the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights in the 
Bill of Rights.99In Jaftha the Court held further that claims based on socio-economic 
rights must necessarily engage the right to dignity.100 The right to access health care 
services as a socio-economic right is thus a component of the right to dignity. Health 
service rights naturally engage the right to human dignity when one considers how health 
services in the past were provided along racial lines and how the majority in this country 
were turned away and refused health care services simply because they were not 
considered worthy to be provided such services. Because their dignity was not respected 
their right to access health care services were not acknowledged. Section 27(1) and 
28(1)(c) which provides for the protection of health care service rights aims to rectify 
                                                 
98 Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (PTY)TLD  and Others (Treatment Action 
Campaign and Another as Amici Curiae)  2006 (2) SA 311 (CC).  
99 Makwanyane above note 88  para 144. 
100 Jaftha above note 35 at para 21. See also Grootboom above note 9 at para 83 where the relationship 
between the right to access housing and the right to dignity is established. 
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those injustices and accords with the intention of the Constitution to ‘improve the quality 
of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person’.101 The ability to access health 
care services thus affords all in South Africa the opportunity to live a dignified life. Thus 
given its connection to the right to dignity which is a core value under the Constitution, 
the importance of the health service rights in section 27(1) and 28(1)(c) is evident.102  
 
The second factor, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, entails considering the 
importance of the state and public interest to be served by the limitation.103  In Magajane 
the Court indicated the importance of this factor when it noted that ‘the second factor… 
is crucial to the analysis, as it is clear that the Constitution does not regard the limitation 
of a constitutional right as justified unless there is a substantial state interest requiring the 
limitation’.104
 
When considering this factor the purpose purported to be served by the limitation must be 
determined first and once this is established then the importance must be evaluated.105 
The objective of the provisions can be determined by considering the following; the 
overall purpose of the Act, the legislative history of the provision and the mischief it was 
                                                 
101 Preamble to the Constitution. 
102 See Khosa above note 33 at para 114 where the Court held that the importance of the right to social 
assistance could not be gainsaid given the fact that it is a right which goes to one of the core values of our 
Constitution, namely, human dignity. See also Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 179. 
103 The limitation must serve a purpose that most people would regard as compellingly important. Currie 
and de Waal  above note 58 at 164.  One of the reasons why the Court in S v Williams and Others 1995(3) 
SA 632 (CC) found that the limitation of the right against cruel and inhumane punishment through juvenile 
wipping could not be justified  in terms of the Constitution was because it held that no compelling interest 
was proved to justify the practice of juvenile whipping as a form of punishment, see para 91-92. ‘The 
purpose for which rights are limited usually consist of the protection or promotion of specific public 
interests, such as state security, public order, morality, public health and the administration of justice. The 
protection of the rights of others is also a purpose’ See Rautenbach above note 39 at 631-634. 
104 Magajane above note 97 at para 65. 
105 Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-73. 
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intended to address.106 The importance of the purpose of the limitation can also be 
assessed by looking at whether the objective of the limitation is to advance constitutional 
values.107 The purpose served by the limitation should be worthwhile and be geared at 
contributing to an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.108
 
The legislature would argue that the use of the status approach in section 129 of the 
Children’s Act is generally for the protection of children against their own immaturity 
and their inability to make value judgments. 109 Laws around the world set age limitations 
for accessing health care services without parental assistance. These age limitations 
protect children by placing the responsibility on adults to make important health 
decisions on behalf of the child. Furthermore, this responsibility to consent on behalf of 
the child is part of parents or guardian’s constitutional obligations to provide parental 
care.  
 
The purpose which section 129 serves can also be gathered from the overall objectives of 
the Children’s Act. The objectives served by the Children’s Act can be ascertained from 
its Preamble and its objects clause. The relevant part of the Preamble reads as follows: 
‘AND WHEREAS it is necessary to effect changes to existing laws relating to 
children in order to afford them the necessary protection and assistance so that 
                                                 
106 Above note 105. 
107 Above note 105. 
108 Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 179. For examples of what the Courts has thus far considered to be 
important purposes in the limitation analysis see Currie and de Waal at 180-181 and Woolman and Botha 
above note 36 at 34-74-75. 
109 T Davel (2000)‘The status of children in South African Private Law’ in Davel CJ (ed) Introduction to 
Child Law in South Africa 1 at 20. See also H Kruger above note 4 at 6. 
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they can fully assume their responsibilities within the community as well as that 
the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, 
should grow up in a family environment and in an atmosphere of happiness, love 
and understanding,’ 
 
The relevant parts of the Objects clause read as follows: 
“Objects of Act 
2. The objects of this Act are- 
(a) …. 
(b) to give effect to the following constitutional rights of children, namely- 
(i) family care or parental care or appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment; 
………………….. 
(i) generally to promote the protection, development and well-being of 
children’ 
 
What stands out from the above is that the Act aims to afford children the necessary 
protection, to ensure they receive parental assistance when needed and to promote their 
development and well-being. In setting age limitations through section 129, children 
below the age of 12 must be assisted by their parents when they need health care 
services. This affords them protection from their lack of experience and places decision 
making responsibility on a parent or a guardian. Their development and well-being are 
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also served by allowing them more time to gain experience in making important health 
care decisions.110   
 
The legislature can also argue that children’s health service rights must also be read 
with section 28(2) of the Constitution which states that the best interest of the child is 
of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.111 The standard of the 
best interest of the child is also made an objective of the Children’s Act.112 By giving 
effect to children’s health service rights section 129 of the Children’s Act is meant to 
serve the best interest of young children in general by protecting them from the 
responsibility of making health care decisions, the implications of which they don’t 
fully understand due to their lack of development and experience.113  
 
The objectives of section 129 read with the objectives of the Children’s Act as a whole 
are thus to give effect to children’s rights such as their right to parental care and more 
directly their right to basic health care services. The section also purports to serve the 
best interest of children by requiring them to be assisted by parents when their well-
being are in issue and they need health care services thus affording them the protection 
they need given their vulnerability. These are very important objectives which certainly 
serves societal and state interest to protect the children of this country.  
                                                 
110 See Ross above note 6 at 488.  
111 In Fitzpatrick the Court found that the best interest principle in section 28(2) extends beyond the reach 
of the rights in section 28(1) to other provisions in the Bill of Rights. See Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development v Fitzpatrick and Others 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) para 17. 
112 It is also entrenched in section 9 of the Children’s Act. 
113 See the case of Sonderup where the Court also found that the Act incorporating the Hague Convention 
on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act 72 of 1996 was consistent with the Constitution 
because inter alia it served the best interest of children involved in custody matters. Sonderup v Tondelli 
and Another 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC). 
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 For the third factor, Woolman identifies five issues a court considers when evaluating 
the nature and extent of the limitation, these are (1) the Court looks at the ‘core’ values 
of the right and determines whether the limitation affects these ‘core’ values; (2) the 
Court considers the actual impact of the limitation on those affected by it (how severe is 
it?); (3) Sometimes the Court also considers the social position of the individual or 
group affected by the limitation (i.e do they occupy a vulnerable position in society in 
general); (4) The duration of the limitation is looked at by considering whether it is 
permanent or temporary. The Court also looks at whether the limitation is a partial or 
complete denial of the relevant right.; (5) Here the Court looks at how narrowly or 
broadly the limitation is tailored to achieve the objective. The question asked is what is 
the reach of the limitation in light of the objective purported to be served or what is the 
extent of the discretion given by the authorizing legislation.114
 
For the purpose of the hypothetical example under evaluation here only three of these 
factors need be considered, namely, the impact of the use of the status approach on the 
applicant’s health service right, the impact of the approach on the applicant herself and 
the reach of the limitation. 
 
It has already been established that accessibility is central to health service rights. In 
other words, the ability to access health care services is a core value of the right to 
health care services. Section 129 does not allow children below 12 to access health care 
services on their own, they must be assisted by an adult in the form of a parent or 
                                                 
114 Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-79-84. 
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guardian. The section does not deny children below the age of consent of access to 
medical treatment or surgery, but makes the ability to access the services dependent on 
the presence and consent of an adult. K’s case is that the health service rights as 
guaranteed in the Constitution are given to everyone and every child and is not 
dependent on a person’s age, hence section 129 limits the core value of the right by 
setting age restrictions for accessing health care services.  
 
On the second factor concerning the impact of the limitation it is contended that the 
status approach does not recognize the autonomy of a child below 12 because it 
assumes immaturity. In S v M it was held that ‘[i]ndividually and collectively all 
children have the right to express themselves as independent social beings…to 
themselves get to understand their bodies, minds and emotions, and above all to learn 
as they grow how they should conduct themselves and make choices in the wide social 
and moral world of adulthood’115 Respect for autonomy enhances the development of 
the child by allowing the child to make decisions on their own. The status approach 
takes away the need to take the views of the child below the age of consent into account 
because it assumes that the child will be unable to express those views because of their 
age.  
 
This assumption thus results in mature minors not being able to participate in health care 
decisions or having their views regarding their health care adequately taken into account 
because they are assumed to be incapable of forming views. As soon as a health provider 
is satisfied that a minor is below the age of consent the minor’s ability to express views 
                                                 
115 S v M  above note 27 para 19. 
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regarding her health care is stayed until they come back with a parent. When a parent is 
present the views of that parent takes precedence and there is no need to consider the 
minor’s views and even if the minor expresses such views they carry little or no weight 
because the minor is deemed immature by reason of age alone. 
 
 This right to participate in decisions involving the welfare of the child is also found in 
section 10 of the Children’s Act which reads: 
 
Child participation 
10. Every child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be 
able to participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate 
in an appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be given due 
consideration. 
 
The problem with the status approach in section 129 of the Children’s Act is that it 
assumes that 12 is the ultimate age at which a child can rightly participate in health care 
decisions affecting that child despite the child’s maturity and stage of development.  
 
Although they need the guidance and assistance of parents when important decisions 
must be made, children’s individuality and right to self determination must be respected. 
This right to self-determination is fundamental to the constitutional system.116 The notion 
of children’s rights stem from the recognition that children are individual beings capable 
                                                 
116 P Carstens and D Pearmain (2007) Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law  99. 
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of being the bearers of their own rights and are no longer considered merely the subject 
of their parents’ rights.  This need to respect individuality was confirmed in the Christian 
Lawyers case where the court found that making maturity and not age the deciding factor 
when it comes to girls accessing termination of pregnancy services was a constitutionally 
valid approach taken by the legislature.  
 
In further defending the use of the status approach the argument is advanced that section 
129 serves the best interest of children. However, the best interest principle is also a 
flexible one which takes into account the individual circumstances of the child.117 
Carstens and Pearmain note that  
‘[i]t is the circumstances and capacity of the individual minor concerned, as 
opposed to minors as an amorphous group that must be considered by those 
rendering health care services. Broad generalisation when dealing with specific 
patients on the basis of factors such as age etc are not only inadvisable, they may 
also be unconstitutional in a number of different aspects not least of which is 
unfair discrimination’.118  
 
The best interest of a child needing health care services such as medical treatment or 
operations must thus be individually assessed depending on the child’s level of 
understanding and maturity and should not solely concentrate on the age of the child. 
 
                                                 
117 Fitzpatrick above note 111 at para 18. 
118 Carstens and Pearmain above note 116 at 108. 
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Thus the impact that the status approach as found in section 129 of the Children’s Act has 
on the applicant in the K matter is that it fails to respect her right to self determination by 
ignoring her individual capacity and circumstances because she is below the age of 
consent. This assumption of immaturity does not serve the best interest of the individual 
child and takes away or limits the mature minor’s ability to participate in decisions 
regarding his or her health needs. 
 
One other important factor to consider here is the duration and reach of the limitation. It 
appears that the disadvantages which the applicant in the K matter would suffer from the 
application of section 129  endures only until she reaches the 12 years of age because at 
that stage she will have the capacity to consent. This appears to be a short period 
considering that she is currently 10 years of age.119 However when looking at the impact 
of the status approach on children broadly and the fact that maturity is not static and 
depends on the individual child it is difficult to determine the exact duration which the 
limitation would take for those individual children. Thus to the extent that it was found 
that the sections unfairly discriminate against her it is clear that the discrimination is not 
of long duration. 
 
 The limitation does not appear to be absolute in that it does not deprive children below 
the age of consent of the ability to access health care services because they are young it 
only makes access dependent on whether or not the child is accompanied by an adult. 
However, it is this requirement of adult assistance that limits the right in the first place in 
                                                 
119 In Khosa  Ngcobo J held that the limitation that the Social Assistance Act had on the right to social 
services for permanent residents was reasonable and justifiable because the limitation was neither absolute 
nor permanent. Khosa above note 33 at para 134. 
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that if the child is unaccompanied and below the age of consent the health care worker 
will not provide the necessary health care service unless the child comes with an adult 
(except where it is an emergency). In such a case where the child is turned away the right 
is denied in its absolute sense as a result of the provisions requiring adult assistance. 
 
The fourth factor to consider is the relationship between the limitation and its purpose. In 
Magajane the Court held that ‘for law that limits a right to be reasonable and justifiable, 
there must be a causal connection between the purpose of the law and the limitations 
imposed by it’.120 This factor thus requires a court to look at the relationship between the 
limitation and the means used to achieve its objectives121 or whether the means used to 
achieve the objective is reasonably capable of achieving that objective.122 The 
relationship between the limitation and its purpose is easily determined by looking at 
whether the limitation is overbroad or underinclusive.  Rautenbach notes that ‘[a] 
limitation capable of furthering the purpose will be overbroad if it  covers instances 
which has little or nothing to do with promoting the purpose…[and] the limitation will be 
underinclusive if it covers less than may be necessary to promote the purpose’. 123
 
Section 129 limits the health service rights of mature children to the extent that their 
access to health services is restricted and dependent on adult assistance. The purpose of 
                                                 
120 Magajane above note 97 at para 72. In Makwanyane it was found that there was no rational connection 
between the death penalty and the state objective to reduce the incidence of violent crime. Makwanyane 
above note 88 at para 184. 
121 Iles above note 42  at 83. 
122 Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-84. For examples of cases where this factor failed the 
limitations analysis and it was found that the limitation was not rationally connected to the objective see 
Woolman and Botha at 34-79-85. 
123 Rautenbach above note 39 at 627. 
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the limitation is to protect children against their own immaturity by giving effect to their 
right to parental assistance in requiring parents to make health care decisions on behalf of 
younger children. The purpose of the limitation is also to serve the best interest of 
younger children. The legislature saw it fit to achieve these objectives by restricting 
children below the age of consent to only be able to access health services if 
accompanied by a parent or a guardian. Although the connection between the purpose of 
the limitation and the limitation cannot be denied the reach of the limitation may be too 
wide in respect of the purpose aimed at being achieved. The limitation is overbroad to the 
extent that it also catches the mature minor in its net even though the purpose of the 
limitation is to protect children against their own ‘immaturity’.  
 
The fifth factor set out in section 36 which a court can consider in a limitation analysis is 
whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the objective served by the limitation. 
If the court find that there is a legitimate purpose served by the limitation and that the 
limitation is rationally connected to its purpose then it will consider the issue of less 
restrictive means.124 What the court looks at is again the reach of the limitation. As 
Rautenbach notes ‘[o]verbroad and underinclusive limitations imply that there are 
alternative ways to limit the right for a particular purpose’. 125
 
However this factor is not the decisive factor which determines the reasonableness and 
justifiability of the measures employed by the state to give effect to the right but must be 
                                                 
124 Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-85. For cases where the state failed this requirement and the 
Court found that narrower means existed to achieve the objected see Woolman and Botha  at 34-86. 
125 Rautenbach above note 39 at 627. 
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considered with all the other factors.126 ‘Even where less restrictive means are available, 
the Court may still find that, on balance, the limitation is reasonable and justifiable’.127 
What is also important to note here is that when the effectiveness of alternative measures 
are looked at by the Court it should give the state a margin of discretion because ‘the role 
of the Court is not to second-guess the wisdom of policy choices made by the 
legislators’.128
 
The legislature wants to protect minors against their immaturity by assuming via section 
129 that children below 12 years of age are immature. It is contended that this objective 
can also be achieved by operation of the maturity test which is also part of section 129. If 
maturity to make decisions is the concern for the legislature then surely this concerns can 
simply be addressed by requiring the health care provider to test the maturity of the child. 
In other words ‘if an age restriction is placed on applicants, because of ordinary attributes 
usually given to people who fall within that age group, then age alone should not be the 
overriding consideration where applicants who fall outside the age group nevertheless 
meet the criteria consistent with the purpose behind that restriction’129  This approach has 
been shown to work in the case of a termination of pregnancy where maturity rather than 
age determines a girl’s ability to have an abortion. The same approach is also taken in the 
Children’s Act in so far as children younger than 12 can consent to an HIV test if they are 
                                                 
126 S v Mamabolo (Etv and Others intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 at para 49. 
127 Woolman and Botha above note 36 at 34-91. Iles notes that ‘Whether or not the fact that a less 
restrictive means was available and was not used should disqualify a limitation will then depend upon the 
importance of the purpose of that limitation, the extent to which it infringes the right and the nature of the 
right being infringed’. See Iles above note 42 at 85. 
128 Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 184. Rautenbach above note 39 at 631-634. 
129 K Hopkins (2006) De Rebus 24 at 27.  
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mature enough to do so.130 So when it comes to medical treatment and surgery the 
immature minor will still be protected from making harmful decisions where he or she is 
found by the health care worker not to be mature enough to give informed consent to 
such treatment or surgery. Focusing on maturity rather than age will then make less 
inroads on young children’s ability to access health care services on their own and will 
respect their autonomy and give effect to the best interest of the individual child. There 
are therefore indeed less restrictive means to achieve the objectives of the legislature.131
 
 
 4.4 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
Having considered the factors in section 36 and how they would apply to the hypothetical 
example of the K matter, what a court would then have to do is to balance the competing 
interests involved in the matter by considering the nature and importance of the infringed 
right, on the one hand, and the purpose, importance and effect of the infringing provision, 
taking into account the availability of less restrictive means available to achieve that 
purpose’.132 In Jaftha the Court found the nature of the right and the nature and extent of 
the limitation are of great importance when weighed against the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation.133  
 
 
                                                 
130 Section 130 of the Act. 
131 In S v Williams above note 103 the Court found at para 91-92 that there was enough sentencing options 
in the South African justice system to conclude that juvenile whipping did not have to be resorted to. 
132 S v Manamela and Another (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at para 66. 
133 Jaftha above note 35 at para 36. 
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Although the importance of the purpose of setting age limitations for children accessing 
health care services is very important it must be weighed against the impact that it has on 
the health service rights of mature minors below the age of consent and on those minors 
themselves. The right to basic health care services and the right to access health care 
services in the Constitution are given to everyone and to every child and those rights 
cannot be overridden ‘simply on the basis that the general welfare will be served by the 
restriction’.134 All the relevant factors must thus be weighed against each other to 
establish whether the use of the status approach is a reasonable and justifiable limitation 
of the health service rights of mature children below the age of consent.  
 
In considering the arguments advanced as far as the nature and extent of the limitation is 
concerned, the following conclusion is made. Firstly, the limitation of the rights is of 
limited duration (it only lasts up until the age of 12), but the infringement of the right 
does not cease because it is of limited duration.135 Although the discrimination which 
results from section 129 is of limited duration and ‘everyone is at a point in their life 
subject to …age restrictions….’136 the problem is that ‘there will always be a category of 
children, this category will always be treated differently and their rights [will] always be 
restricted.’137 Secondly, there appears to be no absolute denial of access to health care 
services, but where situations arise in which health care providers refuse to assist children 
below the age of consent when they are unaccompanied by a parent or guardian then 
there is a complete denial of the right.  
                                                 
134 Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 164. 
135 Mohamed NO and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another 2002 (4) SA 366 (W) 
at para 21. 
136 Currie and de Waal above note 58 at 256.  
137Breen above note 5 at 25.  
 135
 The limitation on the children’s rights is also not justified when one considers the 
relationship between the purpose of the limitation and its objective as well as the fact that 
there are less restrictive means available to the legislature which could serve the same 
purpose. Section 129 only marginally contributes to achieving its purpose because even 
though its ultimate aim is generally to protect immature minors from making harmful 
health care decisions the protection net is thrown so wide that it also captures mature 
minors below the age of consent. This is not necessary for purposes of the protection 
objective which the limitation serves. Thus the purpose that the section serves is not 
adequate to justify the infringement.138
 
The objective of the legislature can also easily be achieved by requiring the maturity test 
to determine the minor’s ability of accessing health care services which would result in 
less inroads to their health service rights. 139 Such an approach would prevent ‘frustration 
of a constitutional right when the minor is in fact emotionally and intellectually able to 
give informed consent to the procedure.’140  Thus, seeing that this approach has proved 
successful when it comes to a termination of pregnancy the limitation (and that the same 
approach is indirectly used in the Children’s Act when it comes to children consenting to 
an HIV test)-to borrow words from Carstens and Pearmain- ‘[i]n principle it is difficult to 
                                                 
138 Currie and de Waal above note 57 at 183. 
139 The more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the ground of justification 
must be. S v Bhulwana above note 92 at para 18. 
140Christian Lawyers  above note 22 at 517 
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see why the logic of Majapelo J in [Christian lawyers]… cannot be applied to most if not 
all health care services for minors’.141  
 
Having regard to the above there is a definite case to be made that the limitations placed 
on children’s health rights are not justifiable in an open and democratic society when the 
status approach is used. In S v M the Court noted that the ‘four great principles of the 
CRC which have become international currency, and as such guide all policy in South 
Africa in relation to children, are said to be survival, development, protection and 
participation’.142 Although the objectives of section 129 accords with the CRC’s 
principles of development, and protection of the child, such development and protection 
can also be advanced by respecting the autonomy of the child. Children’s need for 
protection must thus be balanced against their need to be regarded and treated as 
individuals.143
 
As long as these presumptions of incompetence exist without considering the individual 
development of the child then mature children’s right of access to health care services 
will always be frustrated in one way or another. So, to use the suggestion of  
Muthcherson ‘[a]ny change in the law’s treatment of young people in the healthcare 
context must start from the premise that children are not monolithic, meaning that all of 
                                                 
141 Carstens and Pearmain above note 116 at 108. 
142 S v M above note 27 at  para 17. 
143 B Clark (2001) THRHR 605 at 617.  
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those who are legally minors [and]… below the age of [12] should not be labelled 
immature, incapable, and decisionally dependent.’144  
                                                 
144 K Muthcherson (2005) Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy  251 at 258.  Retrieved 12 November 
2007, from Westlaw online database. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis concerned itself with health service rights and the children as right holder. 
Chapter 2 aimed to set out the entitlements and obligations created by health rights in 
section 27 and section 28(1)(c) the Constitution. The chapter highlighted the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on socio-economic rights in general and 
explored the interpretation of children’s health rights within the context of this 
particular jurisprudence.   
 
Chapter 3 and 4 probed further the guarantees of health service rights but aimed to 
illustrate that a right to access health care services entitles the right holder to more 
than mere geographic or financial access. ‘Access’ to health care services means 
having the ability to obtain such services and the ability to do so is not dependent only 
on financial or geographical factors. Chapter 3 and 4 served to illustrate how the issue 
of consent can also be a determining factor when it comes to the ability to access 
health care services. In chapter 3 the consent provisions of the new Children’s Act 
was considered and the relationship between these provisions and children’s health 
service rights highlighted. The chapter indicated that although the consent provisions 
in the Act go a long way in giving effect to the guarantees created by health service 
rights more, will still need to be done before children could experience the optimal 
enjoyment of their health service rights.  
 
Chapter 4 explored the issue of consent further and examined particularly the use of 
ages of consent in health provisions like the ones in the current Children’s Act. Ages 
of consent are commonly used as criteria to determine children’s ability to consent to 
medical treatment or surgery without parental or guardian assistance. This is the status 
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approach. In chapter 4 a hypothetical example was used to carry out a constitutional 
evaluation of the use of this approach against the general limitations clause. This was 
done so as to bring illustrate the effect that the status approach has on the ability of 
mature minors below the age of consent to access health care services. The conclusion 
reached in chapter 4 was that the use of the status approach limits the health service 
rights of children below the age of consent and that this limitation could not be 
justified in terms of the limitations clause. Although a court may come to a different 
conclusion to the one advanced in chapter 4 the crux of the chapter was to illustrate 
that there are arguments to be made against consent laws which prevent minors from 
adequately enjoying their health service rights and that the problem with these laws is 
that it fails to give adequate attention to the guarantees given to those children as 
owners of health service rights.  
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